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Nowadayes, as the early moderns were fond of saying, there’s no doubt 
that scholarship has gotten emotional— and this mood shows little sign 
of passing, if recent work is any indication. In both the sciences and 
humanities, countless scholars are now participating in the “affective 
turn,” an interdisciplinary movement that traces the social, psychological, 
and material contours of emotional experience, a subject long taken for 
granted in many corners of the modern academy.1
In literary and cultural scholarship of early modern England, the fruits 
of this research cluster are already apparent.2 Though there has long been 
interest in certain discrete areas of Renaissance emotional thought— 
such as attitudes toward grief, or the discourse of melancholy3— about 
a decade ago there began to emerge a body of work, marshaled by Gail 
Kern Paster’s Humoring the Body: Emotions and the Shakespearean Stage 
(2004) and her mutually edited (with Mary Floyd- Wilson and Katherine 
Rowe) collection Reading the Early Modern Passions: Essays in the Cul-
tural History of Emotion (2004), that sounded a new charge for emotion 
as an object of explicit historical study in the period.4 Grounded in a 
rigorously historicist treatment of Galenic humoral physiology— which 
envisioned a materially porous boundary between the environment and 
self— this scholarship seeks to “discover the phenomenological charac-
ter” of Renaissance affect, by imagining “the early modern embodiment 
of emotion in terms that challenge the post- Cartesian divisions between 
thought, soma, and world.”5 A boom of important scholarship followed 
in this mode, variously attending to the Galenic context of early modern 
emotion.6 Complementing the interest in humoralism, other historicist 
work on early modern emotion has taken a variety of forms: Robert 
Cockcroft, Wendy Olmsted, Lynn Enterline, and R. S. White consider 
Renaissance affect through the lens of the contemporary rhetorical tra-
dition; Susan C. Karant- Nunn, Joseph Campana, and Steven Mullaney 
explore the emotional consequences of the Reformation; and Daniel Juan 
Gil, Jennifer C. Vaught, and Cora Fox emphasize the relationship between 
literary works and the period’s changing emotional modes.7 Emotion, 
indeed, is pervasive in recent scholarship on the period: in 2015 alone, 
there emerged no fewer than nine new essay collections on emotion in the 
Renaissance.8
4 Introduction
Following suit, Emotion in the Tudor Court is an attempt to imagine 
the emotional world of the sixteenth- century English court.9 It is also 
an attempt to imagine how the workings of emotion more generally 
might prove valuable to the study of literature, history, and culture. Tex-
tual forms, in their capacity to record the textures of emotion, provide 
the spark for my imaginings. But Emotion in the Tudor Court doesn’t 
seek to historicize early modern discourses of emotion (like so much of 
the valuable work described above), nor to explore Renaissance emo-
tionality via the models of affect currently dominant in contemporary 
cultural studies.10 Instead, I mount in what follows three nested, escalat-
ing claims about the literary and historical study of emotion. A specific 
historical argument, about the role of emotion in the Tudor court, is 
developed in service of a broader, methodological argument about the 
manner of deploying emotion as a generalized analytical mode, itself 
serving a broader still disciplinary argument, about what aggregate 
model of emotion can best undergird this affective analysis for literary 
studies and cultural history. Taken together, these three arguments offer 
new direction for the study of emotion in the early modern period— with 
implications, I hope, for the study of emotion more broadly in the literary 
disciplines.
For the last several decades, historians of the early modern period have 
become increasingly devoted to a “socially derived understanding of 
Tudor politics.”11 This agenda, epitomized by Patrick Collinson’s now- 
famous cry for “an account of political processes which is also social,” 
has guided the efforts of many of the most prominent and influential 
scholars of sixteenth- century British history.12 Thanks to the efforts of 
David Starkey and many others, the great beneficiary of this trend has 
been the early modern court— which, as the amorphous, dynamic social 
core of interpersonal engagement between monarchs and their power- 
players, has been thought to unseat more public, formalized institutions 
like Parliament and the Privy Council as the “centre of political politics” 
in Tudor England.13 Though like- minded historians still fiercely debate 
just how such interaction should be assessed, there is nonetheless a grow-
ing consensus in current scholarship: in Tudor England, sociality was 
paramount to political power, and in Tudor England, the sociality of 
political power was most evident in the royal court.
In its historical mode, Emotion in the Tudor Court thus argues most 
basically that the operation of the Tudor courtly sphere, including its 
production of literary and cultural texts, is made fully comprehensible 
only by acknowledging the centrality of emotion to social and political 
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action. In the sixteenth- century court, I suggest more specifically, particu-
lar moments of political crisis generated sociotextual nodes that are best 
processed by tending to the dynamics of a particular governing emotion. 
In the chapters that follow, I examine the textual field surrounding such 
incidents— for example, the rise and fall of Cardinal Thomas Wolsey, or 
the Earl of Essex’s ill- fated rebellion— via the discourse of an operative 
emotion like disgust or dread. Accordingly, I treat the Tudor court as what 
Ann Cvetkovich valuably terms an “archive of feeling,” viewing its “cul-
tural texts as repositories of feelings and emotions, which are encoded 
not only in the content of the texts themselves but in the practices that 
surround their production and reception.”14
My historical claim finds contemporary support in the increasing sense 
among modern thinkers that many post- Enlightenment models of the 
rational political subject don’t give just due to the emotional components 
of politics.15 Perhaps most notably, Chantal Mouffe’s influential critique 
of the Habermasian tradition argues that a crucial “mistake of liberal 
rationalism is to ignore the affective dimension” of the political realm: 
the “prime task of democratic politics,” she advocates instead, “is not to 
eliminate passions nor to relegate them to the private sphere in order to 
render rational consensus possible, but to mobilise those passions towards 
the promotion of democratic designs.”16 Such work in political theory is 
complemented by research in contemporary neuroscience: the oft- cited 
Antonio Damasio has spent decades arguing for the intimate anatomical 
coupling of reasoning and emotional processes, while Jonathan Haidt has 
similarly refined a thesis that moral and political judgments owe as much 
to intuitive, emotional responses as to reasoned deliberation.17 Several 
mass- market books, such as Damasio’s Descartes’ Error: Emotion, Rea-
son, and the Human Brain (1994), The Feeling of What Happens: Body 
and Emotion in the Making of Consciousness (1999), and Looking for 
Spinoza: Joy, Sorrow, and the Feeling Brain (2003), as well as Haidt’s The 
Righteous Mind: Why Good People Are Divided by Politics and Religion 
(2012), have brought these theories to a nonspecialist audience, and there 
appears to be a growing interest in the emotional underpinnings of the 
“Political Brain,” which calls into question “intellectualist and delibera-
tionist models” of political analysis.18 This suspicion of the Habermasian 
“rational cognitive subject” dovetails with a common inclination of many 
post- structuralists, and theorists working on affect have similarly fore-
grounded the connection between emotions and politics; for example, 
John Protevi’s recent analysis of “affective cognition in social contexts” 
gives rise to a perspective he provocatively calls “political physiology.”19 
In fact, the affective turn has birthed a research cluster known as “public 
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feelings,” an interdisciplinary collective that attempts to correct “how the 
division between public and private spheres has problematically confined 
feelings and emotional life to the domain of the personal and private,” 
thus obscuring the important political stakes of emotionality.20
And though, as we will see, Emotion in the Tudor Court attempts to 
model a mode of affective analysis that is applicable to any domain of lit-
erary and cultural study, the political operation of the early modern court 
is an especially rich arena for emotional investigation. The “promise of 
affect theory,” in Donovan Schaefer’s formulation, is “the possibility of 
sliding together analytical tools used to pick apart both highly individu-
ated and highly social contact zones”— and, as a context in which the 
stakes of emotional life were unforgivingly interpersonal, the court is 
one such contact zone in which it is paramount to consider individuated 
and social experience jointly.21 Produced by men and women who are, 
by definition, some degree proximate to the center of political power, 
courtly literature particularly encodes the affective negotiation between 
the private and public spheres, in a way that reflects how many modern 
theorists understand the operation of emotion more generally. Indeed, 
current research in the affective sciences insists that the subjective experi-
ence of emotion is socially situated: the “social functions of emotions” 
are apparent across “the individual, dyadic, group, and cultural levels of 
analysis,” and it has recently been argued that, as a primary component 
of “relationship reconfiguration” strategy, emotions are fundamentally 
“designed to function in a social context.”22 As early as Petrarch and 
Salutati, in fact, early modern thinkers acknowledged the proximity of 
the social and emotional domains: for many in the Renaissance, Richard 
Strier has shown, “sociality and affectivity are seen as defining the human, 
and as inextricably linked.”23 The court is the social heart of Renaissance 
politics, and emotion is its lifeblood. Tending to emotion, I suggest, can 
freshly situate the social operation of the courtier within the social opera-
tion of the court, and can freshly illuminate the literary, cultural, and 
historical texts that are generated by this interplay.
My suggestion that understanding emotion is paramount to understand-
ing the Tudor court raises an immediate question: what critical method 
best facilitates this analysis? As we’ve seen above, recent work on Renais-
sance emotion has largely focused on how literature reflects and refracts 
early modern discourses of the emotional body, revealing how notions of 
the humors and passions dynamically shaped the relationship between 
early modern subjects and their natural world. But despite the certain 
value of this approach, there remains a sense in which its dominance has 
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obscured the larger possibilities of emotionality as a framework for liter-
ary, cultural, and historical analysis.
My methodological argument, then, entails reconceptualizing how we 
might study Renaissance emotionality, by looking beyond the historical 
phenomenology that has dominated the field. I posit emotion not only 
as a source of inquiry— that is, not only as a set of historical discourses 
to be analyzed and inhabited— but rather as the mode of inquiry itself, 
by leveraging the inherent affectivity of textual, social, and biographical 
data to uncover new sites of meaning and new channels of inspection. 
My primary aim is not to historicize the features of emotionality in early 
modern experience, but rather to use features of emotionality to histori-
cize early modern experience more broadly: I am concerned not so much 
with how early modern subjects understood a sentiment like disgust, 
but rather with how a wide engagement with models and discourses of 
disgust can inform our understanding of how they, and the texts they 
construct, participate in the Renaissance social world. A historicist recon-
struction of the Tudor court, grounded largely in archival data, provides 
the raw material of my analysis; sensitivity to the varied contours of 
emotion, as understood by a variety of discourses, is how that analysis 
proceeds.
For reasons explained above, this project is a treatment of emotion in 
the literature and politics of the sixteenth- century English court. But its 
methodological approach is portable, and it is my hope that this form of 
affective analysis, and the more specific discourses of emotion I explore 
throughout, will be of value to other studies in both the Renaissance 
and beyond. “Affect,” Brian Massumi argues, “like thought or reflection, 
could be extended to any or every level” of analysis— and indeed, much 
like ideology, emotion is implicated in every feature of human engage-
ment.24 As collective theoretical effort proceeds, it is my hope that we will 
continue to speak more regularly of performing an “affective” reading 
of text and culture. Rather than historicizing emotion as an end in itself, 
Emotion in the Tudor Court is committed to performing such broader 
analysis of the Tudor court and its productions.
I have claimed that emotion is crucial to understanding literary and polit-
ical interaction in the Tudor court, and I have claimed that scholars of 
both the Renaissance and other fields might benefit from treating emotion 
not as an object, but as a method of analysis. But a final question remains: 
how should we develop our understanding of emotion?
In response, my disciplinary argument is that those of us working in the 
humanities can benefit from pursuing a model of emotion that is deeply 
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informed by the current, ongoing research programs of the social and 
natural sciences.25 On some level, this should be uncontroversial. Few, I 
think, would bristle at the notion that there’s something to be gained by 
cross- field interaction, which is already integrated into the conceptual 
architecture of much contemporary scholarship— and more specifically, as 
we’ll see below, cognitive studies of the early modern period (a lineage in 
which Emotion in the Tudor Court is generally enrolled) routinely anchor 
their analysis in scientific approaches. But the precise treatment of literary 
emotion has been thornier. In theory, inquiry into humoral subjectivity 
indeed “uses cognitive theory in a historicist context,” and it is true that 
treatments of emotion and affect in literary studies are sometimes pep-
pered with references to the prominent work of scientists like Damasio, 
Joseph LeDoux, Paul Ekman, and Richard Dawkins.26 But in practice, it 
seems to me that the routinely effusive claims of interdisciplinarity often 
mask an engagement with other fields that remains underdeveloped. 
(The work of Lalita Pandit Hogan and Patrick Colm Hogan is a crucial 
exception.)27 As Constantina Papoulias and Felicity Callard sharply note, 
the limited scope of affect studies’ scientific borrowings necessarily risks 
reductive and distorted conclusions, while such interdisciplinary maneu-
vers may ultimately be little more than rhetorical gestures.28 In fact, Ruth 
Leys reveals, some literary and cultural studies of affect have stumbled 
into their own version of the vulgar New Historicist anecdote— in which 
a particular empirical study or concept, often decontextualized and 
misrepresented, is made to bear the burden of a theoretical argument 
surpassing its capacity to be responsibly supported.29
A more thoroughly interdisciplinary approach, in the manner that I’m 
advocating, requires a more thorough effort to engage other fields in their 
own terms— acknowledging, of course, that our status as disciplinary 
tourists will inevitably shape our encounters there, and will help select 
the souvenirs we take home. As such, this book converses widely with a 
variety of other disciplines, since the promise of interdisciplinarity can-
not be realized by casual glances at other fields. But more specifically, the 
project’s interdisciplinary approach is premised on the fact that contem-
porary scientific discourses of emotion— rooted, as they are, in our very 
specific historical, cultural, and epistemological moment— can reach back 
some 400 years into the past, to tell us something nontrivial about the 
early modern world. This conviction does not, it must be said, oblige us 
to lazily essentialize or universalize emotion, or to slip into naive anach-
ronism: a compelling body of evidence, as we will see below, suggests 
that it is still possible to find currents of transhistorical and transcultural 
continuity in the culturally inflected experience of human emotion, and it 
Introduction 9
is possible to use these currents to seek new ground in the study of histori-
cally situated phenomena.
In some instances, scientific models of emotion lead me to conclusions 
that might otherwise be derived independently from humanistic methods, 
a feature that suggests the proximity between fields that are often seen 
as professionally and intellectually disparate. I would never claim that 
scientific approaches are the only way to generate every textual reading 
in this book— and indeed, part of my aim is to demonstrate how the sci-
ences can offer corroborating evidence for the kind of work we’re already 
doing in the humanities. In this sense, Emotion in the Tudor Court partly 
resembles what has been termed “correlational criticism”— that which 
is “often the initial phase of a new theoretical approach to literary anal-
ysis.”30 But more often, I think we’ll find, such scientific models offer 
complementary knowledge that helps enrich and extend the discoveries 
of our own and related fields. To wield the sharpest possible critical tool, 
it seems sensible to integrate this perspective into our interrogation of 
early modern emotionality— and indeed, the editors of Reading the Early 
Modern Passions acknowledge that “empirical science and cultural stud-
ies ought to create more space for each other in their conceptual nesting 
grounds.”31 I very much agree, and in this sense my project aligns with the 
vital comparativist work of Patrick Colm Hogan— a program thoroughly 
grounded in contemporary scientific research— whose transparently titled 
What Literature Teaches Us about Emotion (2011) has recently argued 
that “literature provides a vast and largely unexplored body of data for 
emotion research” in the sciences.32 I concur that the science of emotion 
and literary/historical analysis should be better friends, and in its disci-
plinary argument, this book attempts to nurture such a relationship.
In advocating this method, my project broadly attempts to advance a 
new position in the larger, longer critical conversation about how literary 
scholars engage with the past. When a previous generation of thinkers— 
the so- called old historicists— glanced backward, they found a human 
subjectivity that looked suspiciously like their own; “what those scholars 
lacked,” Gail Kern Paster reflects, “was our theorized notion of the inte-
rior historicity of the subject.”33 New Historicism, of course, changed all 
of that. Seeking instead a history that is radically alien, New Historicist 
and cultural materialist scholars actively sought in their work “a stub-
born, unassimilable otherness, a sense of distance and difference”; finding 
little in early modern subjects that recalled our contemporary sense of 
autonomous interiority, they convincingly urged us to “resist speciously 
imputing modern assumptions about ‘the self’ to a historically distant 
culture.”34 Reflecting “the post- 1980 fashion for theorising the body and 
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affect, and the post- 1990 fashion for inventing fresh paradigms for his-
toricising subjectivity,” the recent turn to Galenic humoralism in early 
modern studies is, most fundamentally, an inheritor of this legacy.35 To be 
sure, humoralism is not merely a manifestation of New Historicism; the 
previous generation of historicists, it has been argued, “shared a suspicion 
of emotions as calculated constructions of power,” and recent scholars of 
emotion and affect are more rightly thought to focus on “physiocultural 
rather than sociocultural formations.”36 But the fact remains that, rooted 
as it is in New Historicism, the historical phenomenology of the schol-
arship described above has been fundamentally committed to honoring 
temporal distance: it emphasizes “historical differences in modes of emo-
tional self- experience” by reconstructing “how emotions might have been 
experienced differently by early modern subjects.”37
My project, however, takes a very different approach. In applying the 
insights of the modern sciences to historical phenomena, my aim is not 
to affirm the subjective continuity of past and present: I acknowledge 
absolutely that emotions have a history, that understandings of emotion 
change over time, and that cultural forces crucially shape how emotions 
are experienced. But I am equally uninterested in defamiliarizing the past 
beyond recognition. Instead, I attempt to employ intellectual frameworks 
anchored in modern understandings to account for the historically situ-
ated conditions of early modern culture, always with the knowledge that 
such understandings might help us make sense of, but distinctly do not 
determine, the experience of past subjects. In such, I am aligned with 
the more recent position of Paster herself— who, having “come to believe 
[that] basic human emotions are fundamentally trans- historical and 
trans- cultural,” now suggests employing “a heuristics of similarity, even 
perhaps of sameness” in the study of early modern emotional life.38 Mod-
ern theories of emotion offer a guide to thinking about historical affect, 
but it is not one contingent on absolute congruence between temporal 
moments. In the moment of New Historicism’s rising ascendancy, Jean 
E. Howard wisely observed that “a phenomenon in one period, which 
seems analogous to a phenomenon in another, may arise amid such dif-
ferent social conditions and play such a different role in a culture’s power 
relations and discursive systems that the two phenomena cannot be seen 
as continuous with one another.”39 A historicist practice like the one I’m 
advocating makes space to acknowledge the messy interplay of phenom-
enal analogy, a unique opportunity to examine both points of contact 
and points of divergence between our world and those worlds of the 
past— honoring, as Paster again puts it, “the productive spaces between 
sameness and difference.”40
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Finally, it is important to note that engaging the sciences in the manner 
I’m suggesting need not entail any epistemological commitments— there 
is intellectual benefit whether or not one assents to the objectivity of 
their methods and findings. Whatever one’s disposition, the sciences (to 
borrow a famous phrase) can be good to think with: such research on 
emotion, I find, helps me see new things about early modern literature 
and culture, and is for that reason worthy of attention.41 Hedging on the 
truth value also alleviates the consequences attached to the mistakes and 
misunderstandings that inevitably creep into interdisciplinary translation. 
I am not a trained scientist, or a trained historian, and I will undoubtedly 
err in my attempts at disciplinary crossing. But by making a good faith 
effort to engage other fields in their own terms, and by seeking in them 
not answers, but new ways of questioning, even such missteps can be 
ultimately productive.
These three arguments guide my study of emotion in the Tudor court. 
They do, however, require some further justification, especially insofar 
as the project embraces the insights of the modern sciences: with good 
reason, literary and cultural studies tend to be skeptical about the trans-
historical and transcultural investments of much scientific discourse. It is 
now long ago that critical theory dismissed ideas of human essentialism 
as “vacuous and untenable”— and in Renaissance studies more specifi-
cally, the emerging practitioners of the New Historicism were quickly 
associated with a shared conviction that “there is no transhistorical or 
universal human essence and that human subjectivity is constructed by 
cultural codes which position and limit all of us.”42 It is thus an important 
question to ask: given what we know about the social construction of 
reality, how are the empirical findings of the sciences compatible with the 
analysis of historically and culturally contingent phenomena?
Vulgar determinism and essentialism are rightly rejected by modern 
scholars. But “in their laudable attempt to ward off one type of reduction-
ism,” William E. Connolly suggests, “too many cultural theorists fall into 
another”— an alternate reductionism “that ignores how biology is mixed 
into thinking and culture and how other aspects of nature are folded into 
both.”43 An adequate theory of lived experience can’t neglect the interac-
tion of biological and cultural phenomena; what’s needed, as Catherine 
Belsey has recently argued, is to account for how “the biology that con-
stitutes human beings always interacts with the relatively autonomous 
culture their evolved brains make possible.”44 In this spirit, John Dupré 
advocates for a pluralism that “draws both on the empirical knowledge 
derivable from the (various) sciences, and on the wisdom and insight into 
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human nature that can be derived from more humanistic studies.”45 F. 
Elizabeth Hart, more specifically, imagines such a framework integrating 
both biological and cultural elements, a “third epistemological position 
nestled between the polar extremes of realism and relativism”:
a third position that effectively reshapes their relations from a binary 
structure to an epistemological continuum on which realist and 
relativist positions occupy opposite— but not all- encompassing— 
ends. This third position is actually a set of positions that together 
define the continuum connecting its two ends, positions that mani-
fest varying degrees of combinatory possibilities of both realism 
and relativism but that do not have to fully commit to either.46
Despite skewing, quite naturally, toward one end or the other of Hart’s 
continuum, scholars working on the nature/culture divide have been 
increasingly vocal in advocating for such a flexible third position— 
whether it is called “soft essentialism,”47 weak constructionism (including 
“weak biological constructionism” and “weak social constructionism”),48 
“constrained constructivism,”49 or “componential compatibilism.”50
“Far from being inconsistent with post- structuralist thought,” Ellen 
Spolsky importantly argues, the “assumptions that emerge from the study 
of evolved human brains in their successive contexts” can actually work 
to “extend and enrich it”— and indeed, the work of her colleagues in cog-
nitive and evolutionary literary studies have led the way in this regard.51 
For though scholars in the humanities (and social sciences) once seemed 
“so afraid of being labeled essentialist, reductionist, or biological,” the 
game is starting to change: as Paul Cefalu and Bryan Reynolds recently 
observed, a growing number of “literary critics are now participating in 
the cognitive revolution, partly because some of the seeming bogeys like 
universalism, essentialism, and eliminative materialism have been shorn 
of their odious sociobiological implications.”52 Though this trend is evi-
dent throughout the discipline— and here Patrick Colm Hogan was also 
a vanguard— it has a particular concentration in early modern studies, 
where scholars like Amy Cook, Mary Thomas Crane, Arthur Kinney, and 
Evelyn Tribble have made groundbreaking contributions to our under-
standing of literary cognition.53
And most crucially of all, this third epistemological position is gaining 
particular ground in the study of emotionality, as scholars from across 
disciplinary lines increasingly argue that emotions are neither “strictly 
biological or chemical occurrences” nor “wholly created by language and 
society”: though having a clear “neurological basis,” they are still crucially 
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“shaped, repressed, expressed differently from place to place and era to 
era.”54 In 2012 William A. Mason and John P. Capitanio observed that, 
although “opinions continue to differ among emotion theorists about 
the relative contributions of biology and experience to the expression 
of emotions, a consensus seems to be building that both factors must 
be included in an integrated theory of emotional expression.”55 This is 
a sound way to account for the wealth of emerging data, which suggest 
both “undeniable variability and irrefutable evidence of consistencies in 
emotional responses across situations, individuals, and cultures.”56 The 
philosopher John Protevi, for example, offers one intriguing model for 
thinking through this “interface of somatic and social”:
We can accommodate universal patterns of basic emotions, which 
although not genetically determined, do reliably develop from our 
shared genetic makeup, given minimally shared developmental con-
texts, such as some form of providing nutrition and care. I think we 
can satisfy the social constructivists, however, by noting that the 
thresholds and triggers of these basic emotional patterns develop 
during the singular contacts of unique somatic endowments and 
complex socialization practices, as do the patterns, thresholds, and 
triggers of higher emotions. These socialization practices instill 
“emotion scripts” that indicate culturally specific forms of accept-
able performance of emotions.57
In a different discipline, the spirit of this formulation is echoed by Jona-
than H. Turner and Jan E. Stets, both sociologists of emotion:
People occupy positions in social structures and play roles guided 
by cultural scripts. They are able to do so because of their cognitive 
capacities to perceive and appraise the situation (its structure and 
culture), themselves (as objects), others, and their own physiologi-
cal responses. Emotions are ultimately aroused by the activation of 
body systems. This arousal generally comes from cognitive apprais-
als of self in relation to others, social structure, and culture. Once 
activated, emotions will be constrained by cognitive processes and 
culture.58
These formulations, of course, are just two of many advanced by scholars 
of emotion, but are representative of the growing transdisciplinary com-
mitment to collapse the traditional nature/culture binary. It is to this end 
that Simon Clarke promotes “an interdisciplinary perspective in the study 
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of emotions which has elements of sociology, social constructionism, 
interactionism, and psychoanalysis and addresses issues such as social 
action, agency, gender, and the embodiment of the emotions”— but, most 
crucially, doesn’t “wholly [discount] elements of biology or the social.”59
There is little doubt in my mind that emotions are the dual products of 
biological and social construction. This categorical hybridity, I argue, is 
what fundamentally underwrites the emotional power of literature itself, 
which transcends time and place to affect us. Literary emotion, it seems 
to me, so often evokes the sense of meeting a familiar stranger: the rage 
of Achilles, the envy of Iago, and the indifference of Bartleby resist full 
assimilation into our contemporary modes of emotional knowing, yet 
still demand to be acknowledged as kin to something in ourselves. As 
such, models from the sciences guide, but do not command, my search 
for literary and historical feeling. In developing this approach over the 
years, I have encountered (exceptionally smart) scholars of historical 
emotion that soundly reject the premise on which my work is founded. 
And indeed, a reader committed absolutely to the position that modern 
understandings have nothing to tell us about the emotions of the past is 
not likely to be satisfied by the book that follows. But scholarly disagree-
ment is the sign of a healthy field. I can only say that I am convinced 
that the particular form of interdisciplinarity outlined above does gener-
ate valuable insights into this most interdisciplinary of phenomena. The 
method that I’m advocating is certainly not the only way to approach the 
study of early modern emotions— but it is one, I hope will become appar-
ent as the chapters unfold, that does offer many virtues.
In four chapters, Emotion in the Tudor Court tries to account for the oper-
ation of some prominent courtly emotions in sixteenth- century England. 
Beginning with the early reign of King Henry VIII, chapter 1 considers the 
literary portrayal of Cardinal Thomas Wolsey, the much- hated alter rex 
who gripped English politics for nearly two decades. I argue that contem-
porary slanders and satires of Wolsey, insistent in their images of illness, 
appetite, and intrusion, are animated by a core notion of disgust, a primal 
response through which the cardinal is cast as a physical and social blight 
contaminating both King Henry and the commonweal. Despite Wolsey’s 
profound role in shaping his early reign, King Henry ultimately fulfills 
the trajectory of disgust anticipated by the poets, diagnosing the now- 
abject cardinal as a foreign pathogen and purging him from the symbolic 
body of the court. Chapter 2 explores the life and art of Henry How-
ard, Earl of Surrey, a young man who, from atop the pinnacle of the 
Henrician court hierarchy, produced some of the period’s greatest literary 
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achievements— but whose short, volatile life never fulfilled the promise of 
its aristocratic upbringing. I argue that Surrey’s courtly experience is best 
understood through the dynamics of envy, an emotion that not only col-
ored his celebrated friendship with King Henry’s illegitimate son (Henry 
Fitzroy, Duke of Richmond), but also ultimately underwrote the terms of 
his destruction, just weeks before King Henry’s own demise.
The book’s second half is devoted to the court of Henry’s most famous 
daughter. Turning to the earlier reign of Queen Elizabeth I, chapter 3 
considers the techniques through which Robert Dudley, Earl of Leicester 
(famed Elizabethan courtier par excellence) and his nephew Sir Philip Sid-
ney (the equally famed shepherd knight), managed courtly rejection, by 
converting the sting of political failure into a source of affective solidar-
ity. In the 1570s, I argue, the discontented Leicester party utilized a series 
of pageants and entertainments, ostensibly designed for royal flattery, to 
tacitly imagine a liberating community of outlaw courtiers. By finding 
emotional strength in mutual opposition, their strategy reveals the social 
and psychic advantages of performing one’s incompatibility with official 
crown policy, even under the guise of endorsing it. The project concludes 
by considering what is perhaps the most memorable event of the Tudor 
dynasty’s final years: the infamous, stillborn rising of Robert Devereux, 
Earl of Essex, and his followers in February 1601. Chapter 4 argues that 
the political experience of Elizabeth’s final decade, in which anxiety over 
the aging queen, the unsettled succession, and unrest at home and abroad 
transformed the court into a factional battleground, was marked by an 
atmosphere of dread— a flexible term, in early modern usage, that could 
attach to both a terrified subject and the object that terrifies it, and that 
reflects the affective ambivalence between Elizabeth’s courtiers and their 
own dread sovereign. In literary and cultural texts associated with Essex, 
members of his circle attempt to find political mastery in the affective 
mode of dread, a mode the crown desperately wished to keep as its own 
prerogative. The struggle for the Elizabethan court in the 1590s was a 
struggle to control the definition of dread, and was one in which Essex 
and many of his followers would finally pay a dreadful price.
The emotions I consider— disgust, envy, rejection, and dread— proved 
elemental to the affective atmosphere of the early modern court, and 
interrogating them in turn will help to situate moments of literary and 
historical interest within it. It is important to note, however, that while 
this book’s early modern content is considered via the emotion I found to 
be most illuminating, the pairings are not indivisible; considering Wolsey, 
for example, through the lens of dread, or Essex through the lens of envy, 
would undoubtedly yield different and useful results. Indeed, though the 
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models of emotion here are necessarily bound to individual chapters, they 
are all ultimately scalable: I can imagine each forming the basis of its 
own full- length study of the Tudor court, as there undoubtedly would be 
value in exploring their operation more broadly in the period. My aim, 
however, is to consider a variety of approaches to emotion in the period, 
as a foundation for more focused studies in the future.
My presentation, most obviously and importantly, is chronological, as 
I proceed through major moments of courtly interest in the sixteenth cen-
tury. Other organizing factors also contribute to the overall design. The 
book’s movement from disgust (according to scholars, the most bodily 
of emotions) to dread (one considerably more metaphysical) is, in gen-
eral, a progression of increasing abstraction. And there is something of 
a birds- eye thematic narrative, as the era’s political rise of middle- class 
bureaucrats and newly made men provoked disgust and envy among 
many onlookers at Henry VIII’s court— the same types of men who 
would find themselves rejected by the too- shrewd- to- be- tractable Eliza-
beth, whose management of the realm in her final years ultimately left 
many courtiers in a perilous state of dread. But I wouldn’t want to push 
on this too hard: such a broad accounting is necessarily a casual one, and 
its explanatory value is accordingly so. Given the complexity of affec-
tive experience, macro- narratives of emotional change (transformation, 
development, rupture, etc.) are particularly vulnerable to oversimplifica-
tion and exaggeration, and it is crucial not to extrapolate too widely 
from one’s analytical frame. My aim is not to offer a rigid taxonomy 
of the court’s emotional modes, or to expose, in the manner famously 
envisioned by Raymond Williams, a sweeping structure of feeling that 
undergirds sixteenth- century England— tasks, I think, that risk obscuring 
the complexities of affective experience.
Two more notes on the project’s limitations. The first concerns the 
valence of the emotions I investigate: there is no doubt that this book 
overwhelmingly dwells on the negative, a feature that aligns it with the 
preexisting bias of current scholarship on early modern emotion. As 
noted above, a focus on grief and melancholy dominated the field prior 
to the “affective turn,” and Richard Strier rightly observes that even more 
recent work on emotion usually “presents the period in dark and dour 
terms.”60 This book offers no remedy— partly because the court, as a 
social arena dominated by the mechanics of competition and rivalry, was 
structurally primed to generate and amplify negative interpersonal feel-
ings. But this does not mean, of course, that courtly life was uniformly 
dour: it was also filled with love, with camaraderie, with enthusiasm, with 
pride, and such positive sentiments certainly deserve more attention than 
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they’ve garnered to date.61 Space prevents me from including a transitory 
chapter that considers the reigns of Edward VI and Mary I as a period 
of hope— in which soldiers on both sides of the post- Reformation battle-
field were marshaled by optimism for England’s religious future— though 
I hope to publish it shortly as a separate study. I am also coediting (with 
Cora Fox and Cassie Miura) an essay collection on positive affect in the 
early modern world, designed to help give a more complete accounting of 
emotional life in the Renaissance.
There is also a gender imbalance in the project’s subject matter. Though 
Queen Elizabeth figures prominently in the book’s second half, its focus 
ultimately settles on several of the prominent men whose courtly expe-
rience provides a nexus of literary and political interest. This is partly 
because of the inescapable realities of Tudor social organization— in 
which men, of course, had vastly unequal access to the center of political 
power— and partly because of the realities of the extant historical and 
literary record. But, again, this does not at all mean that the emotional 
life of courtly women was any less complicated than that of their male 
counterparts. While I have elsewhere explored some of the emotional 
dynamics of women’s manuscript circulation in the Henrician period, it is 
clear that this is an area that demands further study.62
These shortcomings, I hope, will be partly softened by what the book 
does offer. Most fundamentally, Emotion in the Tudor Court is interested 
in uniting archives of literary, historical, social, and biographical data to 
tell a few discrete stories about the affective world of the early modern 
courtly sphere. In what follows, I’ll try to demonstrate the value in telling 




The Disgusting Cardinal Thomas Wolsey
In 1544 the Flemish painter Cornelis Metsys produced an engraving of 
King Henry VIII, a man with three more years to live.1 (See the front cover 
of this book.) In the image, a modern commentator observes, the king’s 
appearance is “ravaged by a combination of overindulgence, disease, and 
ever- increasing suspicion of those around him”; this Henry resembles an 
old toad, perched with “shoulders hunched, his face bloated, his mouth 
pinched, and his wary eyes reduced to mere slits.”2 The king of Met-
sys’s portrait— and the king immortalized in history— bears little physical 
resemblance to the youthful Henry, whose beauty was sung in the courts 
of foreign princes:
And first of all, his Majesty is twenty- nine years old, and extremely 
handsome; nature could not have done more for him; he is much 
handsomer than any other sovereign in Christendom, a great deal 
handsomer than the King of France; very fair, and his whole frame 
admirably proportioned.3
Henry remained the stud of Christendom for the first half of his reign— a 
role more widely acknowledged of late, thanks not only to the work of his-
torians like David Starkey, but also to Jonathan Rhys Meyers’s portrayal of 
the king in Showtime’s popular television series The Tudors (2007– 2010).4
But Henry’s reign would have a second half, and age would not prove 
kind to him within it. At about the time of his infamous break with 
Rome, the king first complained of the “sore legge” that would increas-
ingly plague his life; when this ulcerated wound clogged in 1538, Henry 
was found “without speaking, black in the face, and in great danger,” and 
when the same occurred three years later, he was again “really thought to 
be in danger.”5 Though the king’s mobility was severely limited, his appe-
tite did not follow suit, and he soon swelled to infamous proportions. 
His condition in the final years is perhaps best indicated by an entry in 
20 Chapter 1
the postmortem inventory of the royal household: “Twoo Cheyres called 
trauewes” had been commissioned for the ailing Henry, “for the kinges 
Majestie to sitt in to be carried to and fro in his galleries and Chambres.”6 
The mighty King Henry VIII— who once, “placing his hand on his thigh,” 
had boasted to an Italian diplomat of what “a good calf” he had— spent 
his last days being “moved by engines and art rather than by nature,” the 
same leg unable to hoist his decaying body.7 Time, we know, ravages all, 
but Henry went less gracefully than most, and did so far more publicly.
But even back in Henry’s younger days, when the lusty king kept his 
vigor with a steady diet of hunting, harping, and hawking, his court was 
still home to— and indeed dominated by— an “unwieldy hulk of corrupted 
flesh bearing perilously [a] supple, powerful brain, a demoniac incandes-
cence of ambition and pride driving and lighting from within the bloating, 
rotting body.”8 This is how Garrett Mattingly assessed the life and career 
of Cardinal Thomas Wolsey, the lord chancellor and papal legate whose 
meteoric rise starting in 1509 was capped by an equally spectacular fall 
in 1529. During the years of his ascendancy, Wolsey extended his reach 
into virtually every facet of English monarchal politics— a political mas-
tery that was not unnoticed by contemporaries, for whom he eventually 
assumed the qualities of alter rex (“other king”).9 Having little of his 
father’s taste for bureaucratic tasks, the young King Henry left much of 
his realm’s daily operation to Wolsey, whose control of the Great Seal 
ensured that his own court at Hampton was in many ways an unmatched 
administrative and political center.
Nearly a century after his death, it is Wolsey who plays the villain role 
in Shakespeare’s King Henry VIII, a domineering royal minister whose 
arrogance and treachery pervade the first half of the play. (“The devil 
speed him!” exclaims his chief adversary, Edward, Duke of Buckingham, 
“No man’s pie is freed / From his ambitious finger.”)10 But Shakespeare’s 
depiction of a churlish, self- interested cardinal emerges from a pool of 
anti- Wolsey sentiment that had festered in England for nearly a century— 
and that has, despite some recent revisionist efforts, largely shaped the 
subsequent historical tradition.11 I begin my study of emotion in the 
Tudor court by considering one aspect of how this reputation was gen-
erated: the portrayal of Wolsey in Henrician literary culture. Ripe with 
images of gluttony and disease, contemporary satires of Wolsey— such as 
John Skelton’s Why Come Ye Nat to Courte?, William Roy and Jerome 
Barlowe’s Rede Me and Be Nott Wrothe, and a variety of anti- Wolsey 
ballads— are underwritten by the affective energy of disgust, a visceral 
response through which the cardinal is cast as a physical and spiritual 
contaminant, dangerously infecting both King Henry and his realm.
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In this chapter, I suggest that the dynamics of disgust, as articulated 
by modern researchers in the humanities and sciences, can help us situate 
Wolsey’s place in the Henrician imagination. As the governor of ingestion 
and rejection, disgust is a key force in the emotional arsenal that was 
fielded against Wolsey; as we will see, contemporary attacks insistently 
invoke the rhetoric of disgust in their attempts to discredit the cardinal 
and his political influence. Furthermore, this sentiment of disgust ulti-
mately guides the terms of Wolsey’s ruin: despite his profound role in 
shaping the first half of Henry’s reign— in which he is so fully incorpo-
rated into the body politic that he is often indistinguishable from the 
king— the cardinal is finally imagined as a sickness of the res publica, 
a disease that is only cured by purging him from the symbolic body of 
the court.
“From the Donge Carte”: The Rise of 
Cardinal Thomas Wolsey
“Cardynall wolsey,” so writes George Cavendish, the cardinal’s former 
gentleman usher and contemporary biographer, “was an honest poore 
mans Sonne borne in Ipsewiche with in the Countie of Suffolk.”12 Though 
few imagined that a butcher’s son would grow to become the most formi-
dable subject in England, Wolsey apparently showed a remarkable early 
promise: in 1486 he took his B.A. from Oxford at just fifteen years old, 
earning him the famous moniker “boy bachelor.” As he continued his 
studies, he advanced to fellow and eventually dean of his alma mater, 
Magdalen College; he then turned his attention to an ecclesiastical career, 
taking his first benefice in 1500 at Limington and gradually acquiring 
more over the next decade. After securing a position as royal chaplain to 
Henry VII (and aligning himself with Richard Fox, Bishop of Winchester), 
Wolsey made his ventures into the political realm, embarking on notable 
ambassadorial journeys to the Low Countries and Scotland in 1508.13
At the death of Henry VII, Wolsey was named almoner to the new 
king; by 1511, he was a fixture in Henry VIII’s council, starting the rise to 
power that would see, by the end of 1515, the butcher’s son named arch-
bishop of York, cardinal, and lord chancellor. As Cavendish records, King 
Henry, who lacked his father’s passion for bureaucracy, soon granted his 
cardinal the daily operation of the realm:
[Wolsey was happy] to disborden the kyng of so waytie a charge & 
troblesome busynes, puttyng the kyng in Comfort that he shall not 
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nede to spare any tyme of his pleasure for any busynes that shold 
necessary happen in the Councell as long as he beyng there hauyng 
the kynges auctorytie & commaundenment, doughted not to se all 
thynges sufficiently furnysshed & perfected.14
Wolsey gradually installed himself as head minister and proxy to the king, 
displacing the de facto series of conciliar checks that had developed in the 
first years of the new reign.15
The cardinal’s career enjoyed another crescendo in 1518: after a series 
of maneuverings, he was named papal legate a latere, making him Eng-
land’s foremost ecclesiastical authority.16 That year Wolsey also secured 
his greatest diplomatic coup to date: the Treaty of London, a pact in which 
Europe’s leading political players agreed to cease (at least temporarily) the 
nationalist conflicts that had for the last decade fractured the Christian 
world. Though Henry received nominal credit for the proceedings, Wolsey 
was widely acknowledged as the true architect; in the flattering words of 
Erasmus, it was the cardinal who “cemented with such close- knit treaties 
that peace which all the greatest monarchs had long desired.”17
Over the next decade, Wolsey would continue to guide English policy— 
especially as it concerned the ever- warring powers in Europe, whose 
enthusiasm for peace quickly waned. England forged ties first with Holy 
Roman Emperor Charles V (1521) before defecting to his rival Francis I 
of France (1525); with such flexible commitments, the cardinal hoped to 
keep Henry a player on the international scene, while blocking either of 
the superpowers from achieving real supremacy. At the same time, Wolsey 
was occupied with tending fires at home (such as widespread resentment 
of the levies that funded his foreign endeavors), and soon enough, matters 
foreign and domestic became perilously entwined, in a thread that would 
unravel the very fabric of Henrician court and culture.
That’s because sometime in the middle of the 1520s, King Henry had 
become enamored with a woman named Anne Boleyn.18 It is difficult to 
assess Wolsey’s initial role in the infamous scheme that soon unfolded; 
some contemporaries saw “the Cardinal as the cause . . . of the intended 
divorce,” while Cavendish claims that Wolsey made “perswasion to the 
contrarie. . . . vppon his knees” after learning of Henry’s plan to separate 
from Catherine of Aragon.19 Reluctant or not, however, the cardinal was 
to orchestrate this mission, and it was an inability to secure his mas-
ter’s wish that ultimately secured his own downfall. It does seem that 
he tried in earnest: Wolsey and his agents spent months canvassing pos-
sible grounds for the separation, and in May 1527 he convened a secret, 
exploratory trial at Westminster to adjudge the validity of the king’s 
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current marriage to Queen Catherine. (The famous point of contention 
concerned the young Catherine’s prior marriage to Prince Arthur Tudor, 
King Henry’s deceased older brother.) After initial arguments, on both 
the spiritual legality of the match and the validity of the papal bull that 
dispensed it, it became clear that Wolsey and Henry would have to look 
to Rome for satisfaction.
But conflict between Francis and Charles continued to ravage Europe, 
making it rather untimely for Pope Clement VII, caught in the cross-
fire, to pass judgment on so realm- shaking a matter. (To make matters 
worse, Queen Catherine was aunt to Charles V, whose imperial troops 
had seized Rome in the spring of 1527 and taken the pope into custody.) 
In 1528 the pope would eventually order Cardinal Lorenzo Campeggio 
to London, ostensibly armed with a commission to try the case within 
England— but Clement had no intention of allowing a judgment there, 
preferring instead that proceedings unfold within his own jurisdiction in 
Rome.20 After months of further legal maneuverings, the trial was finally 
convened at Blackfriars in May 1529; Campeggio successfully stalled the 
operation, leaving no choice but to nullify the current action and recon-
vene in Rome.21 Wolsey’s fate, it is often said, was sealed at this moment.
I will save the climax of the story for later in the chapter, as it belongs 
to a different, final phase of Wolsey’s career. The cardinal’s time at the 
top of fortune’s wheel was much longer than that at the bottom, and it 
was during his long ascendancy that he provoked the ire of so many of 
Henry’s subjects, both noble and common— including those with sharp 
tongues and sharp pens.22 In the decade preceding his downfall and death, 
the cardinal was a subject of considerable literary interest, figuring in a 
robust corpus of surviving satires and slanders. Collectively, these texts 
have been largely ignored by modern scholars, despite their tempting 
position at an intersection of literary and cultural concerns.
Writing Wolsey
The best known of the anti- Wolsey poems flow from the pen of John 
Skelton, tutor to Henry VIII and self- styled poet laureate of the English 
realm.23 Though he may have first assailed the cardinal in the allegorical 
interlude Magnyfycence (c. 1516– 19)24— in which a king is corrupted by 
his courtly minions— Skelton is most remembered for a trilogy of explicit 
poetic attacks against the cardinal in the early 1520s, setting much of 
the satirical agenda that would subsequently define sixteenth- century 
anti- Wolsey slander.25 The first salvo was the infamously opaque Speke, 
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Parott, a virtuoso performance that embeds a critique of Wolsey within a 
tapestry of linguistic fragments; often regarded as a masterpiece of Skel-
ton’s canon, the poem lampoons the cardinal on a variety of grounds, 
including his usurpation of royal authority and his lavish expenditures. 26 
Wolsey equally figures in Skelton’s Collyn Clout, a descendant of medi-
eval ecclesiastical satire; here, the cardinal epitomizes clerical negligence, 
an unchecked tyrant whose oppressive policies have left the common-
wealth both spiritually and financially bankrupt.27 Finally, Why Come Ye 
Nat to Courte? is perhaps the most direct of Skelton’s attacks; framed as 
a warning to the English nobility, the poem records the degradation of 
court culture under the base- born cardinal’s malevolent influence. Taken 
together, these three poems entail a major assault on Wolsey’s personal 
and political character— and as we will see, they do so in a surprisingly 
consistent affective mode.28
In addition to Skelton’s well- known corpus, attacks on Wolsey appear 
elsewhere in the records of Henrician literature. George Cavendish, 
Wolsey’s biographer, also penned a lesser- known poetic treatment of 
the cardinal; as part of his de casibus cycle of Henrician worthies, he 
conjures Wolsey’s doleful ghost, who laments the ruthless ambition that 
brought about his ruin.29 Equally interesting is what may be called the 
populist tradition of anti- Wolsey poems. At least two anonymous bal-
lads denounce the cardinal’s ruinous authority; “Of the Cardnall Wolse” 
(c. 1521) is cast as a direct complaint to King Henry himself, while “An 
Impeachment of Wolsey” (c. 1528) develops the cardinal’s unfavorable 
comparison with Thomas Becket into a prophecy of Wolsey’s inevitable 
fall.30 At the other end of the social spectrum is the anonymous courtly 
interlude Godly Queene Hester— a hybrid- morality drama that, in the 
spirit of Skelton’s Magnyfycence, attacks Wolsey directly in the guise of 
the treacherous advisor Aman.31
But perhaps the most elaborate anti- Wolsey invective is Rede Me and 
Be Nott Wrothe, a nearly 4,000- line salvo composed by the Lutheran 
exiles William Roy and Jerome Barlowe. Writing from Strassburg in 1527, 
the authors leave little unscathed in their treatment of England’s spiritual 
shortcomings; as the realm’s premier churchman, Wolsey is accordingly 
blasted throughout as the quintessential example of ecclesiastical corrup-
tion.32 This satire is most notable for its intricate paratextual structure: 
the complete edition consists of (1) a mock- display of Wolsey’s coat of 
arms, explicated in the accompanying stanzas; (2) a series of fictionalized 
letters between two would- be readers of the text, designed to obscure 
the poem’s true origin; (3) a prefatory dialogue between the author and 
the book, in which the personified text fears reprisal for its contents; (4) 
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an ironic lamentation, in which a Catholic clergyman mourns the recent 
death of the Mass; and (5) finally, the main satire itself, a two- part dia-
logue on all matters religious by a pair of simple serving men.33 This long, 
demanding text— smuggled secretly into England, to the ire of Wolsey 
and his agents— suggests again how easily the cardinal could serve as a 
flashpoint for extensive religious critique.
Such works comprise a dispersed, yet surprisingly consistent rejoinder 
to Wolsey’s stranglehold on Henrician politics. United in their appar-
ent disdain for the low- bred, ambitious cardinal, they inevitably return 
to Wolsey’s unseemly place in the contemporary political scene: he is 
painted as a base usurper, slowly poisoning the commonwealth with his 
unchecked, unmatched power. As such, I argue that these poetic satires 
and slanders are ultimately animated by a core response of disgust, the 
affective mode that dominated literary reaction to what might be called 
the “Wolsey crisis.” Disgust, to be sure, is often central to the generic oper-
ation of satire— which has, in the tradition of the ancients, long deployed 
scatological tropes in efforts to purge social ills.34 (Indeed, in emphasizing 
the connection between bodily and moral revulsion, modern scientific 
treatments of disgust offer much to elucidate the general psychological 
underpinnings of satiric conventionality.) But literary disgust for Wolsey, I 
suggest, cannot be satisfactorily attributed to mere convention: given the 
cardinal’s place in the Henrician social order, we will see how the emotion 
proves especially apt for denouncing Wolsey’s precise role as a noxious, 
foreign body infecting the English court. First, however, we must pause to 
consider what it means to be repulsed.
A Brief History of Disgust
Nowhere do the Henrician satirists employ the term “disgust,” a word 
that began its career in the English language at approximately the same 
time that Shakespeare was starting his as a playwright.35 Yet there is little 
doubt that the sentiment of disgust, as we would now describe it, was 
richly featured in early modern life, and the basic condition that evokes 
it— “matter out of place,” in anthropologist Mary Douglas’s memorable 
phrase— was of obvious interest to a culture so invested in the manage-
ment of social, political, and spiritual hierarchies.36
Since Darwin’s pioneering work on emotional expression, disgust 
has been considered a core emotion of human experience; disgust elici-
tors in a cross- cultural context37 reliably predict a stereotypical set of 
responses, including facial behavior,38 physiological changes,39 and 
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neuro- anatomical activation.40 Yet disgust has long been an undertheo-
rized emotion, and has become subject to serious investigation only in the 
last several decades.41 Since then, new contributions to the literature on 
disgust have been published every year, and the emotion has occasioned 
several recent full- length treatments indebted to theories from both the 
sciences and humanities.42
At its core, disgust is an emotion about food— or, to be more precise, 
spoiled food. It is an emotion about vomit, about nausea, about nox-
ious, putrid smells; it is about how we know what we can eat, and how 
we know what we cannot. In evolutionary terms, natural selection obvi-
ously favored those organisms with higher avoidance tendencies toward 
spoiled or rotten food, and it’s likely that this safeguard was internalized 
into the disgust response during the long process of human development. 
In fact, disgust’s basic, biological response is so integrated into human 
adaptive behavior that some theorists question whether it is an emotion 
at all— it might be closer, they suggest, to a motivational state like thirst 
or hunger.43
Food and its rejection have long been recognized as central to the oper-
ation of the disgust response, since Darwin’s initial investigation in The 
Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals.44 In the early twenti-
eth century, A. Angyal confirmed that fear of “oral incorporation” was 
disgust’s fundamental motivation, and in subsequent decades researchers 
have largely agreed that the primary domain of disgust was the mouth, 
the site of both ingestion and vomit.45 In a foundational article of mod-
ern research, Paul Rozin and April E. Fallon offer a concise definition of 
“disgust as a food- related emotion”: the feeling of disgust, they suggest, 
entails “revulsion at the prospect of (oral) incorporation of an offensive 
object. The offensive objects are contaminants; that is, if they even briefly 
contact an acceptable food, they tend to render that food unacceptable.”46 
As subsequent research has confirmed, food- aversion behavior seems 
the fundamental component of disgust’s physiological response, which 
includes, most centrally, the induction of nausea.47 The emotion is, in 
other words, the “guardian of the mouth”— that which crucially prevents 
us from incorporating infectious or dangerous substances.48
Yet disgust is also an emotion about much more than food: it is an 
emotion about blood, about pus, about excrement, about wounds, about 
corpses. Despite the theoretical foundation outlined above, it is clear that 
issues of oral incorporation alone cannot account fully for the phenom-
enology of disgust, which occurs in many circumstances that have little to 
do with food or orality. Accordingly, investigators have located a variety 
of domains in which disgust triggers can be identified, radiating outward 
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from the emotion’s origins as an oral defense. Unsurprisingly, many of 
these domains continue to constellate around the issue of contamination, 
but the conceptualization of this contamination becomes increasingly 
abstract as we travel further out on the spectrum from disgust’s original 
purview. In an influential essay, Jonathan Haidt, Clark McCauley, and 
Paul Rozin introduced the “Disgust Scale,” an articulation of the emo-
tion’s forms across a series of discrete domains.49 Their research suggests 
that disgust elicitors can be broadly categorized into two tiers. The first 
set, elicitors of core disgust, attends to the emotion’s origins in orality: 
when we are disgusted by food, bodily products, or animals (particularly 
organisms associated with food or excrement, such as maggots, cock-
roaches, or rats), we are experiencing a visceral, somatic warning against 
oral incorporation. In evolutionary terms, these foundational elicitors 
originate as an oral prophylactic for a “species living with the constant 
threat of microbial contamination.”50
Alternately, the second set of disgust elicitors has little to do with oral-
ity. In a process of cultural evolution, core disgust seems to have enlarged 
its purview, adapting to regulate matters of sex, hygiene, the body enve-
lope (i.e., the physical integrity of the human body), and death. These 
domains, the researchers suggest, have in common their ability to remind 
human beings of their fundamentally animal origins— and as such, this 
category of animal- reminder disgust serves an important cultural func-
tion, as a “defensive emotion that guards us against the recognition of our 
animality.” They continue:
Humans cannot escape the evidence of their animal nature. In every 
society people must eat, excrete, and have sex. They bleed when 
cut, and ultimately they die and decompose. We propose that most 
cultures have found ways to “humanize” these activities, through 
rituals, customs, and taboos that serve to differentiate humans from 
animals. People who violate their local food and sex taboos risk 
being shunned and reviled by their peers, and in many cultures they 
are labeled as “animals.”
Because of the human need to distinguish ourselves from mere animals— to 
insist that our lives have a higher meaning, and perhaps even extend 
beyond death— we have evolved an emotional mechanism that discour-
ages us from engaging that in the world which suggests the opposite.51
To be sure, the disgust domains outlined here are not exhaustive; in 
their recent revision of the disgust scale, Bunmi O. Olatunji and col-
leagues have suggested adding contamination as a third category of 
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disgust elicitors, while other researchers have advanced an entirely differ-
ent taxonomy, around the categories of pathogen avoidance, mate choice, 
and social interaction.52 But the consensus is that disgust is an emotion 
of avoidance, by which we attempt to limit our exposure to those objects 
that may endanger us, either with the physical threat of illness or with 
the existential threat of confronting our own material nature.53 Taken 
wholly, this entails the basic notion of “pure disgust,” the feeling of dis-
gust “devoid of moral connotations.”54
But more challenging, and more pertinent to our analysis of literature, 
history, and culture, are the instances in which disgust seems occasioned 
by violations of the moral order— or does, at least, according to ordinary 
language. Some researchers have claimed that the lay sense of “moral” 
disgust is, strictly speaking, a linguistic slippage: that is, when we claim 
to be disgusted by an act of racism, for example, we are really just mis-
labeling the experience of anger.55 Yet there is compelling evidence that 
suggests the deep connection between the visceral, embodied experience 
of pure disgust and the so- called disgust that is elicited by sociomoral 
transgressions. While the elicitors of this sociomoral disgust are shaped 
by culturally specific variation,56 the semantic congruence of disgust’s vis-
ceral and sociomoral forms occurs across a wide linguistic range: we can 
point to examples from the Indo- European, Afroasiatic, and Sino- Tibetan 
language families in which a single word signifies both eruptions of the 
stomach and eruptions of the social order.57 As the guardian of social 
contamination, sociomoral disgust is a culturally inflected elaboration of 
core disgust’s biological purview.58
In her groundbreaking study of purity regulations, Douglas tentatively 
explored “the relations between pollution and morals”— but it is the 
modern research tradition that fully articulates the deep linkage between 
visceral and moral disgust, and it is this tradition that helps to account 
for their dual operation in anti- Wolsey satire.59 That sociomoral infrac-
tions elicit a genuine disgust response— sometimes called the “moral 
dyspepsia” thesis— has received ample substantiation in the laboratory 
setting.60 The recent work of Gary D. Sherman and his colleagues reveals 
that viewing morally offensive images predicts the same somato- visceral 
responses typically associated with food- based, core disgust. That morally 
objectionable content should elicit the tightening of the throat and quea-
siness in the chest and stomach— involuntary behaviors poised to block 
the ingestion of offensive food, and, if necessary, expel it— suggests the 
deep continuity between the biological origins of disgust and its cultur-
ally conditioned adaptations.61 The hypothesis is further substantiated by 
Edward B. Royzman and his colleagues, who find that laboratory subjects 
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asked to imagine an act of consensual sibling incest still experience a state 
of “oral inhibition,” consisting of nausea, gagging, and diminishing of the 
appetite.62 That the orality of the disgust response adheres in such moral 
examples suggests that these emotional elaborations are mapped across 
a spectrum. To this point, neurological research indicates that both pure 
and moralized disgust responses are underpinned by a similar anatomi-
cal architecture: functional MRI reveals that both domains “recruited 
remarkably overlapping neural substrates” in the medial and lateral orbi-
tofrontal cortex.63
The evidence, it follows, suggests that humans have evolved a “pri-
mary” disgust system as a biological safeguard, which became elaborated 
in a set of culturally and historically determined “complex” forms.64 In its 
complex form, moral disgust guards not the human body, but the human 
soul: it is that which involves “the protection of the self as a spiritual 
entity from degrading and polluting influences,” as articulated within a 
particular cultural context.65 Charged with “the protection of the soul or 
the world from degradation and spiritual defilement,” moral disgust thus 
keeps vigil over “regulative concepts such as sacred order, natural order, 
tradition, sanctity, sin, and pollution,” just as disgust in its core form 
stands watch over the literal violation of our material self.66 The transi-
tion from disgust’s role as guardian of the body to guardian of sociomoral 
conventions seems to be an example of what evolutionary theorists call 
“exaptation,” the process by which an organism’s fitness is enhanced 
by features serving a purpose other than that for which they were evo-
lutionarily built.67 In its primary form, the emotion of disgust helps us 
determine what sorts of (material) things we should allow within our 
physical body; in its extended, culturally elaborated form, it helps social 
groups collectively determine what sort of (behavioral) things should be 
allowed within their symbolic body. Or, as Jonathan Haidt and his col-
leagues aptly put it: disgust, having “evolved to help our omnivorous 
species figure out what to eat in the physical world, now helps our social 
species figure out what to do in the cultural world.”68
Unsurprisingly, then, disgust is an emotion particularly implicated in 
the production of automatic, affective moral judgment. In fact, we can 
even go so far, as has been recently argued, to label the response of dis-
gust as an “embodied moral judgment”: there is a “causal relationship 
between feelings of physical disgust and moral condemnation,” and the 
emotion’s visceral activation makes it particularly suited to influence cog-
nitive processes.69 This connection has been confirmed in the laboratory, 
where individuals who have been primed with disgust elicitors have been 
shown to appraise moral situations more severely.70 This is not at all, of 
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course, to imply that disgust ought to be a criterion of moral assessment; 
the interaction of politics, morality, and disgust is incredibly fraught, as 
evidenced by any number of contemporary debates in the public sphere, 
and there is no doubt that the rhetoric of disgust has been routinely 
invoked to justify any number of discriminatory and dehumanizing prac-
tices, such as prohibitions against miscegenation or same- sex marriage.71 
And dehumanizing is indeed a key term, because “disgust in humans 
serves as an ethnic or outgroup marker” that establishes “a social bond or 
attraction that distinguishes the ingroup from outgroups”— a distinction, 
in its most extreme iteration, that leads to the denial of interiority, sub-
jectivity, and sociality to the target subject or outgroup.72 “When people 
fail to take the perspective of dehumanized targets,” it has been suggested, 
“they feel disgust, a strictly negative emotion often linked to perceived 
moral violations and subsequent aggressive responses”— and indeed, 
these dehumanized targets elicit activity in neural structures associated 
with disgust (the insula and amygdala), but not in the medial prefrontal 
cortex, the “brain region reliably implicated in mentalizing and social 
cognition.”73 In other words, the dehumanized disgust target does not 
register as worthy (or perhaps even possible) of social intercourse. This 
is hardly pleasant stuff— but current thinking suggests that, whether we 
like it or not, the moral politics of disgust is an issue with which we must 
contend, as did those in the early modern period.
The term “disgust”— a cognate of the Italian disgusto and French des-
goust, derived ultimately from the Latin gustus (taste)— came into the 
English language at the close of the sixteenth century; the earliest printed 
appearance that I’ve located occurs in John Florio’s Italian dictionary A 
Worlde of Words (1598). Florio’s translation reveals the semantic con-
gruence of disgust’s visceral and sociomoral forms: the Italian disgusto/
sgusto is rendered with the English cluster “disgust, distast, vnkindnes, 
dislike.”74 This dual usage is confirmed in Randle Cotgrave’s A Dictionary 
of the French and English Tongues (1611), which renders Desappetit as 
“a queasinesse, or disgust of stomacke” and Desaimer as “to fall into dis-
like, or disgust.”75 When the Catholic loyalist Anthony Copley denounces 
both Jesuit and Protestant prophecy, his expression equally suggests the 
proximity between moral disgust and distaste:
So likewise of her Maiesties end how disasterously they haue 
prophecied, and do expect, I am sure you haue heard and do dis-
gust as much as I. But what talke I of Protestants, seeing that also 
vpon very religious Catholikes they haue augured no lesse fatally, 
for being their known or but suspected distasters?76
The Disgusting Cardinal Thomas Wolsey 31
That, in 1602, both “disgust” and “distaste” are deployed in this context 
suggests the immediate connection between the concept’s gastric origins 
and its moral elaboration. In fact, in the years immediately after Flo-
rio’s rendering, “disgust” is used quite regularly in its sociomoral form: 
in the first years of the seventeenth century, the word appears often in 
religious polemics, as a term of moral derision.77 Though some research-
ers assert that the sociomoral usage of “disgust” is merely a figurative 
extension of the emotion’s true visceral form (the form suggested by its 
etymological origins in “distaste”), it is telling, I think, that both the gus-
tatory and sociomoral usage enter the English language simultaneously. 
And indeed, in the pre- Cartesian physiology of the sixteenth century, the 
deep association between an individual’s corporal state and their higher- 
order existence has an organic connection to the disgust spectrum I have 
articulated throughout.78 Though Skelton and the anti- Wolsey satirists 
would probably not have known the word “disgust,” its imminent, mul-
tivalenced entry into the language suggests the general saliency of its 
varied forms in the early modern period.
I have reviewed this literature in such detail because the contempo-
rary poetic reaction to Cardinal Wolsey was underpinned by these very 
dynamics of disgust. The domains of disgust— issues of contamination, 
infection, rottenness, corporality— dominate the satirical response to 
Wolsey’s role in Henrician politics, and disgust is the primary affective 
state that is elicited by the cardinal. As an emotion flexible enough to 
account for both visceral and symbolic alienation, disgust provided the 
disenchanted observers with a poignant affective vocabulary with which 
to denounce Wolsey. Armed with the rhetoric of disgust, they cast him 
as a rotten blight on the English body politic, repulsive in both body 
and soul.
Stomaching Wolsey
Suitable for indicting both material and moral failings, revulsion is the 
affective touchstone of anti- Wolsey sentiment; as we will see, attacks on 
Wolsey are punctuated with references to appetite, indulgence, beastli-
ness, and disease, reflecting the domains of disgust I have just examined. 
In this sense, portrayals of Wolsey take pains to bar the cardinal from any 
association with the Bakhtinian classical body, that “strictly completed, 
finished product . . . isolated, alone, fenced off from other bodies.”79 But 
at the same time, this emphasis on the grotesque is hardly carnivalesque; 
there is little festive about the cardinal’s open body, which elicits revulsion 
32 Chapter 1
and terror, not celebration and empowerment.80 For the Henrician sati-
rists, the disgust that Wolsey evokes is the index to his moral status— and 
it is this disgust that guides their smear campaign, which denounces both 
the cardinal and his polluting influence on England’s social body.
We can begin with food, the core domain of disgust. Among his many 
traits, Thomas Wolsey seems to have been a larger man— at least accord-
ing to (some) early modern portraiture, and at least according to John 
Skelton.81 In the poetic context, Wolsey’s weight was an easy metonym 
for his greater tendencies toward gluttony and avarice; the satires rou-
tinely invoke eating habits as indicative of Wolsey’s general character, 
condemning his “myche bely- joye, and so wastefull banketyng” as viscer-
ally taxing and morally sickening.82
There is little doubt that Wolsey liked to eat, and he seems to have 
made a show of it: during his many feasts and banquets, Cavendish 
records, Wolsey’s tables were stocked with “ijcc [200] disshes or above of 
wonderouse costly meates & devysys, subtilly devysed.”83 In 1527 he pro-
duced a particularly lavish spread for the visiting French ambassadors:
Anon came vppe the second Course with so many disshes, subtilt-
ies, & curious devyses whiche ware above an Cth in nomber of so 
goodly proporcion and Costly that I suppose the Frenchemen neuer 
sawe the lyke. The wonder was no lesse than it was worthy indeade. 
There ware castelles with Images in the same, powlles Churche 
& steple in proporcion for the quantitie as well counterfeited as 
the paynter shold haue paynted it vppon a clothe or wall. There 
ware beastes, byrdes, fowles of dyuers kyndes and personages most 
lyvely made & counterfet in dysshes. Some fightyng (as it ware) 
with swordes, some with gonnes and Crosebowes, Some vaughtyng 
& leapyng, Some dauncyng with ladyes, Some in complett harnes 
Iustyng with speres. And with many more devysis than I ame able 
with my wytt to discribbe.84
For good reason, Wolsey’s dining habits became the stuff of diplomatic 
legend, though not always to his credit: the Venetian ambassador Sebas-
tian Giustinian, for example, records that during public functions “no one 
is served with the viands of the sort presented to the Cardinal, until after 
their removal from before him.”85 Yet even with this notable appetite, 
food didn’t sit well with Wolsey’s stomach; he long suffered from diges-
tive issues, which he tried to relieve in 1520 by securing papal approval 
to continue eating meat during the Lenten season.86 Skeptics like Skelton 
railed against his motives:
The Disgusting Cardinal Thomas Wolsey 33
For he hath suche a bull,
He may take whom he wull,
And as many as him lykys,
May ete pigges in lent for pikys,
After the sectes of heretykis!
For in lent he wyll ete
All maner of flesshe mete.87
In light of such criticism, Wolsey eventually thought it wise to extend 
permissions to the populace; according to Polydore Vergil, in 1522 he 
overturned the Lenten restrictions on dairy products, in order to “lessen 
the stigma attaching to his name.”88
The tension between the pleasure and pain of the gourmand’s life has 
a formal correlation in the literary rendition of Wolsey’s diet. For Skelton, 
so apt at producing rhetorical excess, the elaborate description of Wolsey’s 
“banketynge braynlesse” becomes stomach- turning, and the excessiveness 
of the catalog stands as an obvious indictment of the cardinal’s moral 
appetite.89 Why Come Ye Nat to Courte? offers a pointed example:
To drynke and for to eate
Swete ypocras and swete meate.
To kepe his flesshe chast
In lent, for a repast,
He eateth capons stewed,
Fesaunt and partriche mewed,
Hennes, checkynges, and pygges.
He foynes and he frygges;
Spareth neither mayde ne wyfe.
This is a postels lyfe.90
The rapid- fire enumeration of Skelton’s signature style renders this menu 
nauseating, a cumulative effect inducing sensory exhaustion. And exhaus-
tion is a concern, given the apparent scope of Wolsey’s consumptive habits: 
the transitional rhyme pygges/frygges indicates a temporary shift in reg-
isters, and the corresponding turn from conquests digestive to conquest 
sexual suggests the flexibility of appetite as a category of moral critique, 
which readily expands (like the spectrum of disgust) from the gustatory 
to the genital. Indeed, the legend of the cardinal’s appetite endured long 
after his death— so much so, in fact, that in Thomas Churchyard’s Eliza-
bethan portrayal of Wolsey (in The Mirror for Magistrates), it serves as 
the generalized vehicle for the cardinal’s de casibus trajectory:
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So, tasting some, of Fortunes sweete consayts,
I clapt the hoode, on shoulder, braue as Son,
And hopt at length, to bite at better bayts,
And fill my mouth, ere banket halfe were don.
Thus holding on, the course I thought to ron:
By many a feast, my belly grue so big.91
Churchyard’s Wolsey learns to enjoy dining above his station— a trope 
originated by Skelton, whose condemnation of Wolsey’s more physical 
stomach is perhaps most salient in the depiction of what the upstart car-
dinal is not eating:
Howe ye were wonte to drynke
Of a lether bottell
With a knavysshe stoppell,
Whan mamockes was your meate,
With moulde brede to eate— 
Ye cowde none other gete
To chewe and to gnawe,
To fyll therwith your mawe— 
Lodged in the strawe,
Couchynge your drousy heddes
Somtyme in lousy beddes.92
In these lines, we find the most naked connection between food and 
disgust; a man of Wolsey’s social standing and moral character (so the 
associative logic goes) should be eating rotten table scraps. As above, this 
gastric association soon extends to other disgust elicitors: if the world 
was just, the cardinal would be spending his nights not in the elaborate 
chambers of Hampton Palace, but in the muck and filth of its stables.
This image of the “lousy” Wolsey introduces another key disgust trope 
in the contemporary satires: the cardinal as a site of disease and infec-
tion. As noted above, Wolsey’s health was routinely ailing; he may have 
suffered from adult- onset diabetes, bouts of gallstones and jaundice, and 
regular infections.93 The poetic tradition, however, emphasized the ill-
ness that contained the most obvious moral dimension: Wolsey’s alleged 
struggle with the effects of syphilis. Roy and Barlowe broach the issue 
with little subtlety:
Ief: O naye, for he hath no wyfe,
But whoares that be his lovers.
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Wat: Yf he vse whoares to occupy,
It is grett marvell certanyly,
That he escapeth the frenche pockes.
Ief: He had the pockes with out fayle,
Wherfore people on hym did rayle,
With many obprobrious mockes.94
Though it is impossible to ascertain the validity of this rumor, Wolsey 
apparently did have a perennial ailment of the eye, which Skelton took as 
sign of a venereal infection:
So fell and so irous,
So full of malencoly,
With a flap afore his eye,
Men wene that he is pocky.95
A Spanish dispatch of 1522 confirms that Wolsey had an issue with his 
sight, but it acquires here a very different moral valence:
Henry leads his usual life, leaving all the cares of state to Wolsey, 
who is so very ill that he is in danger of losing an eye, and the rest 
of his body seems almost equally affected. There seems little hope of 
his immediate recovery, especially as he will not abandon the affairs 
of the kingdom to others and must see many people daily.96
Wolsey’s “flap,” Gwyn suggests, was likely “some kind of disfigurement,” 
which “gave Skelton the opportunity to make an easy gibe.”97 Nonethe-
less, the gap between truth and tradition is instructive: Wolsey’s physical 
form still provokes a disgust response, which is, in turn, still correlated 
with the moral loathsomeness his behavior displays.
And Skelton would gibe, ruthlessly: Why Come Ye Nat to Courte? con-
cludes by comparing this “morbilloso Thoma” to a host of ancient lepers, 
monsters, and incurables.98 Most humorously, he imagines a scene in 
which Wolsey seeks aid from Balthasar de Guercis, the queen’s physician:
He is nowe so overthwart,
And so payned with pangis,
That all his trust hangis
In Balthasor [who] . . . 
Hath promised to hele our cardinals eye.
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Yet sum surgions put a dout
Lest he wyll put it clene out,
And make him lame of his neder limmes.
God sende him sorowe for his sinnes!99
It is telling that Skelton concludes his poem, an invective of over a thousand 
lines, with a meditation on Wolsey’s health: after enumerating the cardinal’s 
social and moral maladies, the poet leaves the reader with an unmistakable 
sense that Wolsey is rotten to the core, body and soul. In fact, after the 
poem proper concludes, Skelton again lampoons Wolsey’s health in a Latin 
epilogue, which continues to correlate his physical and moral decay:
Oppressed with the Neapolitan disease, laid low under plaster poul-
tices, pierced by the surgeon’s iron instrument, relieved by nothing, 
nor made better by any medicine . . . If only, therefore, that prof-
ligate, that bad Cretan lord, more aptly called disgusting, a mad 
fanatic, would keep away from the brothel.100
A convergence of disease, decay, and sexual depravity, the syphilis trope is 
a particularly damning example of disgust- based rhetoric.
We have seen how the anti- Wolsey satirists coordinate their attacks 
along various points of the theoretical disgust spectrum, clothing their 
barbs in images of food and orality, physical illness and degeneration, 
and sexual indiscretions. They also routinely dehumanize Wolsey through 
animal associations, another of the central categories in the taxonomy of 
disgust. These images are not, to be clear, the conventional figures of the 
beast fable, which had long deployed animal allegory in a satiric mode; 
instead, Skelton and company employ animalization specifically to debase 
the hated cardinal, to strip him of his pomp and dignity, to reduce him to 
the barest matter. Much like the example of syphilis, animal metaphors 
have little trouble invoking a network of overlapping disgust elicitors: 
when, for example, Skelton observes that “So fatte a magott, bred of a 
flesshe- flye / Was nevyr suche a fylty gorgon, nor suche an epycure,” a sin-
gle couplet activates images of animality, appetite, orality, rottenness, and 
excrement.101 Though merely a pest in this instance, Wolsey most often 
takes on a more sinister form; he is famously cast in the satiric tradition 
as the “Bochers Curre,” a ferocious mastiff who treats the realm as his 
chew- toy.102 Again, the concurrent association with orality is inevitable: 
the cardinal, “An Impeachment of Wolsey” laments, “gnawen hys pepyll 
as A dogge dothe a Catte.”103 Skelton confirms that the cardinal is on the 
heels of England’s nobility, who
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Rynne away and crepe;
Lyke a mayny of shepe,
Dare nat loke out at dur
For drede of the mastyve cur,
For drede of the bochers dogge . . . 
He pluckes them by the hode,
And shakes them by the eare.104
Happily for the satirists, the cardinal’s surname seemed to indicate his 
canine form, as when Roy and Barlowe denounce him as a “Ragynge 
courre, wrapped in a wolues skynne.”105 Because of the typographical and 
paleographical properties of the early modern “long” form of the minus-
cule s, detractors relished the visual similarity between wolfe and wolse.
In concert with their general strategy of debasement and desubli-
mation, the satirists also harped more generally on Wolsey’s humble 
beginnings, quite apart from any animal association. (Though, to be sure, 
his father’s trade ensured that any discussion of Wolsey’s origin implicitly 
activates both food and animal concerns.) The poems abound with broad 
harangues against Wolsey’s undue elevation; “Of the Cardnall Wolse,” 
for example, begs King Henry to free himself “from that Churle borne by 
kynde / and from that vyle bochers Blode.”106 But the cardinal’s origin is 
also cast more basically as a source of inherent revulsion. In the Renais-
sance, Frank Whigham has shown, anxieties about a changing cultural 
order were encoded within an elaborate literary discourse of the alimen-
tary tract, and it is thus unsurprising that early modern social warfare 
also borrowed more inclusively from the rhetoric of disgust.107 The satires 
insistently expose from “whatt vilnes [Wolsey’s] pompe did aryse,” an 
indictment with both moral and material force.108 Again, Skelton is tell-
ingly caustic:
He ruleth all at wyll
Without reason or skyll.
How be it the primordyall
Of his wretched originall,
And his base progeny,
And his gresy genealogy,
He came of the sank royall
That was cast out of a bochers stall!109
It seems to me that the phrase “greasy genealogy” is a mark of Skelton’s 
unique genius— one would be hard- pressed to express the sentiment in a 
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From the donge carte,
The mattocke and the shovll,
To reygne and to rule.110
Cast away with the butcher’s viscera, and cast up from the dung- cart; 
as Skelton tells it, Wolsey is a phoenix rising from a pile of filth. What’s 
more, his physical defilement accrues a moral analogue, when we recall 
that in early modern England carts were used to convey all manner of 
social and legal offenders to sites of public punishment and execution: 
by revealing the “carte” as the site of Wolsey’s generation— from which 
he sprang, it seems, like Athena from the head of Zeus— Skelton sug-
gests that the corrupt cardinal is destined for that “vile deathe that is 
ordained for wretchede theves.”111 That Wolsey has traded the cart and 
the shovel (the tools of his station) for the scepter and a cardinal’s hat 
suggests the extent to which the natural order has been perverted by his 
undue elevation.
There are myriad ways in which contemporary satires attempt to 
construct Wolsey’s physical body as a site of revulsion: he is associated 
materially with images of overindulgence, illness, sexual decadence, rot-
tenness, excrement, filth, and animality. Yet as we have seen, disgust is an 
emotion elicited by stimuli both physical and symbolic, a reflection of its 
dual role as guardian of the body and the soul. And while descriptions of 
the cardinal’s corporeal repulsiveness carry an obvious symbolic freight, 
another strand of anti- Wolsey discourse tends to exhibit the ways that 
Wolsey enacts the more figurative dynamics of disgust.
For example, the satires condemn Wolsey as a general intruder in the 
courtly sphere: his very authority, quite apart from his physical loath-
someness, entails an encroachment and violation of the king’s prerogative. 
In this sense, Wolsey doubly relates to the notion of defilement: he both 
is defiled (by his low birth, polluted body, and physical repulsiveness) 
and threatens to defile those in his proximity, such as the king.112 After 
spending four years in the court of the young King Henry, the Venetian 
ambassador Giustinian concluded that the “Cardinal is the person who 
rules both the King and the entire kingdom”; this sentiment was appar-
ently shared by many English observers, and a general anxiety about 
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Wolsey’s prominence pervades the contemporary poems.113 For Skelton, 
Wolsey exemplifies the worst type of statesman, he
That wolde conquinate,
That wolde contemminate,
And that wolde vyolate,
And that wolde derogate,
And that wolde abrogate114
the sanctity of the English realm. Wolsey’s rule has descended upon the 
country like a plague, to the despoilment of King Henry and his sub-
jects. This usurpation is attacked prominently in the ballad tradition: “Of 
the Cardnall Wolse,” for example, warns the king that “As long as one 
/ Dothe Reyne & Rule, as ye do see, / So long in poverte this Realme 
shalbe.”115 Alternately, “An Impeachment of Wolsey” directs its address 
at the cardinal himself:
of yngland the Rule, & Souerente
of yngland thow haste had . . . 
Vsurpyd awtoryte is thy defence;
no man darre the Resyste.116
As Skelton records in his trilogy, the most damaging aspect of Wolsey’s 
influence is its unending scope; whether in Star Chamber, Chancery, or 
the Common Law courts, the cardinal’s unilateral authority demonstrates 
how dangerous it is “For one man to rule a kynge . . . To governe over all 
/ And rule a realme royall.”117
But as a social pathogen, Wolsey was most dangerous in his capacity 
to infect Henry himself. The cardinal’s influence on the king was a regular 
concern of contemporary observers, many of whom could not believe that 
King Henry would willingly subject himself to such a monster. Accord-
ing to legal records, an Englishman named Anthony Irby proffered (quite 
unwisely) one such suggestion:
It is a wonder to see the kyng, how he is ordered now a days: For 
the Cardynall & the duke of Suffolk, which the kyng haith brought 
vpp of noughte, do rewle hym in all thynges as they lyst; whedr it 
be by Negramancy, wytchecrafte, or pollycy no mann knoweth, but 
as it is thought the oon of them by his Negramancy and the other 
by his wytchecrafte.118
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More broadly, this charge was echoed by William Tyndale in The Practice 
of Prelates, in the midst of an anti- Wolsey diatribe:
And, as I heard it spoken of divers, he made by craft of necro-
mancy graven imagery to bear upon him; wherewith he bewitched 
the king’s mind, and made the king to dote upon him more than 
ever he did any lady or gentlewoman; so that now the king’s grace 
followed him, as he before followed the king.119
Finally, Skelton invokes the witchcraft trope in Why Come Ye Nat to Courte?:
The kynges grace
Is toward hym so mynded,
And so farre blynded,
That he can nat parceyue
How he doth hym disceyve.
I dought, lest by sorsery,
Or suche other loselry
As wychecraft or charmyng;
For he is the kynges derlyng.120
Whether or not such claims were literally believed by contemporaries, 
this textual record suggests that Wolsey’s social infection could have the 
imaginative quality of a demonic possession. In the nineteenth century, 
anthropologists argued that cultural laws of contagion were a brand of 
“sympathetic magic”; in these early modern accounts, Wolsey is imagined 
as a magician who casts his contagion into being.121
The stakes of this symbolic inhabitation were not small. The latent 
anxiety in much of the anti- Wolsey literature is that the cardinal will 
eventually come to supplant King Henry entirely— a virus that has over-
run its host, so to speak. A report of Giustinian’s experience in England 
suggests one possible form that this effacement might take:
On the ambassador’s first arrival in England, [Wolsey] used to say 
to him,— “His Majesty will do so and so:” subsequently, by degrees, 
he went forgetting himself, and commenced saying, “We shall do 
so and so:” at this present he has reached such a pitch that he says, 
“I shall do so and so.”122
Ten years later, in the midst of Wolsey’s undoing, a “boke of articles whiche 
the Lordes had put to the kynge agaynste the Cardinall” would similarly 
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complain that “in all writynges which he wrot to Rome or any other 
forayn Prince, he wrot Ego et Rex meus, I and my kyng, as who woulde 
say that the kyng were his seruant.”123 In this linguistic slippage, Wolsey’s 
assumption of Henry’s voice nonetheless entails a symbolic occupation 
of the royal person— and it exemplifies, I think, a more pressing concern 
about monarchal integrity. This dilemma is anchored at the heart of Why 
Come Ye Nat to Courte?, as elaborated in its most famous passage:
Why come ye nat to court?
To whyche court?
To the kynges courte?
Or to Hampton Court?
Nay, to the kynges court!
The kynges courte
Shulde haue the excellence;
But Hampton Court
Hath the preemynence!124
There is little frivolous about Skelton here, who identifies a troubling 
ambiguity at the center of Henrician politics. To entertain the notion 
that Henry’s authority may not be absolute— that it might be flexible, or 
porous, or even contingent— inherently entails a major destabilization of 
the social order of Skelton’s England. In order to account for Wolsey’s 
power, Skelton must essentially deconstruct the governing discourse of his 
political world: he must come to terms with the fact that, quite unhappily, 
“court” is no longer an unambiguous signifier. What happens to England, 
and to the English people, when one can no longer distinguish between 
the king’s court and Wolsey’s court? What does it mean that we must even 
ask “whyche court”? These questions belong to a much different concep-
tual register than those regarding Wolsey’s weight, or those concerning his 
poxy eye. Yet they share an equal concern with the mechanics of disgust— 
the guardian of the moral order, and the emotion to which Skelton and his 
allies turn to guide their response to Wolsey’s social intrusion.
As we have seen, contemporary satirists employed a regular thematic 
vocabulary in the denunciation of Wolsey. Poets routinely railed upon his 
infamous low birth, his insatiable appetite, his unseemly entry into English 
politics— all domains that correlate with the associative matrix of disgust. 
To conclude, there is a particular instance that exemplifies these trends, but 
that also warrants specific consideration of its own: the mock- display of 
Wolsey’s crest, perhaps the most immediately compelling feature of Rede 
Me and Be Nott Wrothe.125 Proudly emblazoned on the title page, the crest 
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offers a seductive visual guide to the contents within the volume. On the 
verso, the image is complimented by a verse “descripcion of the armes,” 
three stanzas of rhyme royal that both explicate the visual parody and 
introduce many of the central terms of the satire that follows.126 (See figure 
1.) The shield, supported by “two angels off Sathan,” exemplifies in its orna-
ments Wolsey’s status as a lightning rod of social conflict and dissention:
The sixe blouddy axes in a bare felde
Sheweth the cruelte of the red man,
Whiche hath devoured the beautifull swan.
Mortall enmy vnto the whyte Lion,
Carter of Yorcke, the vyle butchers sonne.127
In these opening lines, Roy and Barlowe deploy the groundwork for the 
associative network that accrues as their project progresses; Wolsey’s 
affinity with red, for example, suggests his numerous identities as cardi-
nal, antichrist, bloodthirsty tyrant, and butcher’s son.
Fig. 1. “The Descripcion of the Armes,” from Folger STC 1462.7. Used by 
permission of the Folger Shakespeare Library under a Creative Commons 
Attribution- ShareAlike 4.0 International License.
The Disgusting Cardinal Thomas Wolsey 43
Wolsey’s social presumptions are implicitly underscored by the beast 
allegory, in which the cardinal is framed in opposition to his noble adver-
saries the dukes of Buckingham and Norfolk, invoked by their heraldic 
icons (“beautiful swan” and “whyte Lion”). The animal motif is balanced 
by a description of Wolsey’s own mascot:
The bandog in the middes doth expresse
The mastif Curre bred in Ypswitch towne
Gnawynge with his teth a kynges crowne.128
It is no coincidence that Wolsey’s canine form chews upon the symbol of 
royalty; he incorporates Henry’s power into his own form, just as he has 
incorporated himself into the political center of the court. Furthermore, 
his predation is specifically construed as an act of leisure, suggesting the 
luxury that his usurped position affords; the “gnawynge” dog is one that 
savors the bone he chews, and there is a sense of oral sadism that attaches 
to Wolsey’s mastery over the crown. The poem concludes by reflecting 
upon the more general consequence of this usurpation (“The cloubbe sig-
nifieth playne hys tiranny / Covered over with a Cardinals hatt”), before 
delivering a final warning to the upstart Wolsey: “Wherfor prest take 
hede and beware they croune.”129 Though they had no way to know it in 
1527, Roy and Barlowe would not have to wait long to see this prophecy 
fulfilled; in two years Wolsey would be cast from the court, and in three 
he would be dead.
Half a century later, when lamenting that very fall, Churchyard’s ren-
dition of Cardinal Wolsey reflects upon his own cardinal sin in a telling 
register:
Pryde is a thing, that God and man abores,
A swelling tode, that poysons euery place,
A stinking wounde, that breedeth many sores,
A priuy plague, found out in stately face,
A paynted byrd, that keeps a pecocks pace,
A lothsome lowt, that lookes like tinkers dog,
A hellish hownd, a swinish hatefull hog
That grunts and groanes, at euery thing it sees,
And holds vp snowt, like pig that comes from draffe.130
In Churchyard’s act of poetic necromancy, Wolsey addresses his pride via 
the imagery of food, animals, and disease— the very elicitors of disgust 
that dominated the cardinal’s satirical identity during his life.
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The Abject Alter Rex: Thomas Wolsey’s Fall
In the final movement of Skelton’s Magnyfycence, the virtuous counselor 
Good Hope frames a telling consolation to the titular king, newly repen-
tant for squandering his fortunes on courtly leeches and usurpers:
Good Hope, your potecary, assygned am I,
That Goddes grace hath vexed you sharply
And payned you with a purgacyon of odyous poverte,
Myxed with bytter alowes of herde adversyte.
Nowe must I make you a lectuary softe— 
I to mynster it, you to receyve it ofte— 
With rubarbe of repentaunce in you for to rest;
With drammes of devocyon your dyet must be drest.131
The conclusion of Skelton’s interlude, framed in the disgust- based lan-
guage of diet and purgation, anticipates the thematic terms that would 
dominate the conclusion of the cardinal’s own story a decade later. Long 
cast as a source of social illness, Wolsey was a piece of spoiled meat in the 
belly of the body politic— and in his final years, he is ultimately purged 
from the Henrician social body, cast away in a remarkable, repentant act 
of political expulsion.
In the summer of 1529, things were not going particularly well for Car-
dinal Wolsey. Unable to muster enough leverage to force Pope Clement’s 
hand, the cardinal and his agents watched hopelessly as King Henry’s 
divorce proceedings were recalled to Rome— a devastating blow to the 
English party, who had hoped to convert its home field advantage into a 
favorable judgment before the case was ensnared in the papal courts. In 
the months preceding the unsuccessful legatine trial, Henry had already 
become suspicious of Wolsey’s enthusiasm for the cause; despite the cardi-
nal’s long- standing protestations that he was “redy to expone [his] body, 
life, and blod for the accheving of the same,” Henry received reports that 
both Campeggio and Wolsey could not be trusted.132 The trial’s relocation 
to Rome was a blow to Wolsey, and his weakness in its aftermath was 
apparently not lost upon contemporaries. According to a report in Hall, 
after the legatine adjournment— and after it had become apparent that 
“the kings fauor was from the Cardinal sore minished”— the royal coun-
cil presented Henry with a book of “thirtie and foure” articles against 
Wolsey; by setting out “with what dissimulacion and clokyng, he had 
handeled the kynges causes,” the cardinal’s enemies successfully “moued 
the kyng against hym” further.133 After the conclusion of the legatine 
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proceedings in mid- July, Wolsey was quietly barred access from the king’s 
presence, and his role in decision- making was severely restricted.
By early autumn, the writing was on the wall. In mid- September, letters 
make reference to “the reports which are circulated” against the cardinal, 
and in a dispatch of October 4, the French ambassador Jean du Bellay 
remarked that he could “see clearly [that] Wolsey is to lose his influence 
entirely” in the upcoming session of Parliament.134 Having failed to make 
headway in the divorce, and having made an enemy of the would- be 
Queen Anne, Wolsey was left virtually unprotected. On October 9 he was 
formally indicted with the jurisdictional crime of praemunire: by exercis-
ing his legatine powers on English soil, Wolsey was said to have imported 
a foreign legal authority into the realm, to the prejudice of the king’s royal 
prerogative. (That Henry had both enabled and exploited Wolsey’s legatine 
standing for over a decade was ignored.)135 Wolsey was soon commanded 
to “surrender and delyuer vppe the great Seale”; in late October, he admit-
ted to the charge of praemunire, and threw himself on the king’s mercy.136
The initial stage of Wolsey’s downfall was complete. He would never 
regain his former place by Henry’s side, and his vast fortunes were confis-
cated by the crown.137 But his ruin was not final, at least not yet. In the fall 
of 1529, Henry seems to have had no desire to annihilate his long- trusted 
minister, and there is even evidence that the king assured Wolsey of his 
general good standing.138 With Wolsey in this limbo— disgraced, but not 
destroyed— his enemies seized the offensive, attempting to muster a mass 
of evidence too damning to be ignored. In this campaign, the anti- Wolsey 
sentiment again seems to activate the mechanics of disgust that we have 
explored throughout this chapter. Wolsey’s narrative culminates in this 
fundamental act of rejection and repulsion: like an ill humour, his malig-
nant influence is drained away from the king and his council, so that new 
blood might circulate in its place. Even the sudden, surprising charges of 
praemunire mirror this trajectory: Wolsey’s legatine authority was con-
strued, appropriately enough, as an intruding foreign body, needing to be 
purged and expelled to restore the integrity of the English realm.139
One such example is deployed by the new lord chancellor, Thomas 
More, who addressed his predecessor’s ground- shaking fall in his opening 
remarks to the Parliament of November 1529. In the midst of a general 
meditation on the state of the realm, in which King Henry is figured as the 
nation’s shepherd, More reflects upon the recent woes that have plagued 
the English flock:
As you se that emongest a great flocke of shepe some be rotten and 
fauty which the good sheperd sendeth from the good shepe, so the 
46 Chapter 1
great wether which is of late fallen as you all knowe, so craftely, so 
scabedly, ye & so vntruly iuggled wyth the kyng.140
Given the timing of More’s oration, there is little doubt that Wolsey is 
the anecdote’s referent; the new lord chancellor takes care to smear his 
predecessor with the raw material of disgust. We’ve already seen how 
the poetic satires regularly dehumanize Wolsey by means of bestial 
identification, invoking an alleged animality as grounds for moral con-
demnation. In this elaboration, More imagines a dangerously infected 
Wolsey: he is portrayed as an ailing animal, a communicable threat that 
must be cast off for the greater good of the flock. “Rotten and fauty” 
accommodates both the material and moral registers of Wolsey’s alleged 
disease, and More accordingly affirms the proximity of disgust’s literal 
and figurative domains. Wolsey’s designation as “wether” pushes the 
metaphor even further: signifying both a neutered ram (and by natural 
extension) a courtly eunuch, the term configures the cardinal as a devi-
ant sexual subject, another damning witness to his moral disfigurement. 
(With this castration, More perhaps also enforces the clerical celibacy 
that Wolsey infamously flouted.) Little doubt remains when Wolsey is 
finally denounced as scabbed, an image triply suited to More’s rhetori-
cal aim: in Henrician usage, the word might entail a literal “disease of 
the skin,” a “moral or spiritual disease,” or, a specific “cutaneous disease 
in animals, esp. sheep.”141 Consistent with the general trend in anti- 
Wolsey satire, More’s oration constructs a cardinal who is repulsively 
compromised; his rejection from the metaphoric flock was a necessity 
for the well- being of the whole, as was his purgation from the room of 
state.
More’s rhetoric is echoed (and intensified) elsewhere. To supplement 
the praemunire charge, the House of Lords apparently drafted a more 
inclusive catalog of Wolsey’s offenses. Many of the charges in the 44- item 
list concern his abuse of legatine authority, as a clear usurpation of King 
Henry’s royal prerogative. But the sixth item is rather different:
Whereas your grace is our soveraign lord and head, in whom stan-
deth all the surety and wealth of this realm; the same lord cardinall 
knowing himselfe to have the foule and contagious disease of the 
great pocks broken out upon him in divers places of his body, came 
daily to your grace, rowning in your eare and blowing upon your 
most noble grace with his perilous and infective breath, to the mar-
vellous danger of your highnesse, if God of his infinite goodnesse 
had not better provided for your highnesse. And when he was once 
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healed of them, he made your grace to believe, that his disease was 
an imposthume in his head, and of none other thing.142
Hall succinctly confirms the charge that Wolsey, “hayvng the Frenche 
pockes presumed to come & breth on the kyng.”143 In this passage, we find 
Wolsey’s association with disgust nakedly literalized: not only a symbolic 
sore on the commonweal, he also imperils the king quite concretely with 
his infectious breath. Given their general emphasis on Wolsey’s coercive 
influence, the Lords’ complaint thus reveals how the literal and metaphoric 
domains of disgust find respective targets in the king’s body natural and 
his body politic: an assault converging here in the oral image of Wolsey’s 
whisper (“rowning”), the unifying act in which the sly minister pollutes 
the kingdom with his policy and the king with his contagions.144 This 
bifurcated sense of disgust is further suggested in the particular emphasis 
on Wolsey’s syphilitic condition; his illness entails not just a corporeal 
infection, but a moral one as well. Finally, there may be some irony in 
how the cardinal is said to have obfuscated his specifically venereal illness: 
though “impostume” had a generalized meaning of “sore” or “abscess,” 
in the sixteenth century it equally developed a figurative sense of “moral 
corruption in the individual, or insurrection in the state.”145
But despite the efforts of his opponents, the cardinal endured into the 
New Year— and in fact, as Henry’s position continued to soften, Wolsey 
was granted a pardon in mid- February 1530. In return for this partial 
restoration, the cardinal was commanded to take residency in York— the 
seat of his archbishopric, and a diocese in which the absentee cardinal 
had never set foot— in a domain far removed from court. In the spring 
and summer months, Wolsey made the slow trek northward, a spatial 
literalization of his expurgation from Henrician politics. Yet despite his 
disgrace, observers suggested that the cardinal still cut an impressive 
figure:
It has been reported in the court that he rode in such sumptuous 
fashion that some men thought he was of as good courage as in 
times past, and that there was no impediment but lack of authority. 
Certain people came to him, some for debt, and some for restitu-
tion of things wrongfully taken by him; to which he answered that 
the King had all his goods, and he could neither pay nor restore.146
The journey north offered many such moments of image rehabilitation, 
in which Wolsey embraced (or at least embraced the performance of) a 
pastoral care that stands in sharp contrast to his conventional guise as 
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the courtly wolf. In his imitatio Christi, the abject cardinal embraced in 
his parishioners that which might otherwise evoke revulsion: Cavendish 
records, for example, how Wolsey tended to “lix [59] poomen whos feet 
he than wasshed wyped & kyssed.”147 As the journey progressed, Wolsey 
remained a formidable politician, propped by (in Gwyn’s words) a “sur-
prising degree of confidence that all would be well.”148
But the increasing goodwill of his flock could not save Wolsey from 
his king— and only months later, in the fall of 1530, further consider-
ation found use at home for a disgraced cardinal. On November 4, amidst 
a backdrop of increasing papal resistance to Henry’s matrimonial aims, 
Wolsey was suddenly taken into crown custody for the crime of high 
treason; the cardinal, it was alleged, had for several months been secretly 
plotting with the European powers to derail the divorce proceedings 
and expel Anne Boleyn from Henry’s side. The precise motive for this 
maneuver remains obscure, but it is clear that the king had decided (or, 
depending on the account, had been convinced) to ruin his alter rex com-
pletely.149 In a humiliating parody of his first exile, Wolsey now began the 
return journey back to the court— where he looked forward not to pomp 
and splendor, but to looming death.
Wolsey never had to face those charges; he died of illness on November 
29, 1530, at Leicester Abbey. Accordingly, we’ll never know what Henry 
had planned for his former minister— though it seems unlikely, perhaps 
he would have issued a second pardon, or found another way to secure 
Wolsey’s obedience. What is clear, however, is that subsequent accounts 
of Wolsey’s life shared a profound interest in these final days, chronicling 
the suffering cardinal’s decay in rich detail; the relevant passages are insis-
tently corporeal in description, demanding that we remain focused on 
Wolsey’s malfunctioning body. They are concerned with the alimentary 
component of the cardinal’s painful death, abounding with images of eat-
ing, excrement, and vomit. There is thus an implicit irony, a kind of poetic 
justice, in these portrayals of Wolsey’s demise: long cast as a contaminant, 
a noxious figure whose very presence infected the realm, Wolsey finally 
finds the tables to be turned. The domains of disgust turn inward, and in 
a striking act of self- consumption, he becomes destroyed by the same feel-
ings of repulsion and revulsion that he so often invoked in others.
Though doubtlessly embellished, Cavendish’s eyewitness account is the 
most elaborate chronicle of Wolsey’s demise— and it is one that seems 
strangely keen on foregrounding the gustatory textures of its subject’s 
final days. The motif is established early in the narrative, when, on the 
evening of his arrest, Wolsey shares a symbolic meal with his servants:
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With that came vppe my lordes meate, and so we left our comyny-
cacion. I gave hyme water & sett hyme down to dynner  .  .  . 
notwithstandyng my lord did eate very littill meate but wold many 
tymes burst owte sodenly in teares with the most sorowfullest 
words that hathe byn hard of any wofull creature. And at the last 
he fetched a great sighe frome the bottome of his hart . . . [He was] 
more fed & moysted with sorowe & teares than with owther pleas-
aunt metes or dylicate drynkes.150
Tears do little to satisfy a man of such infamous appetite: the scene, 
despite its tenderness, cannot help but parody Wolsey’s infamous gluttony, 
which now can do little but vomit sighs. But while food is sublimated in 
this example, Cavendish goes on to reveal the gruesome materiality of 
his master’s digestion, anticipating the gastric illness that will eventually 
overtake him.
In a statement that recalls the category of animal- reminder disgust, 
Wolsey feared that he would “dye lyke a beast” on his journey back to 
London, a remark confirming the sociomoral linkage of human dignity 
and corporeal integrity.151 Cavendish, however, does little to shield us 
from the animalistic details of Wolsey’s physical deterioration, which 
is chronicled by moments of agonizing urination and defecation. On 
one evening, after observers “perceyved hys color often to chaynge and 
alter dyuers tymes,” Wolsey announced that he had been “sodenly taken 
abought my stomake with a thyng that lyethe ouerthywart my brest as 
cold as a whetston.”152 With the help of an apothecary’s purgative, he 
“avoydyd, excedyng myche wynd vppward,” but the relief was only tem-
porary.153 As the evening continued, there “came vppon hyme suche a 
laske that it caused hyme to goo to his stoole,” and later “he rose vppe 
and went in to his chamber, to his cloose stoole, the Fluxe trobled hyme 
so sore.”154 Plagued with “laske” (“looseness of the bowels, diarrhœa”) 
and “flux” (“an abnormally copious flowing of blood, excrement, etc. 
from the bowels”), Wolsey’s entrails turn inside- out, with a violence 
that recalls his own sudden expulsion from the court.155 After his hor-
rific local description, Cavendish next works to quantify his master’s 
agony:
Whan nyght came that we shold goo to bed, my lord waxed very 
syke thoroughe hys newe desease, the which caused hyme contynu-
ally frome tyme to tyme to goo to the stolle all that nyght. In so 
myche frome tyme that his desease toke hyme vnto the next day. 
He had above l [50] stooles, so that he was that day very weke.156
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Wolsey’s dozens of evacuations serve as a bathetic parallel to the dozens 
of dishes that once filled his banquet table. In this account, I find it hard 
to ignore the moral resonance of Wolsey’s hyper- purgation; in his final 
days, the cardinal’s long- accumulated sins are slowly (and excruciatingly) 
drained from his body, in a corporal prelude to the spiritual purification 
of death.157
In fact, as the end unfolded, the expulsions of Wolsey’s body become 
an index to his degenerating condition. As Cavendish records, the cardi-
nal himself first proffered the diagnosis:
The matter that he avoyded was wonderous blake, the which phisi-
cions call color adustum. And when he perceyved it he sayd vnto 
me “if I haue not” quod he “some helpe shortly yt will cost me my 
lyfe.” With that I caused oon doctor . . . to loke vppon the grosse 
matter that he avoyded, vppon sight wherof he determyned howe 
he shold not lyfe past iiij or v dayes.158
By reading his own waste, the sorcerer Wolsey performs a de facto act 
of extispicy— though in this demonic divination, it is his own entrails 
that foretell the future. Even without the physician’s confirmation, Wol-
sey could see that the end was near: his symptoms, he reflected, promised 
an imminent “excorriacion of the Intraylles, or Francye [frenzy], or elles 
present deathe, and the best ther of is deathe.”159 After a farewell to Cav-
endish and a (famed) speech of repentance, he expired around daybreak 
the following morning.
Though it is impossible to determine the precise cause of Wolsey’s 
death, there is little doubt that Cavendish encodes his master’s suffering 
in terms that are insistently alimentary. As suggested by the spectrum 
of disgust, the thematic matrix of illness, purgation, and excretion that 
pervades his account is an affective linkage to the revolting sociomoral 
violations that are levied in the anti- Wolsey satires.160 The chronicle tra-
dition largely echoes (and in some cases, elaborates) the gastric focus 
of Cavendish’s narrative, ensuring that wretched purgation would mark 
the standard account of Wolsey’s final days. Consistent with early mod-
ern physiological theory, the Italian historian (and friend of Machiavelli) 
Francesco Guicciardini links Wolsey’s physical degeneration with a cor-
responding psychological/dispositional analogue: Wolsey, he notes, “was 
suddenly taken with a fluxe, engendred either of the humour of disdaine, 
or of the passion of feare.”161 In his chronicle of the age, Charles Wriothes-
ley curtly observes (without further comment) that some “recken he 
killed himselfe with purgations”— a statement vague enough, at least as 
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I take it, to entail either an unintentional overdose or a doctor- assisted 
suicide.162 The more scandalous suggestion is made explicit by an anon-
ymous (and questionably reliable) Spanish chronicle of the age, which 
gossips that Wolsey “took some poison to die, to avoid a more shameful 
death.”163 This notion of a “more shameful death” reveals an intriguing 
contest between the domains of disgust: the indignity of corporeal decay 
is thought preferable to the moral revulsion of dying a traitor in a public 
spectacle. (Though, to be sure, the manner of Wolsey’s agonizing death 
recalls the execution rites of a common traitor: both entail, echoing Wol-
sey’s words above, excoriation of the entrails.)
The Protestant martryologist John Foxe similarly fixes on the physical 
indignity of Wolsey’s death— the result of “purgations and vomites” that 
were “so blacke, that the stayning therof could not be gotten out of his 
blankets by any means.”164 But Foxe takes the most pleasure in his elabo-
rate postmortem description:
It is testified by one, yet being aliue, in whose armes the sayde Car-
dinall dyed, that hys body being dead, was blacke as pitch, also was 
so heauie, that sixe coulde scarse beare it. Furthermore, it did so 
stinke aboue the grounde, that they were constrayned to hasten the 
buriall thereof in the night season, before it was daye. At the which 
buriall, such a tempest, with such a stinch there arose, that all the 
torches went out, and so he was throwne into the tombe, and there 
was layde.
The trope of the putrid Catholic corpse was a favorite of Foxe, whose 
usage ranged historically from the “rotting stinch” of the dead Roman 
emperor Maximinus to the “stincking death” of his own contemporary 
Bishop Edmund Bonner— and when recording the demise of the Marian 
persecutor Stephen Gardiner, Bishop of Winchester, Foxe further won-
dered “whether he stonke before he dyed, as Cardinall wolsey did.”165
It is Edward Hall’s account, finally, that offers the most detailed con-
nection between Wolsey’s death and his alimentary distress:
When the Cardinal saw the capitaini of the garde, he was sore 
astonnyed and shortly became sicke, for then he perceiued some 
great trouble toward him, and for that cause men sayd that he wil-
lyngly toke so much quantitie of strong purgacion that his nature 
was not able to beare it . . . [He was then brought to the Abbey of 
Leicester], wher for very feblenes of nature cause by purgacions and 
vomites he dyed the second night folowyng.166
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The scene is concluded with a telling summation: “This Cardinal as you 
may perceiue in this story was of a great stomacke, for he compted himselfe 
egall with princes, and by craftie suggestion gatte into his handes innu-
merable treasure.” In early modern usage, the concept of stomach entailed 
not only “the pipe wherby meate goeth dowen,” but also sentiments like 
“indignation, anger, vehement wrath, hatred, displeasure, abhorring of 
anie thing that liketh not”— a set of emotions with an obvious proximity 
to moralized disgust.167 In fact, the earliest examples of the verb “to stom-
ach” (as in 1523, when Thomas Cromwell could barely “stomak . . . the 
high Inuries done by the saide Francoys”) entail only the moral applica-
tion of indignation, resentment, and reluctant toleration: it is not until the 
nineteenth century that the verbal form reflects a more literal concern with 
digestive tolerance.168 Wolsey was a man of great stomach, both literally 
and figuratively— and as such, he was a man who routinely activated the 
affective circuits of disgust, in both how he lived and how he died.
Given the nature of contemporary attacks on Wolsey, it is no surprise 
that motifs of contamination, illness, and purgation are literalized in the 
depictions of his death. In such accounts, the metaphors of political disgust 
are desublimated, inscribing themselves nakedly on Wolsey’s increasingly 
hollow form. The cardinal, in fact, seemed aware of the implicit anal-
ogy between this evacuation of his body and the larger evacuation of his 
moral, even spiritual identity: according to Cavendish, in his final days 
he referred to himself as “a very wretche, replett with mysery, not worthy 
to be estemed but for a vile abiecte, vttirly cast a way.”169 This remark is 
telling— for it is in the discourse of abjection, as famously articulated by 
Julia Kristeva, that modern critical theory most squarely engages with 
the issue of disgust. As the “jettisoned object” of the symbolic order, the 
abject exists “on the edge of non- existence and hallucination”; it is those 
necessary preconditions of existence that must, in their loathsomeness, 
be forcefully cast from sight.170 Kristeva explains the notion further in a 
catalog of abjection:
Loathing an item of food, a piece of filth, waste, or dung. The 
spasms and vomiting that protect me. The repugnance, the retching 
that thrusts me to the side and turns me away from defilement, sew-
age, and muck. The shame of compromise, of being in the middle of 
treachery. The fascinated start that leads me toward and separates 
me from them.
Kristeva’s understanding of the abject is a meditation on the dynamics 
of disgust— yet it also helps account for the unmistakable ghostliness of 
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Wolsey’s last days. It seems likely that the ultimate destination of Wol-
sey’s final journey was the executioner’s block; when informed of the 
cardinal’s passing, the Spanish chronicler alleges, Henry VIII remarked 
that “I suppose he guessed that I wanted to give him a different death.”171 
As a walking dead man, Wolsey in his final days typifies the loathsome 
uncanniness of abjection: he was a grotesque parody of the Cardinal 
Wolsey who ruled the realm for nearly two decades, an evacuated shell 
that revealed the ultimate fragility of “identity, system, order.”172 That the 
chroniclers equally insist upon marking the physical decomposition of 
Wolsey’s body suggests the material analogue to the spiritual exile occa-
sioned by King Henry’s rejection. We watch as the cardinal is gradually 
reduced to a corpse, the form of empty matter that entails “the utmost of 
abjection.” Wolsey ends his life as an object of disgust— in the same man-




The Envious Earl of Surrey
“By the Masse, now I see that the olde saied sawe is true,” erupted 
Charles Brandon, Duke of Suffolk, as the Blackfriars divorce proceedings 
of 1529 crumbled before him: “there was neuer Legate nor Cardinall, 
that did good in Englande.”1 During his ascendancy, as we have seen, 
Cardinal Thomas Wolsey evoked widespread disdain in both court and 
country— perhaps most of all in men like Suffolk. For nearly two decades, 
the realm’s great peers could do little but watch as their share of English 
governance, a formerly inalienable birthright, was increasingly consumed 
by the churchman’s voracious political appetite.
That Suffolk himself was newly made did little to soothe this sting, 
and indeed, perhaps intensified it. It was only his grandfather who had 
managed “to emerge from the obscurity of minor merchant status,” and 
Brandon’s own elevation to the dukedom in 1514— ostensibly for service 
in the French campaign of the previous year, but owing primarily to his 
personal friendship with the king— suspiciously recalled the rise of Wol-
sey.2 (The Duke of Buckingham, a man incensed by upstarts lay or clergy, 
was said to grumble that “the King gave fees and offices to boys, rather 
than to noblemen.”)3 In just three years, Suffolk had gone from master of 
the horse to duke of the realm— or, as Erasmus put it, the king had “made 
a nobleman from Dama.”4 This jab suggests the resemblance of Suffolk 
and the slave Dama, a horse- keeper in Persius’s Fifth Satire, whose eman-
cipation does little to elevate his innate boorishness:
Oh you in whom truth is not even
Conceivable, who think that you can twirl a man round once
(Pronouncing the prescribed gibberish) and he’ll be
Free. Here, for instance, is Dama: two cents’ worth of hired man,
Woozy with flat booze and happy to perjure himself
For a handful of wheat. This one his master accords
The ceremonious whirl and, abracadabra, he
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Comes out of the spin a free man, with a first name: he’s
Marcus Dama now!5
From the stables to a ducal spread, or from a dung cart to Hampton 
Court? “Le second Roy,” as Brandon was deemed in 1513 (even before 
his ennobling), or the infamous alter rex?6 To some, Suffolk and Wolsey 
were of a similar feather. This was certainly true, as we saw in the last 
chapter, for one Anthony Irby, who in 1516 condemned the pair for their 
mutual corruption of the young King Henry: “It is a wonder to see the 
kyng, how he is ordered now a days: For the Cardynall & the duke of 
Suffolk, which the kyng haith brought vpp of noughte, do rewle hym in 
all thynges as they lyst; whedr it be by Negramancy, wytchecrafte, or pol-
lycy no mann knoweth.”7
In affective terms, the disgust that Wolsey evokes in Suffolk— or that 
Suffolk evokes in Buckingham and Erasmus, or that both Wolsey and 
Suffolk evoke in Irby— returns us to Mary Douglas’s notion of “matter 
out of place”: in the universe of the Henrician court, these social particles 
are askew, a misalignment threatening to wreak havoc on the system at 
large.8 But it is not simply the threat of contamination that prompts this 
response, but also that of displacement: in its disruption, the offending 
matter has usurped a place from something else, an object exiled from 
its native domain. In the zero- sum court of Henrician England, an ambi-
tious social move risked knocking others out of bounds— a maddening, 
inevitable fact for those who could not help but watch the game unfold 
around them. For every Wolsey, there was a Suffolk, and for every Suf-
folk, a Buckingham; entitlement was an easy thing to have, but harder 
to hold.
But if a disgust response, as we saw in chapter 1, is one affective mani-
festation of social conflict in the courtly sphere— an external performance, 
directed at the offending, usurping object— it often occurs in conjunc-
tion with another emotional reply, far less apt to be publicized, but still 
vitally shaping to the psychic world in which it manifests: the envy that 
is also evoked by the successful courtly rival, the venom that churns in 
the guts of the disgusted, displaced observer. A natural (though by no 
means inevitable) affective companion to disgust, envy is contamination 
by the social maneuvers of another: the rival’s engagement with the exter-
nal world occasions a reciprocal disruption in the internal world of the 
envier, a reminder of the extent to which their mutual affective fates are 
entwined. It is no wonder, then, that envy and the related jealousy have 
been called the “rivalrous emotions,” a designation that indicates their 
inherent connection to the world of social combat.9 The early modern 
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court was nothing if not rivalrous— and understanding the workings of 
envy, it follows, is central to the task of mapping its affective terrain more 
generally.
It would be possible to organize such a study around a figure like 
Wolsey, by considering how an object of obvious disgust and resentment 
inspired envy in the social superiors who were threatened by his advance-
ment. But while certainly valuable, this approach risks obscuring the full 
range of the rivalrous emotions. Feelings like envy are not only evoked 
by the triumphs of our sworn social enemies; the flames of rivalry can be 
fanned by the good fortune of strangers, or— it is sometimes difficult to 
admit— by the success of friends and allies, whose victories, even as we 
celebrate them, still inflict their own wounds upon us. To demonstrate 
such situational complexity, this chapter considers envy as an affective 
touchstone in the life and work of perhaps the realm’s most infamously 
haughty young man: Henry Howard, the poet Earl of Surrey. The son of 
England’s senior peer, Surrey was, to be sure, incensed by the upstarts and 
newly made men with whom he waged social war— but his experience in 
the Henrician court, I argue, was equally shaped by a rivalrous, envious 
orientation towards even those closest to him.
To consider envy thusly finds it lurking in some potentially unexpected 
places— such as, for example, the structure of an early modern elegy. The 
envy of others is treated explicitly in Surrey’s famed elegies to his friend 
and poetic mentor Sir Thomas Wyatt; in “W. resteth here, that quick 
could never rest,” “Dyvers thy death doo dyverslye bemone,” and “In the 
rude age when science was not so rife,” Surrey affirms his own relation-
ship to Wyatt by denouncing the envious hearts of false mourners.10 But 
the elegiac poet, I argue, was not immune to envy himself. The first half of 
this chapter thus considers the rivalrous emotions in “So crewell prison” 
(c. 1537), Surrey’s haunting memorial to his boyhood friend Henry Fitz-
roy, Duke of Richmond— better known to history as the illegitimate son 
of King Henry VIII, deceased suddenly in his late teens. After even a cur-
sory reading of “So crewell prison,” it is difficult to remain unmoved by 
the tenderness of Surrey’s commemoration: cast as a reflection on the 
experience of shared adolescence, the elegy offers an astonishingly inti-
mate glance into the formative years of two of Henrician England’s most 
powerful young men. But despite this intimacy, idealization, and even 
latent eroticism— aspects that have occupied the elegy’s previous com-
mentators— I suggest that the poem’s primary emotional subtext registers 
a different kind of impulse.11 Composed during a period of personal tur-
moil for Surrey— after an act of violence at court, he had been imprisoned 
in the same grounds where as a youth he lived with Richmond— the poem 
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reveals, like much of Surrey’s work, the poet’s profound ambivalence 
toward the Henrician political world that inscribed his identity, and his 
profound ambivalence toward the friend and symbolic kinsman whose 
unexpected death left him to negotiate its corridors alone.
Moving forward in Surrey’s life, the chapter’s second half tracks the 
rivalrous dynamics that shaped the earl’s spectacular and sudden demise: 
one that would cost him his head at barely the age of thirty, charged 
with a treasonous plot to seize the English crown. The documentary 
record surrounding Surrey’s downfall is flush with the affective register 
of envy, as the earl becomes symbolically locked in a tortured, ambiva-
lent relationship with the nine- year- old Prince Edward— half- brother to 
his departed friend Richmond, and a boy whose future reign Surrey had 
particular interest in shaping. The mechanics of envy and jealousy, as they 
are understood both by modern researchers and their early modern coun-
terparts, underpin not only Surrey’s fall, but the emotional atmosphere of 
the dying king’s court.
A model of these (inherently ambivalent) rivalrous emotions offers a 
framing context for the key events of Surrey’s life— and a framing context 
for the courtly crisis occasioned by the end of King Henry’s four- decade 
reign, in which England’s most powerful men grasped and clawed for 
their share of the country’s future.
Surrey’s “Noble Fere”: The Life and Death of Henry Fitzroy
As readers have long observed, “So crewell prison” offers a moving depic-
tion of Surrey and Richmond’s personal friendship. At the remove of 
some 400 years, however, what is not as apparent is Richmond’s identity 
as a figure of national consequence in Henrician England. Despite his 
illegitimacy, Henry Fitzroy was the only surviving royal son in the first 
half of King Henry’s reign, and the details of his brief life are accordingly 
chronicled in the dispatches of ambassadors, councilors, and courtiers.12 
Fitzroy’s symbolic importance to English politics provides the civic con-
text for Surrey’s personal grief, and the action of the elegy variously 
engages both the private and the public consequences of his friend’s 
untimely death. But Richmond remains relatively obscure to many mod-
ern readers of “So crewell prison,” whose engagement with the young 
duke seldom exceeds the bounds of his traditional resting place, the brief 
explanatory footnote. To appreciate fully the force of Surrey’s elegy, it is 
necessary first to excavate the historical Richmond, in order to gauge his 
significance both to Surrey and to the English body politic.
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As the sexual appetite of Henry VIII is a cornerstone of modern lore 
about the king, it is a bit surprising to find that Henry Fitzroy was the 
only illegitimate child to be recognized during his long stay on the Eng-
lish throne. Despite his son’s bastardy, King Henry wasted little time in 
grooming him for a future place in English politics: after his birth in 
1519, Fitzroy’s arrangements were immediately undertaken by his godfa-
ther Wolsey, and the boy was only six when his elevation to the dukedoms 
of Richmond and Somerset in 1525 made him England’s most decorated 
peer. As the nominal head of the crown’s revived attempt to establish con-
ciliar management in the north, Richmond spent his early years among 
his own household at Sheriff Hutton, where he was immersed in both 
humanist learning and the aristocratic arts— an educational regime apt 
for a boy many already thought could one day rule the realm. In 1529 he 
served a short term as nominal lord lieutenant of Ireland, and in the same 
year, the ten- year- old boy was summoned to the first sessions of what 
would come to be known as the Reformation Parliament.
It was also in 1529 that Richmond entered the orbit of the Howard 
family: after Wolsey’s demise his care was transferred to Thomas Howard, 
Duke of Norfolk, uncle of the increasingly influential Anne Boleyn and 
father to the then thirteen- year- old Earl of Surrey. Almost immediately, 
Norfolk took steps to forge a bond between the promising royal child 
and his own precocious son— who was, according to the imperial ambas-
sador Eustace Chapuys, already writing letters in “very good Latin.”13 At 
a private meeting in December 1529, Norfolk informed Chapuys of this 
“project which he had”:
The King has entrusted to me the education of his bastard son, 
the duke of Richmond, of whom my own son may become in time 
preceptor and tutor, that he may attain both knowledge and virtue, 
so that a friendship thus cemented promises fair to be very strong 
and firm.
Though the future Queen Anne, a Howard relation, was already sharing 
the king’s bedchamber, this was not enough for Norfolk, ever the patri-
arch; it was by means of Surrey and Richmond’s projected friendship 
that he hoped to secure a place for the Howards in England’s long- term, 
post- Henrician future.
In April 1530 Richmond left Sheriff Hutton for his new residence at 
Windsor, where he and Surrey spent several years leading the life recalled 
in “So crewell prison.” Their growing friendship took the boys beyond 
Windsor’s walls, and in the autumn of 1532 Richmond and Surrey joined 
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the royal train to Calais on its diplomatic mission to secure French sup-
port for King Henry’s ongoing divorce proceedings. After Henry returned 
to England in November, Richmond and Surrey remained with the French 
court, as pledge of the pending Franco- English treaty; entertained by the 
French princes, the boys wintered in Paris, enjoyed spring at the magnifi-
cent Palace of Fontainebleau, and spent the summer touring the southern 
provinces on progress with King Francis. Recalled to England in August 
1533, they became further entwined when Richmond was wed to Sur-
rey’s sister Mary that November (though the couple’s youth prevented 
the union from being consummated). Fitzroy’s death in July 1536 was 
sudden: Chapuys reports on the 8th of that month that Richmond had 
been judged “consumptive, and incurable,” and on the 18th Lord Lisle 
in Calais was similarly informed that “my lorde of Rychemonde [is] very 
syck.”14 King Henry, who had both a personal and political stake in his 
son’s health, was especially distraught, and Chapuys wrote to his supe-
riors that Henry had “no hope that the duke of Richmond can live long, 
whom he certainly intended to make his successor, and but for his illness, 
would have got him declared so by parliament.”15
On July 22, Wriothesley records, the seventeen- year- old Richmond 
“departed out of this transitorie lief at the Kinges place in Sainct James.”16 
His son’s death could not have come at a more politically volatile time 
for Henry: just months earlier, the king had executed his second wife 
and married his third, and it was only days before Fitzroy’s death that 
Parliament had finalized its attempt to give shape to the now- muddled 
succession. Though details remain unclear, it seems that Henry did not 
want the distraction and stress of a public funeral for Richmond: on 
August 3, Chapuys reported that the body had “been secretly carried in 
a wagon, covered with straw, without any company except two persons 
clothed in green, who followed at a distance, into Norfolk, where the 
Duke his father- in- law will have him buried.”17 Unfortunately for Nor-
folk, however, the job was apparently bungled, and the duke soon found 
himself a victim of Henry’s famous temper. With a hand “full full full 
of color and agonye,” Norfolk attempted to defend his performance to 
Thomas Cromwell, the king’s principal secretary:
This nyght at viij a cloke came dyuers lettres to me from my frendes 
and seruantes abowtes london, all agreing in one tale, not a litle to 
my sorow, that the kynges highnes shuld be in gret displesure with 
me because my lord of richmond was not carried honorably and 
so buryed: my lord I dout not ye know the kynges plesure was that 
his body shuld be conveyed secretly in a close cart vnto thedford 
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and at my sewte thider and there so buryed; and accordyng to the 
same I sent order with both the cottons and commanded them that 
his body shall haue be wrapped in lede and a close cart provyded 
for hym, whose body was neyther put in lede nor no close cart 
provyded for him nor yet conveyed veray secretly.18
Fortunately for Norfolk, the matter was soon forgotten by the king— but 
not, we must imagine, by Surrey, whose virtuoso poetic commemoration 
in “So crewell prison” is a natural counterpoint to Richmond’s unexpect-
edly humble burial. At the very least, we do know that the earl remained 
devastated by his friend’s death; months later, Norfolk reported that Sur-
rey had been sick with grief for “a great parte of the last yere,” and he 
was still “very weke, his nature ronnyng from hym habundauntlie . . . for 
thought of my lord of Richemond.”19
But unfortunately for the earl, there would be little time to grieve in 
the immediate wake of Richmond’s death. October 1536 marked the 
beginning of the popular religious uprisings known as the Pilgrimage of 
Grace, and both Norfolk and Surrey played strategic roles in their even-
tual suppression.20 In early 1537 order was finally reestablished after a 
confused campaign, and in the conflict’s aftermath Surrey remained away 
from court on account of illness.21 When he rejoined the court in July, the 
specter of the Pilgrimage brought with it disastrous consequences: in an 
infamous episode, Surrey seems to have struck another courtier (tradition-
ally said to be Edward Seymour, brother of the pregnant queen) to defy 
the treasonous charge that the Howards had secretly sympathized with 
the Catholic rebels.22 Though respect for Surrey’s rank spared the loss of 
his hand (the routine penalty for acts of violence within the bounds of 
court), the twenty- year- old earl was nonetheless reprimanded and con-
fined to Windsor in July 1537— a palace still haunted by the memory 
of Richmond, who had been dead for only a year.23 “So crewell prison,” 
written during his stay, is the product of both this period of custody and 
Surrey’s grief— grief that would remain with the earl until the end of his 
short life.
Surrey, to be sure, was greatly moved by the loss of his closest compan-
ion; though destined to outlive his friend by only a decade, he never in 
his adult life seems to have matched the amicitia perfecta he enjoyed 
with Richmond. Yet to understand the full complexity of this bond, it is 
necessary to say another word about Surrey’s emotional profile. Surrey 
enacted— and indeed, perhaps helped inaugurate— a social archetype that 
would become increasingly prevalent throughout the sixteenth century. 
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I mean the angry young man of privilege, who found his way of compre-
hending the world— one defined by warfare, neo- chivalric cults of honor, 
and a masculine investment in the aristocratic arts— perilously threatened 
by a changing social order, in which kings and queens were happy to 
raise an army of bureaucrats and middlemen to administer their increas-
ingly centralized realms.24 Though noblemen such as Surrey continued 
to serve a crucial function in England’s political hierarchy, they found 
less room to actualize their own ambitions, and some, at least, developed 
a temperament marked by frustration, impulsivity, and recklessness— 
especially toward the hated social upstarts (such as Seymour), whom they 
saw as usurping the nobility’s God- given role as monarchal advisers. Sur-
rey exemplified this brand of sixteenth- century man; as we will see in 
later chapters, Sir Philip Sidney was something of this type, as certainly 
was the infamous Robert Devereux, Earl of Essex at the end of Elizabeth’s 
reign. And though these flames burned bright, they also burned quickly: 
Sidney died in war at thirty- one years of age, while Surrey and Essex died 
by the axe at thirty and thirty- five respectively. In his short life, Surrey 
was imprisoned at least three times for unsanctioned violence— though, 
because of his social standing (as we saw above), his punishments were 
perfunctory. As Surrey was supremely aware, the distant blood of royalty 
was in his veins— and in the tense, final months of King Henry’s reign, it 
was alleged that he had plotted to seize the crown himself from the young 
Prince Edward. Though these charges did not stick, Surrey was finally 
deemed guilty of quartering in his badge the ancient arms of Edward 
the Confessor— an implicit claim of royalty, so it was said, and thus an 
implicit threat to the king’s prerogative. This heraldic crime was enough 
for Surrey to lose his head in January 1547, the last person executed in 
Henry’s long, bloody reign.25
Surrey’s sensitivity to matters of precedence, honor, and social standing 
ultimately cost him his life. When reading “So crewell prison,” it is thus 
important to consider what else, besides grief, he may have felt toward 
Richmond, both before and after his death. It is possible to speculate, 
especially when we reframe the question: what else did Surrey, at the ages 
of both thirteen and twenty, feel toward the best friend who was younger, 
but of a higher rank; who was illegitimate, but was a royal son; and who 
was, by many accounts, being groomed to rule the realm? How did a 
young man of Surrey’s volatile temperament respond to this unique play-
mate, perhaps the only adolescent in the realm whose standing surpassed 
his own?
Though any answers must be tentative, we can grid what we know 
of Surrey into the larger social matrix that underpinned Henrician 
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aristocratic culture. This task must take its bearing in the familial inter-
play of Howard and Tudor— a relationship of enormous psychological 
complexity, perhaps most of all to Surrey. To put it another way, what did 
it mean to Surrey that he was a Howard, what did it mean that he was 
not a Tudor, and how did the answers to such questions inflect his friend-
ship with Richmond? Buried in the Howard family’s ancestral tomb, 
Richmond was something of an honorary Howard; for his own part, 
we will see below, Surrey often indulged in fantasies that seem to efface 
the distinction between Howard and Tudor. But such fantasies were just 
that. Surrey was not a Tudor, and his increasingly flagrant insistence 
on the Howard family’s ancestral royalty suggests the envy and aggres-
sion inherent in such projective identifications. There are many reasons 
to suspect that Surrey’s response to Richmond’s death was profoundly 
ambivalent, underpinned by the long- fought competition of two power-
ful feelings: the idyllic fantasy of sameness, in which he and Richmond 
lived and ruled the realm together as brothers, and the agonizing reality 
of difference, that cold- blooded cultural logic assuring finally that Surrey 
and Richmond were not the same, and that Howard was not Tudor.
When reading the poem, this is the question I’d like us to keep in mind: 
is it reasonable to believe that a man like Surrey, whose concern with 
matters of honor and precedence was arguably pathological, would have 
felt no envy, no resentment, and no anger at the superior fortune of his 
friend? I think the answer is convincingly no, and that the manifest grief of 
“So crewell prison” is undercut throughout by a darker affective register. 
More specifically, I detect in the poem a node comprised of the rivalrous 
emotions I introduced above: envy, jealousy, and latent aggression. In “So 
crewell prison,” it is possible to explore the poem’s contestatory energy 
across these distinct, yet affiliated emotions; their collective operation, I 
suggest, fuels the ambivalence that ultimately shapes the expression of 
Surrey’s grief.
The Experience of Envy
For the reasons discussed above, envy seems to have been a core compo-
nent of Surrey’s emotional profile.26 But what, precisely, characterizes the 
phenomenon of envy? Despite its apparent universality— recent scholars 
note that nearly “all cultures have a word meaning something close to 
envy, even though words for other common social phenomena may be 
absent”— defining the sentiment is deceptively difficult.27 In contempo-
rary English, this confusion arises largely from a lexical imprecision: in 
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common usage, the word “envy” is often exchanged freely with overlap-
ping terms like “jealousy” or “resentment.” Yet both philosophical and 
empirical research insists upon the importance of distinguishing envy 
from the related rivalrous emotions, a taxonomy that will be central to 
my subsequent discussion of “So crewell prison.”
In literary studies of the early modern period, envy most obviously 
features in René Girard’s notion of “mimetic desire,” the process through 
which one party’s desire inflames that of another.28 This concept alone, 
however, does not account fully for the variety of contexts in which this 
rivalrous sentiment emerges— envious desire is not always mimetic— and 
it is thus important to supplement our understanding with the insights of 
alternate research traditions. Most basically, of course, scholars charac-
terize envy as the discomfort we feel at another’s good fortune, the pain 
that accompanies the recognition of “another’s superior quality, achieve-
ment, or possession.”29 To experience envy, however, is to experience any 
number of concurrent feelings, and the variegated nature of its pain sug-
gests that envy is a compound emotion: as Maria Miceli and Cristiano 
Castelfranchi note, envy can be theorized across a variety of affective 
spectra, including longing- greed- covetousness, admiration- emulation, 
anger- resentment- sense of injustice, and depression- despair- inferiority.30 
Like many emotions, a degree of cognitive appraisal is crucial in the 
envious subject, but it is the specifically comparative nature of envy— 
the awareness of one’s own lack and another’s intolerable gain— that 
distinguishes it from non- differentiated hostility or antagonism. As this 
unfavorable comparison becomes embedded in feelings of social infe-
riority, the subject’s self- respect is accordingly threatened; this affective 
mechanism proves especially intense for a man like Surrey, for whom 
social standing is paramount.31 This is because envy (as well as jealousy) is 
most powerful when a rival threatens some domain that we have deemed 
central to our sense of self:
The critical variable that determines whether the successes of close 
others make us feel good about ourselves (reflection) or have the 
opposite effect (comparison) is the relevance of the other’s success 
or personal qualities to our self- definition. Reflection results when 
the other’s performance is in an unimportant domain. We are moti-
vated to maintain high self- evaluation, so we bask in the reflected 
glory of our friends’ unimportant (to us) successes because they are 
not threatening to us. But when personal relevance (i.e., domain 
importance) is high, we are likely to experience envy or jealousy.32
The Envious Earl of Surrey 65
Richmond was a rival that could trigger Surrey like no other. As this 
passage suggests more generally, however, the envier’s precise attitude vis- 
à- vis the rival (and thus the coveted advantage) is contextually dependent, 
leading to an affective field that is often contested; this dynamic reflects 
the ambivalence that I detect in “So crewell prison.” Recent research sug-
gests that there are at least two distinct forms of envy, unique in their 
associated thoughts and actions: the malicious (or true) envier longs to 
destroy the rival’s advantage, whereas the benign envier (free of venom, 
but not frustration) aspires to join the rival in the desired position.33 Envy 
is an amorphous emotion, capable of evoking a multitude of concurrent 
responses: the envier is tortured both by an attraction to the unfulfilled, 
desired object and by the venom occasioned by its distance.
In early Tudor England, envy was an equally vexed concept.34 The Eng-
lish word “envy” ultimately derives from the Latin invidia/invidere, to 
look upon (in + videre) with malice, scorn, or rivalry; the basic sense 
of malicious envy was thus actively used in the period, as Renaissance 
thinkers inherited a classical and medieval Christian framework that 
denounced invidia among the deadliest of sins.35 In Thomas Wilson’s A 
Christian Dictionarie, “enuie” is neatly defined as that “affection which 
makes men grieue & fret at the good and prosperity of others,” and the 
“enuious” soul is defined as one “who repineth and grutcheth at the wel-
fare and happinesse of others.”36 In the Renaissance emblem tradition, 
the conventional iconography of invidia (popularized by Ovid) portrays 
Envy as a gaunt, haggard woman, who is imagined “fast gnawing on the 
flesh / Of Snakes and Todes, the filthie foode that keepes hir vices fresh.”37 
Whitney’s collection offers a typical example in its commentary:
This, Enuie is: leane, pale, and full of yeares,
Who with the blisse of other pines awaie.
And what declares, her eating vipers broode?
That poysoned thoughtes, bee euermore her foode.38
In The Faerie Queene, Spenser adapts this trope in his famous portrayal 
of Envie:
inwardly he chawed his owne maw
At neibors welth, that made him euer sad;
For death it was, when any good he saw,
And wept, that cause of weeping none he had,
But when he heard of harme, he wexed wondrous glad.39
66 Chapter 2
Closer to Surrey’s time, Alexander Barclay’s Ship of Fools (a translation/
adaptation of Sebastian Brant’s late fifteenth- century Das Narrenschiff) 
offers a similar depiction of those “whiche greatly them delyte / In others 
losse”:
If one haue plenty of treasour and ryches
Or by his merytis obteyne great dignyte
These folys enuyous that of the same haue les
Enuy by malyce, the others hye degre
And if another of honour haue plente
They it enuy and wysshe that they myght sterue . . . 
These folys desyre agaynst both lawe and right
Anoters good if they may get the same
If they may nat by flaterynge nor by myght
Than by fals malyce they hym enuy and blame.40
In its basic configuration— the painful desire to level another’s advantage— 
the sense of malicious envy in early modern English was quite similar to 
the modern definitions we have seen above.
Yet Renaissance thinkers also utilized a concept of benign envy, even 
if no such lexical category existed. Consider, for example, the reaction of 
Sir William Cornwallis to the heroes of the ancient world:
When I heare of any famous Action of our time . . . it takes away 
my sleepe, not with Enuie, but with an honest Emulation. I desire to 
robbe no man of his Glory, but to participate with Experience: well 
it pleaseth not my Destiny, I hope it will do, that’s my Comfort: In 
the meane time I will see Battailes in Imagination, and reade them, 
since I may not be in them.41
As Cornwallis makes clear, this desire to emulate is not predicated on rob-
bing another of his glory, or destroying the object of envy. Yet the feeling 
that disturbs his sleep seems hardly pleasant, and is therefore distinct from 
the less agitative positions of admiration or reverence. Despite his protesta-
tion, Cornwallis describes the emotional configuration of benign envy, even 
though the term was not linguistically native to the early modern period.
In fact, Cornwallis’s professed distinction between envy and emula-
tion reveals another contour to the early modern understanding of envy. 
Despite the common impulse to keep both terms distinct— such as in the 
late sixteenth- century treatise that distinguishes “countentious enuies” 
from “honest emulations”— the word “envy” was nonetheless also used 
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in the period to signify an emotionally neutral, or even admirable, form of 
emulation.42 This lexical overlap was certainly native to Surrey’s period: 
in The Image of Gouernance (1541), Sir Thomas Elyot describes how 
a counselor of high merit will “ingender in noble men an honest enuy, 
eyther to excede hym in vertue, or at the leste to be iudged equall vnto 
hym,” while John Palsgrave (incidentally, Richmond’s former tutor) imag-
ines that his translation of a neo- Latin classroom drama will move “some 
lyttell grayne of honeste and vertuous enuye” in the hearts of King Henry’s 
subjects.43 In fact, some modern studies of envy have also argued for the 
emotional specificity of emulation, an orientation in which “there is no ill 
will towards the advantaged party,” an innocuous rival perceived merely 
“as an example to follow (and possibly surpass).”44 Though it is not nec-
essary here to enumerate the precise differences between benign envy and 
emulative envy (a subject on which scholars disagree), it is important to 
note that there is a category of emotional response (often labeled “envy” 
in modern and early modern speech) that entails not pain, but genuine 
feelings of admiration and inspiration at another’s advantage. Whether 
or not we deem such feelings a species of envy, the larger point remains: 
notions of envy and emulation are entwined, suggesting the ambivalence 
so often evoked by another’s social superiority.
With these dynamics of envy in mind, I’ll now turn to the poem itself. 
Despite its obvious elegiac action, “So crewell prison” is also inundated 
with the emotional investments I have outlined above in my taxonomy 
of envy: a tangled network of malice, desire, admiration, emulation, and 
(above all) ambivalence.
The Envious Elegy: “So Crewell Prison”
At Windsor Castle in the summer of 1537, Surrey found a ready cir-
cumstance to conjure the memory of his childhood friend. Though a 
meditation on the poet’s past, “So crewell prison” takes its bearing from 
this contextualized present, and it is in this manner that Surrey com-
pounds the generic action of elegy by dramatizing the act of memory 
that inspires the elegy itself. A foundational motif throughout Surrey’s 
work, memory thematically governs such poems as “When ragyng love 
with extreme payne” and “Dyvers thy death doo dyverslye bemone,” as 
well as (and perhaps most prominently) his translation of the Aeneid.45 
In “So crewell prison,” however, the mechanics of memory are uniquely 
doubled: the poem recalls both a person and a place, and it reveals how 
such memories necessarily overlap.
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Though Henry Fitzroy becomes the eventual subject of “So crewell 
prison,” the poem begins with an address to Windsor itself:
So crewell prison howe could betyde, alas,
As prowde Wyndsour, where I in lust and joye
With a kinges soon my childishe yeres did passe,
In greater feast then Priams sonnes of Troye.46
By outlining the poem’s topographical and temporal scope, this apostro-
phe introduces the atmosphere of ambiguity that underpins “So crewell 
prison.” The tangled syntax of the first two lines, which collapses “prison” 
into “Wyndsour,” reflects the poet’s disorienting confinement within a 
familiar setting, while Surrey analogously disrupts the poem’s temporal 
frame by invoking complementary images from both the personal and 
the (mytho- )historical past. As a site of memory, Windsor becomes con-
flicted ground: its celebration of Richmond is occasioned only by his 
death, while Surrey’s return to this generative site comes under rather 
unpleasant circumstances. The hostile Windsor of 1537, tortured by this 
paradox, becomes the natural analogue to the prelapsarian Windsor of 
Surrey’s youth— until, that is, the poem reveals that even this memory of 
Windsor is subject, in more subtle form, to the emotional complexity that 
characterizes the poet’s description of his present state.
If it is hard to square the Windsor of the past with the Windsor of 
the present, Surrey’s celebratory comparison of Windsor and Troy is also 
troubled. In the most basic sense, the image is tempered by the reader’s 
knowledge of Troy’s ultimate collapse— a fact that casts a shadow over 
Surrey’s recollection, and that prefigures the conceptual fall of Windsor 
in the wake of Richmond’s death. But the precise terms in which Sur-
rey frames this association are suggestive. In one sense, yoking Troy and 
Windsor has an obvious attraction; as Candice Lines notes, with this 
image Surrey effectively “writes himself into the royal family, as Rich-
mond’s brother and a king’s son himself.”47 Yet despite this idealization, 
a set of darker associations also lurks in the margins of this metaphor. If 
Surrey and Richmond stand as the Trojan royal sons, Henry VIII must 
figure as King Priam— a particularly ominous identity for Henry, when 
considered next to the brutal rendition of Priam’s death (by the hand of 
Pyrrhus) that Surrey would later translate in the Aeneid:
At the altar him trembling gan he draw
Wallowing through the blodshed of his son;
And his left hand all clasped in his heare,
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With his right arme drewe fourth his shining sword,
Which in his side he thrust up to the hilts.48
Furthermore, the very association of Henry and Priam has an inherently 
ironic currency, as the symbolically fecund Priam (with his fifty sons) 
stands as the crushing inverse to Henry’s own generative difficulties. 
The image has a final twist when we recall that Pyrrhus also slaughtered 
several of Priam’s sons. Polites, the most notable case, is gruesomely 
described by Surrey as
fleing fourth till he came now in sight
Of his parentes, before their face fell down,
Yelding the ghost, with flowing streames of blood.49
Unpacked fully, the logic of the metaphor suggests a latent aggression 
not only toward King Henry, but also toward Richmond, and even 
toward himself— the poet casts himself explicitly as a Trojan prince, and 
implicitly as a Trojan- slaughterer.50 Though Surrey had probably not yet 
come to translate his Aeneid in 1537, he was undoubtedly aware of the 
metaphor’s implications: by beginning his elegy with the comparison 
of Windsor to Troy, he introduces an emotional ambivalence that will 
increasingly preoccupy the poem.51 Surrey’s status as a son of Troy is a 
site of both idealization and aggression, conflicting emotional responses 
that come to define the poet’s attitude to his lost friend.
It should also be clear how the double logic of the opening stanza rep-
licates the emotional architecture I have associated with envy. By effacing 
the hereditary distinction between Surrey and Richmond, and by insist-
ing instead on their symbolic equivalency as Trojan princes, the poem 
enacts the behavioral profile associated with benign envy: it eliminates 
the social disparity by elevating Surrey to a position coequal to the rival’s 
advantage. Yet, given the ominous history of Troy, the metaphor equally 
contains a violent, malicious fantasy, culminating in the destruction of 
both the rival and his advantage: a textbook enactment of “true” envy. 
“Upward social comparison,” observes Richard H. Smith and his col-
leagues, “often represents an unattainable, frustrated desire, invidiously 
personified in the advantaged person.”52 And, as further research suggests, 
the pain and frustration of such upward social comparison is amplified 
enormously when the envied party’s advantage seems to be absolute: as 
with, for example, the cultural logic that assured social preference for 
the younger Richmond, despite his youth and bastardy.53 Given this con-
text, I suggest that Surrey harbored no small amount of this social envy, 
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and the opening lines of “So crewell prison” reveal the poet vacillating 
between an emulous love for his symbolic brother and a malicious aggres-
sion toward his social superior.
As the poem continues, Surrey depicts a variety of scenes which 
similarly enact this ambivalence, and which trigger the emotional con-
figurations of envy. Masculine contests are a primary occasion in which 
Richmond is remembered— and though these activities certainly depict 
the tender act of adolescent bonding, they also introduce to the poem 
a more explicit dynamic of rivalry, standing as a narrative analogue to 
Surrey’s emotional ambivalence. Athletic competition was a cornerstone 
of Surrey and Richmond’s boyhood training in the aristocratic arts; such 
contests form a central motif of Surrey’s recollection, animating much of 
the poem’s charm and pathos. These bouts, however, carry a sense of both 
contention and intimacy, and the aggression they entail may be thought 
to channel Surrey’s envious, emulous relationship to his friend. Surrey’s 
description of mock combat offers an explicit example: “On fomynge 
horse, with swordes and frendlye hertes / With chere as thoughe the one 
should overwhelme, / Where we have fought and chased oft with dartes.”54 
The stark contrast of “sordes” and “frendlye” suggests the proximity of 
combat and camaraderie within their role- play, their antagonistic “chere” 
(Middle English, “countenance”) confirming that the feigned pretense of 
mutual aggression is an integral part of their combative drama. Though 
the combat may be fictionalized, the rewards of athletic triumph inspire 
the genuine exchange of violent energies; this ambivalence is native to the 
ritual altogether, which serves as preparation for the bloody transactions 
of real combat in the future.
In the stanza devoted to hunting, we find a series of equally pregnant 
associations, latent with the material of envious rivalry:
The wyld forest, the clothed holtes with grene,
With raynes avald and swift ybrethed horse,
With crye of houndes and mery blastes bitwen,
Where we did chase the fearfull hart a force.55
It is certainly true that such lines can be read in terms of eroticism: the 
classical exempla of Adonis and Hippolytus provide a model for asso-
ciating the hunt with the repression and sublimation of sexual desire, 
and Wyatt’s famed “Whoso List to Hunt” may have offered Surrey an 
immediate precedent for the metaphor.56 But the passage also depicts the 
process through which the adolescent boys were socialized as members 
of the warring class: presumably accompanied by adult men, Surrey and 
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Richmond here learned to generate and regulate the same violence that 
underpinned the aristocracy’s crucial sociopolitical identity as an instru-
ment of controlled force. Such depictions of the symbolic, regulated 
violence of adolescent bonding suggest the more naked hostility that is 
latent in Surrey’s emotional response to Richmond’s memory. And cru-
cially for boys like Surrey and Richmond, jousting and hunting were not 
socially neutral acts: they were imbued with the dynamics of age, identity, 
and birthright. Accordingly, because they activate the mechanism of social 
competition, they are also implicated in the ambivalent trajectory of iden-
tification and envy I have located elsewhere. Surrey both did and did not 
want to become one with his friend, just as he both did and did not want 
to overtake him symbolically— an emotional state, I think, that manifests 
remarkably in the quasi- aggression of Surrey’s grieving memories.
The Experience of Jealousy
Of course, aggression and rivalry in “So crewell prison” are not limited to 
such boyhood exercises. Though much time at Windsor was conducted 
under the sign of Mars, an important share was also governed by Venus, 
and the poem’s wistful memories of the erotic hunt naturally compliment 
the boys’ adventures in the woods and lists. To this end, it is important 
to expand our discussion of envy by considering a distinct but intimately 
related phenomenon: the rivalrous dynamics of jealousy.
As is the case with envy, it is no easy task to arrive at a working definition 
of “jealousy”; though the emotion contains its own affective mechanism, 
in common speech “jealousy” routinely stands in for the affiliated “envy.” 
Because of this confusion, scholars have devoted no small time to parsing 
the two emotions, and both theoretical and empirical research suggests 
that each has a set of unique characteristics.57 More precisely, “envy” and 
“jealousy” have something of an opposite valence: whereas the envier 
suffers on behalf of some current lack— the coveted advantage, just out 
of reach— the jealous subject cannot tolerate the threat to something he 
or she already possesses (or thinks to possess)— and the anticipation of 
its loss, whether reasonable or unreasonable, fuels the subsequent agita-
tion. In most situations, the threat is occasioned by a specific rival; hence, 
jealousy is most often thought in terms of a three- party relationship, as in 
the familiar case of romantic jealousy.58 Yet, despite these differences of 
orientation, envy and jealousy often co- occur (as is clear from ordinary 
experience), and their affective domains overlap. At the categorical level, 
envy and jealousy tend to prompt similar reactions: “both can involve 
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some form of hostility (envy may produce resentment and rancor; jeal-
ousy may produce anger over betrayal), and both can involve some form 
of lowered self- esteem and sadness (envy because of inferiority and long-
ing and jealousy because of rejection and loss).”59 Though distinct, these 
emotions are clearly linked in our common experience, and it is no sur-
prise that both emerge in the affective subtext of “So crewell prison.”
It is equally unsurprising that “jealousy,” like “envy,” was a quite flex-
ible term in early modern English. Renaissance usage often entailed the 
basic configuration of three- party rivalry, as shown in this verse “descrip-
tion of Iealousie”:
It is the death of ioy, twixt man and wife,
Where loue is too much loaden with mistrust:
It makes the maide to feare the married life,
Least firmest faith should fall to be vniust:
It beats the braine and grindes the wit to dust,
It makes the wise a foole, the wealthie poore,
And her that wold kepe house, to ope the dore.60
Then, as now, jealousy was a common condition of wedded life. A similar 
sentiment is repeated in an advice manual of 1540:
Wedded persons may thus passe ouer theyr lyues quietly and 
without complaynynges, yf the husbande become deafe, and the 
wyfe blynde. Signifyenge, that womankynde is much subiecte to 
the sycknes of  gelousie, wherof vndoubtedly springeth greate 
variaunce & playntes.  .  .  . [She’d thus avoid] the suspicion to be 
made Cokequen [a female cuckold], yf she wanted her eye syghte.61
And I needn’t spend more time showing that romantic jealousy was an 
active concept in the early modern period: Shakespeare, after all, pro-
vided us with its most enduring epithet.
But like “envy,” the term “jealousy” also encompassed a broader reg-
ister. Descended from the Greek zelos, jealousy in the Renaissance was 
intimately connected to the notion of zeal; as such, it too participated in a 
much larger semantic network, of contextually fluid association. Jealousy, 
like zeal, entails the intense activation of emotional energy— and like zeal, 
its ethical valence is shaped by the particular whims of the speaker. This 
ambivalence is well reflected in early modern usage. While Thomas Wil-
son, for example, defines jealousy in the sense of triangulated (romantic) 
rivalry— “Griefe, for suspition of dishonesty in married yoake- fellowes, 
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Husbands or Wiues”— he also offers a positive sense of the term: “One 
which loueth others truely, not for lucre and glory to him- selfe, but for the 
benefit of the persons loued. . . . Heere Iealous is taken in good part.”62 
Furthermore, jealousy (like envy) also had a close association with the 
act of emulation. Indeed, in ancient Greek, zelos can refer to honorable 
emulation, as in Aristotle’s Rhetoric: “Emulation [zelos] . . . is therefore 
virtuous and characteristic of virtuous men, whereas envy [phthonos] is 
base and characteristic of base men.”63 In the early modern period, the 
amorphous boundary between these terms is illustrated splendidly by an 
annotation in the Geneva Bible, which describes the Apostles’ persecu-
tors as “ful of blinde zeale, emulation and ielousie.”64 As with envy, the 
experience of jealousy is varied, involving ambivalent feelings of rivalry, 
aggression, and emulation, often simultaneously.
In “So crewell prison,” notions of jealousy offer a valuable guide for 
considering the specifically eroticized competition latent in the poem— 
that is, when a third party becomes implicated in Surrey and Richmond’s 
combative play. Windsor’s “ladyes bright of hewe” provide this source 
of libidinal competition for the boys, whose attempts at teenage love are 
often imbued with rivalrous energy. 65 This dynamic can be detected in the 
passage describing their love- struck banter:
The secret groves, which ofte we made resound
Of pleasaunt playnt and of our ladyes prayes,
Recording soft what grace eche one had found,
What hope of spede, what dred of long delayes.66
Within the pastoral world of Surrey’s idealized Windsor, such ostensibly 
erotic (and homoerotic) expression must also be read as contentious— the 
kind of rustic sparring Surrey may have encountered in his own read-
ing of the pastoral mode, and that Spenser would go on to portray so 
notably in The Shepheardes Calendar. Though ostensibly good- natured, 
such poetic contests serve as a further analogue to the physical rivalry of 
masculine play.
But more notably, Surrey himself reveals the thematic proximity of 
jealousy and eroticized rivalry in the stanza devoted to a sporting event 
with Richmond:
The palme playe, where, dispoyled for the game,
With dased eyes oft we by gleames of love
Have mist the ball and got sight of our dame
To bayte her eyes which kept the leddes above.67
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In his memory of the disrupted game, Surrey recalls both the envious 
rivalry of physical competition and the jealous rivalry of erotic competi-
tion. On one hand, the match is another example of direct engagement 
between Surrey and Richmond, an extension of the various war games 
described elsewhere in the poem. In this sense, vying for both skill and 
advantage entails envy and emulation: as Kenneth Burke elegantly notes, 
“what we call ‘competition’ is better described as men’s attempt to out- 
imitate one another.”68 Yet on the other, Surrey suggests that the true 
source of the boys’ contention lies not in the action on the court, but 
in their battle to attract the female spectators: here, the three- term con-
figuration of jealousy rules the day, governing Surrey and Richmond’s 
development as both aristocrats and as sexually mature men.
As a concrete site in which eroticism and rivalry converge, the sporting 
of “So crewell prison” suggests the larger way in which the celebration 
of Richmond’s life is fraught with impulses that are often competing; 
in Surrey’s recollection, formative moments of both adolescent bonding 
and adolescent sexuality are framed within an oppositional context, bub-
bling with latent energy of both jealousy and envy. This emulative combat 
is a crucial counterweight to the more obvious dynamic of “So crewell 
prison,” in which Surrey comes to identify with his lost companion: as 
Lines has demonstrated, the poem systematically “erases any distinc-
tion of identity between the two friends,” while the increasingly intimate 
description of their shared bedchamber (“The voyd walles eke, that har-
bourd us eche night  .  .  . wherwith we past the winter nightes awaye”) 
suggests the extent to which Surrey and his “noble fere” finally become 
indistinguishable.69 Throughout the poem, Surrey works with one hand 
to efface the distinction between Howard and Tudor, even as he can-
not help but affirm it with the other. Such confusion of intersubjective 
boundaries is a key dynamic of the rivalrous emotions, and it is one that 
ultimately underpins the poem’s concluding movement.
We have seen how the bulk of “So crewell prison” is an architectural 
catalog, in which the castle’s various locales trigger memories from Surrey 
and Richmond’s shared past. In the poem’s conclusion, however, Surrey 
comments directly on his grief, seeking desperately to make sense of both 
Richmond’s loss and his own imprisonment. With “sobbing sighes,” Sur-
rey rails against Windsor itself, asking for some account of his friend’s 
absence:
‘O place of blisse, renewer of my woos,
Geve me accompt wher is my noble fere,
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Whome in thy walles thow didest eche night enclose,
To other lief, but unto me most dere.’70
Though consistent with the poem’s larger mode of address— “So crewell 
prison” is, of course, an apostrophe— Surrey’s accusation here begins a 
series of displacements and confusions that overwhelm the final lines. 
Unsurprisingly, Windsor provides no satisfactory answer:
Eache stone, alas, that dothe my sorowe rewe,
Retournes therto a hollowe sound of playnt.71
This echo exemplifies the erosion of boundaries that has been steadily 
enacted by the poem; it is a ghostly utterance that both does and does not 
emanate from Surrey’s own mouth. Because it is an act of reflexive speech, 
Surrey is implicated in his own allegation: though he may charge Windsor 
with his sorrow, Windsor charges him right back. To compound the con-
fusion a final degree, there is even a sense in which the speech belongs to 
Richmond, the figure who has from the elegy’s opening moments haunted 
the castle.
We need not embrace a fully psychoanalytic reading of the poem to 
acknowledge the emotional displacement at play in these passages. In 
simplest terms, Surrey’s fixation on Richmond’s absence provides an 
attractive safeguard from the events that have resulted in his imprison-
ment: by immersing himself in the loss of his friend, Surrey sidesteps the 
need to confront his own erratic behavior. (He also avoids the unenviable 
task of condemning those responsible for his sentence, including King 
Henry.) In this sense, the intensity and quality of Surrey’s grief suggest 
that his lamentation for Richmond is in many ways a displacement of the 
sorrow he feels for himself: grief for the friend, in other words, is substi-
tuted for the narcissistic mourning of Surrey’s own wretched state.72
Yet at the same time, when Surrey does explicitly address his own 
misfortunes, we may also detect some attendant aggression toward Rich-
mond: the friend who, by virtue of his unexpected death, has abandoned 
the poet and condemned him to unhappiness. This sentiment emerges in 
the elegy’s final lines, when Surrey finds means to express the hostility and 
resentment that lurks beneath his grief:
Thus I alone, where all my fredome grew,
In pryson pyne with bondage and restraynt,
And with remembraunce of the greater greif,
To bannishe the lesse I fynde my chief releif.73
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Like Jonathan Crewe, I find it difficult to read this concluding moment 
without detecting some animosity toward the friend who has left the poet 
in his time of need.74 A logical extension of the poem’s latent rivalry motif, 
this aggression is a counterpoint to the larger elegiac action— but, given 
the reality of Richmond’s death, Surrey seems to feel no small guilt at his 
own ambivalence. The logical conclusion of rivalry is a fantasy of the oth-
er’s destruction: it is this thought that Surrey cannot tolerate, and he must 
accordingly divert its attendant aggression toward himself and his own 
misfortune. Insofar as Surrey feels abandoned by Richmond, he develops 
an anger that must be subsequently repressed; insofar as he has also become 
identified with this lost friend, the anger directed outward must be also 
directed toward himself. This ambivalence forcefully emerges in the final 
couplet— in which, despite the ostensible agenda of the elegiac occasion, 
it is difficult to ultimately know what part of Surrey’s grief is the greater.
The properties of the rivalrous emotions help account for the posi-
tion in which “So crewell prison” leaves its grieving poet: as R. Horacio 
Etchegoyen and Clara R. Nemas put it, envy entails “the paradox that the 
same faculty that allows [the envier] to appreciate the good qualities of 
the object is at the same time the source of unbearable pain.”75 In this view, 
envy is grounded upon “an unconscious projective identification with the 
envied person, who represents the image of whom the envying person 
would want to be in the ideal sense . . . [but] because feelings of inferior-
ity partly motivate such identification, this idealization is blended with 
resentment and derogation.”76 Surrey and Richmond certainly enjoyed 
a close relation, as symbolic brothers of the highest social order— but 
as experience often confirms, we are most quick to envy “those who are 
close to us in terms of time, space, age and reputation.”77 This feature of 
social life was not obscure to Renaissance thinkers:
Lastly, near kinsfolks, and fellows in office, and those that have 
been bred together, are more apt to envy their equals when they 
are raised. For it doth upbraid unto them their own fortunes, and 
pointeth at them, and cometh oftener into their remembrance, 
and incurreth likewise more into the note of others; and envy ever 
redoubleth from speech and fame.78
Such proximity, and the co- mingling of social identities it entails, ulti-
mately confound Surrey’s attempt to console himself with his verse, in 
which he finds it impossible to clearly delineate the object of his grief.
Despite its resounding success as a poetic performance, “So crewell 
prison” thus fails as a tool of grief. If, as Peter Sacks has argued, the 
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conventional elegy guides its speaker through the “work of mourn-
ing,” then Surrey’s poem to Richmond must be recognized for the way 
it rejects consolation: there is no vision of renewal, no sublimation of 
the lost object, no affirmation of the speaker’s willingness to endure.79 
In this sense, the poem has surprising affinities with the modern elegy, 
which has been characterized by a tendency toward “unresolved, violent, 
and ambivalent” forms of mourning.80 Though “So crewell prison” can 
express, it cannot finally escape the act of memory that entwines Surrey’s 
present fate with the idealized vision of his friend. At the poem’s end, Sur-
rey is left with only the choice between two kinds of grief— and though 
the lesser may be banished, it is only by reference to the larger shadow 
that still hangs over both Windsor and the speaker. “So crewell prison,” 
it turns out, is an unexpectedly angry poem: the troubled comparisons 
to Troy, the simmering displays of adolescent aggression, and the sever-
ity of the poet’s melancholy suggest a well of emotional energy too often 
ignored by scholars. The poem registers the concurrent loss of an ideal 
companion, of a pastoral youth, of face at court, of a promised future: it 
accordingly reflects, in its emotional tenor, the profound entanglement of 
tenderness, melancholy, and aggression. As a core emotional response of 
courtly combat, envy installs the affective network through which these 
varied feelings flow.
Like Surrogate Father, Like Surrogate Son
Though deprived of Richmond, Surrey was restored to court in the fall of 
1537— where (as Susan Brigden puts it) “he assumed the role of guardian 
of honour and defender of true nobility, and began to be notorious for the 
extremity of his pride.”81 He was a principle mourner at the November 
funeral of Queen Jane, who died only days after giving birth to Hen-
ry’s long- sought legitimate male heir; in the next three years, Surrey was 
appointed to a number of local posts in Norfolk, and in 1541 was made 
a Knight of the Garter. (And as that year turned over, he also attended the 
trial and execution of his infamous cousin Katherine, the second Howard 
queen to share Henry’s bed and die by his will.) But Surrey, by his own 
admission, was still fueled by “the fury of rechless youth,” and before 
long he was jailed for a second and third time. In the first incident of 
1542, he was imprisoned in the Fleet Prison after challenging an adver-
sary to a duel over a private matter.82 In the second, his notorious Lenten 
romp of 1543, he and a posse of friends were charged with terrorizing 
London “in the night abowght the stretes and breaking wyth stonebowes 
78 Chapter 2
off certeyne wyndowes”; this incarceration inspired one of Surrey’s best- 
known lyrics, the scathing jeremiad “London, hast thow accused me.”83
But despite these disruptions, in the years that immediately followed— 
what would be the final years of his life— Surrey became quite happily 
entwined in the emulous, envious rivalry of another: that of Richmond’s 
father. Now in his sixth decade of life, the ailing King Henry renewed his 
war with Francis I of France in 1543, backed by the (ostensible) support 
of imperial forces. This was to be, reflects David Potter in his magisterial 
account of the conflict, a war between “two ageing warhorses . . . pre-
maturely aged by illness,” whose “relations since 1515 had been marked 
by alternating phases of competition in war and diplomatic/cultural 
display.”84 Childs similarly notes that the action found fuel in the long- 
simmering, “intense personal rivalry” between the princes, with Henry 
making “no secret of his desire to emulate his ancestors, especially Henry 
V, and revive the ancient English claim to suzeranity over France.”85 The 
psychodrama here seems to reflect Henry’s grasping attempt to reclaim 
long- expired years for both his body politic and body natural— fanning, 
in the words of Polydore Vergil, his long- simmering desire “not merely to 
equal but indeed to exceed the glorious deeds of his ancestors.”86
It is perhaps unsurprising, then, that in his declining years, Henry had 
fantasies of recapturing his former glory, three decades exactly after win-
ning his spurs on French soil at Thérouanne and Tournai. Yes, the spirits 
of both his royal ancestors and his younger self would be revived— and 
King Henry was “determined to heave his huge body into armour” and 
don those spurs again.87 But, as Potter outlines, this was something of a 
large issue: for Henry to personally lead English forces was “like convey-
ing an ungainly and threatening totem into the midst of the war; there 
was no doubt his presence was an encouragement but it also had its 
penalties.”88 It was a delicate point indeed, and one that occasioned con-
siderable logistical attention; English councilors were reluctant to voice 
their concerns, while Chapuys, noting that Henry possessed “the worst 
legs in the world,” observed that troops would be forced “to march much 
more slowly because of the weight and illness of the said lord King.”89 
Eventually, a diplomatic calculus thankfully proved that both princes 
might forgo direct forward command with no loss of honor— but King 
Henry, who “night and day thought of nothing else” but military glory, 
would still eventually taste war on French soil, suited in a massive coat of 
armor preserved today at the Metropolitan Museum of Art.90
It was ultimately the young Surrey, not much older in 1543 than Henry 
had been in 1513, who would become the king’s own avatar in the field, a 
linkage through which cross- generational fantasies of honor and conquest 
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might be shared between the earl and the father of his closest friend. We 
see hints of this dynamic early in the conflict, when Surrey was allowed 
to cross the Channel and observe the Anglo- imperial siege of Landrecy in 
1543; King Henry recommended him personally to the emperor, whom 
he asked “to order the captains and lieutenants of [his] army to help and 
assist in all things in which the said Earl may advance and improve his 
knowledge of military affairs.”91 (Though even here Surrey couldn’t stay 
out of trouble: according to Chapuys, Henry was not pleased by “a cer-
tain foolish letter written by the earl of Surrey,” who was consequently 
ordered “to abstain in future from making such reports.”)92 When English 
troops were deployed the following year, “the Duke of Norffolk” and 
“therle of Surrey” were appointed leaders of “the vantgards”; Surrey was 
named lord marshall of the army, and soon he and his father began (an 
ultimately untenable) siege of the port town of Montreuil.93
In July 1544 King Henry had made the journey to Calais; rather 
than fortifying Surrey and Norfolk’s siege, he and his old friend Suffolk 
embarked upon a concurrent assault on Boulogne, which surrendered to 
great fanfare in September. Surrey, who had come to witness the siege per-
sonally, arrived just in time: a “Trayne of Powder was set to the Castell” 
on the 11th of that month, and “the Kinges Majestie, accompanied with 
the said Erle of Surrey . . . went to his Standing to see the Castell fall.”94 
The surrender, which Sessions deems “the most spectacular military tri-
umph of Henry VIII’s career,” offered cause for immediate celebration, 
and the king’s victorious entry into the city was “carefully dramatized to 
make the decaying Henry VIII appear like Henry V on the nearby field 
of Agincourt.”95 His honor appropriately puffed, Henry soon returned 
to England, eventually appointing Suffolk to defend his prize— but, in 
August 1545, the duke died before he could assume his post. This was 
great luck for Surrey, who was weeks later named “Lieutenant, and Cap-
tain General, Commander- in- chief and Governor” of Boulogne.96
With this appointment, Surrey was now, undisputedly, Henry’s proxy 
in the field. And in fact, there emerged a triangular dynamic in which 
Surrey, inhabiting the symbolic position of his lost friend, appears to 
actively dismiss the guidance of his own father in favor of the surro-
gate Henry.97 The keeping of Boulogne— “the one tangible fruit of [the 
king’s] campaigns in France,” and the nexus of Surrey and Henry’s twin 
chivalric fantasy— was a money- pit for a realm already sinking in debt, 
and consensus in the king’s council urged for a speedy withdrawal.98 In a 
letter from Windsor that September, Norfolk explicitly warned his son to 
“anymate not the kyng to moche for the kepyng of boleyne, for who so 
doth at length shalt get small thank” among those at court.99 But this, and 
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similar advice that he should be “maid werye . . . of Bowleine,” did little 
to deter Surrey, who relished his lieutenancy, and who would in the com-
ing months continue to construct elaborate plans for its fortification and 
victualing.100 “In conversation,” an imperial ambassador reported, King 
Henry had “called Boulogne ‘his daughter’”— and Surrey, in turn, stuck 
up admirably for his symbolic sister.101
In early November 1545, the earl received a scathing letter from Nor-
folk’s secretary, which did little to hide his real father’s displeasure:
I see my lordes grace somewhat offended by your priuate letteres 
to the Kynges Majestie of such vehemency as towching the anima-
tynge of the King’s Majesty for the kepynge of Bowlleyn and in 
especial considering his dyuers letteres adressed to you lordschype 
to the whiche as he thinketh ye haue gevyn simple credence for 
what his grace and the rest of the Cownsell worketh in for the 
renndre of Bowleyne [and] the conclewdyng of a pease.102
Despite Norfolk’s explicit instruction to the contrary, Surrey had contin-
ued to inflame the king’s desire for a hopeless cause; in fact, in a personal 
letter to the increasingly invalid Henry, Surrey boasted of his search for 
“the grounde of most advauntage for your majesties campe if it shuld be 
your pleasure to come to the felde the next yere.”103 To the great annoy-
ance of the royal advisors, the earl’s dispatches had a special gravity: 
what the “Cownsell worketh  .  .  . in vi daies,” Surrey was warned, “ye 
with your letters sett bake in sixe owres, sutche importans be your let-
ters in the kinges oppinion at this tymme.”104 But that “every cownsellor 
saithe away with it” mattered little to Henry Howard or Henry Tudor, 
united in equal vehemence for Boulogne as an English holding.105 Given 
the familial symbolics inherent to this affair, the precise manifestation of 
Norfolk’s anger and betrayal seems particularly apt: “I herde my lordship 
[Norfolk] saye,” Surrey was told, “that he had rathre burie yow & the 
reste of his childrene befoure he shulde geffe his consent to the rwyne of 
the realme.”106
But things went bad for Surrey, and they went bad quickly. On Janu-
ary 7, 1546, only two days after dispatching an elaborate stratagem for 
Henry’s forces in the region, Surrey suffered the first defeat of his military 
career, when French troops overwhelmed his army at St. Etienne, slaying 
nearly two dozen English captains and forcing the (hungry and destitute) 
common- file to a mutinous retreat.107 This “shame of St. Etienne,” Ses-
sions suggests, “mark[ed] the first stage of Surrey’s downfall,” and the 
earl himself was instantly affected— in the midst of the English retreat, 
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so records one contemporary account, Surrey had apparently “begged 
Sir John Bridges and some of the gentlemen who were with him to stick 
their swords through his guts and make him forget the day.”108 In their 
account of the disaster, Surrey and his command scrambled to empha-
size the positive— there was “mo of their parte slayne then of oures,” 
they reported, and (more importantly) assured that “ther was no defaulte 
in the Rulers nor lacke of courage to be geven them”— but an unrecep-
tive audience awaited in London; only days after the battle, the imperial 
ambassador François van der Delft concluded his dispatch on the matter 
by observing that Surrey “has consequently lost greatly in reputation, and 
there is considerable discontent at these heavy losses.”109 (Surrey was also 
a victim of the early modern post: while his own debriefing was still in 
transit home, he was sent a scathing letter from the Privy Council, who, 
having learned of the defeat, could “nott butt marvyll very much thatt in 
so many dayes [Surrey had] aduertysed hither no part of that mater.”)110
The defeat of St. Etienne shattered Henry’s faith in his chivalric sur-
rogate, and Surrey’s attempts at damage control “did so little satisfie our 
King (who lov’d no noyse but of Victory) that he ever after disaffected 
him.”111 The immediate cost was the earl’s lieutenancy, which was trans-
ferred to his old rival Edward Seymour, a man much advanced since 
1537: now earl of Hertford, Seymour had (as Sessions puts it) “not only 
distinguished himself as the leading military figure of England, both in 
Scotland and in France, but had also represented the king in almost every 
major diplomatic initiative.”112 (He was also, not unnotably, uncle to the 
young male heir of a moribund king— a fact that becomes quite relevant 
to Surrey’s ultimate demise.)113 With considerable frankness, Secretary 
Paget (another “new man”) urged the earl to “passe the thing over in 
silence” and accept a lesser command, lest a retreat home further tarnish 
his reputation:
Being hitherto noted, as you ar, a man of a noble courrage and of a 
desyre to shewe the same to the face of your ennemies, if you shuld 
now tarye at home within a wall, havyng I doubt a pece of your 
authorite toched, it woold be thought abrode, I feare, that either 
you wer desyrous to tary in a sure place of rest, oreles that the credit 
of your courrage and forwardnes to serve wer diminished, and that 
you wer taken here for a man of non activite or service.114
It seems safe to say that such sentiments, from such a source, must have 
especially stung the earl— and indeed, when on trial a few months later, 
Surrey (so says one account) would command Paget to “hold thy tongue, 
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for the kingdom has never been well since the King put mean crea-
tures like thee into the government.”115 But Surrey was a man who, in 
his own words, couldn’t “dare kepe silence,” and continued to advocate 
for himself, despite pending demotion to captain of the rearward— and 
that March, as Hertford assumed his new command, the Privy Council 
summoned Surrey home to account for a variety of issues related to his 
former governance, including some “aduertisementes . . . of treasons that 
ar conspired specially touching the victuails & munintions.”116 A diplo-
matic missive of the 28th suggests his welcome, noting that “the Earl of 
Surrey, formerly captain of Boulogne, arrived at Court yesterday, but was 
coldly received and did not have access to the King.”117 It seems the con-
sequence of his defeat was not lost upon the earl: “after the ouerthrow of 
the grete skyrmoche at St Etiuens,” a witness later reported, “I hard hym 
saye he had the kinges majestes dyspleashor or disfavour, [to which] he 
hath taken greate thought.”118
In ten months, the earl would be headless. But it was not St. Etienne that 
signaled Surrey’s doom— and in fact, Henry would soon thaw, bestowing 
on him several honors for his French service in April and May. Rather, 
Surrey had to die because Henry soon would. “His Majestie was sickly,” 
all were aware as 1546 ticked on, “and could not long endure,” leaving 
the nation to wonder just who would steady the ship of state as a nine- 
year- old prince became a nine- year- old king.119 This, the realm’s most 
pressing political dilemma, choked the dying Henry’s court, now dually 
anchored by Surrey’s primary rival Hertford— who would, as future duke 
of Somerset, serve as lord protector for the first half of his nephew’s immi-
nent reign— and lesser rival Lord Admiral John Dudley— who would, as 
future duke of Northumberland, himself unseat Somerset and orchestrate 
the remaining years of Edward’s short kingship.120 It was with grave con-
sequence that Surrey lost his own bid to govern the young prince.
Prince Envy? The Death of Surrey 
and Prince Edward’s Legacy
In some seventy years of life, the Duke of Norfolk had established him-
self as one of the sixteenth century’s premier political survivors— and 
he predictably spent the final months of King Henry’s reign attempting 
to ensure that the Howards, a pillar of ancient English nobility, had a 
place among those who would rule the boy king. Unencumbered by Sur-
rey’s intractable sense of ancestral purity— and by this time, apparently 
growing weary of (what he called) “my foolish son’s demeanour”— he 
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concocted a plan in the summer of 1546 to intimately enhance his fam-
ily’s affinity with the emerging Seymour regime:
I brake unto his Majesty most humbly beseeching him to help 
that a marriage might be had between my daughter [Richmond’s 
widow] and Sir Thomas Seymour [Hertford’s infamous brother]; 
and whereas my son of Surrey hath a son, and divers daughters, 
that with his favour, a cross marriage might have be made between 
my Lord Great Chamberlain [Hertford] and them: and also where 
my son Thomas hath a son . . . that he might be in like wise married 
to one of my said Lord’s daughters. 121
In 1538 Norfolk had made earlier efforts (with apparent royal support) 
to bestow “his doughter, the Duchesse of Rychmonde . . . uppon the saide 
Sir Thomas Seymour.” 122 His renewed attempt, however, would similarly 
come to naught— owing in no small part, we’ll see, to his son’s obstinacy.
In 1546 Surrey too considered, with grave concern, his place in Eng-
land’s future— but he did so in a manner that fixed his gaze firmly on the 
past. This is exemplified in Surrey’s famed “Arundel portrait,” an icono-
graphic spectacle prepared by William Scrots, successor to Holbein as 
England’s royal painter. (See figure 2.) In the painting, which has been 
analyzed in great detail, a full- length Surrey emerges triumphantly from a 
centered arch, to an interior space flush with marble statues and decora-
tive icons in a classical mode.123 Most prominent in this frame is the pair 
of figures flanking Surrey, each holding a shield: a man, to the viewer’s 
left, displays the paternal arms of Surrey’s ancestral link to Edward I, 
while a corresponding woman advertises the earl’s maternal inheritance 
from Edward III. There is little subtle about this announcement of the 
subject’s royal blood. But of even greater interest, given the focus of this 
chapter, is the composition of the earl’s right arm, which leans against a 
broken pillar emblazoned in gold: in Surrey’s original design, the column’s 
anchor was to feature a “tablet wher my lord off Richmondes pictuire 
shuld stand.”124 For reasons that remain obscure, Surrey abandoned the 
plan in the final months of his life, and the column’s base instead features 
the motto SAT SVPER EST— “enough survives.” But it is striking that, 
nearly a decade later, Surrey’s “noble fere” remained important enough 
to have been featured in so provocative a portrait— and indeed, it has 
been suggested that its inherent provocativeness may have ultimately 
occasioned Richmond’s absence, lest the envelope be pushed a bit too 
far.125 For it seems at least partly clear, as Sessions (and others) have thor-
oughly detailed, that the Arundel portrait looks forward to the coming 
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succession, despite its obvious reverence for the Howard past. In boast-
ing a “genealogy worthy [of] a possible king,” the painting argues that its 
subject “possessed a right to be Protector to the young Prince Edward”— 
and the canceled image of Richmond, Edward’s half- brother, would have 
powerfully reminded that Surrey had already once nursed the blossoming 
of a Tudor royal son.126 At the time of Surrey’s trial, we will see below, 
similar images of genealogical interest were seized from the Howard 
residence at Kenninghall— where they served, we must presume, not as 
external envoy of Surrey’s credentials, but rather as an identity- affirming 
mirror of their subject, mired in the most difficult (and final) year of his 
young life. The form of that identity, emerging from the insistent, inextri-
cable proximity of Surrey’s Howard blood to the Tudor throne, replicates 
much of the symbolic dynamics embedded in “So crewell prison.”
And that proximity would eventually kill him. The powers that be, 
including the dying king, wanted him dead, so they found a way to make 
it so— and, to be sure, Surrey did little to make things difficult for them. 
Though many official records are now lost, a narrative of Surrey’s ultimate 
Fig. 2. Henry Howard, Earl of Surrey, NPG 5291. By courtesy of the National 
Portrait Gallery, London.
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downfall emerges from a variety of sources. He was arrested on December 
2, 1546, when Richard Southwell, a cousin to Surrey, revealed that “he 
knew certain things of the earl, that touched his fidelity to the king”; after 
an initial confinement at Lord Chancellor Wriothesley’s house, on the 12th 
he was “sent to the Towre of London” via a humiliating march through the 
streets of London.127 (Norfolk was arrested the same day for undisclosed 
reasons.) In the weeks that followed, royal agents scoured for “report 
off suche” Howard doings that “myght in any wyys towche the kynges 
hyghnes & hys posteryte,” eventually compiling a litany of possible charges 
by which Surrey, and for good measure his father, might be destroyed.128
Surrey’s conduct was scrutinized on a variety of fronts. Specific inquiries, 
for example, were made about the earl’s governance in France— whether 
(quite ridiculously) he had plotted the “selling or yelding vp of Bulleyn”— 
while agents equally considered more nebulous matters like “my lord of 
S dissembling” and “my lord of Surreys pryde and his gowne of gold.”129 
But in the month of investigation, three major themes emerged in the 
crown’s discovery, and each tellingly engages the central focus of this 
chapter: Surrey’s ambivalent, envious affinity with the royal family, a 
dynamic first apparent in his complex friendship with the lost Richmond.
The first concerned Surrey’s relationship with Richmond’s half- brother, 
the nine- year- old Prince Edward. Earlier that year, it was alleged, Sur-
rey had initiated a discussion of “who were meetist to haue the rule and 
governmennt of the prynce,” arguing that “his father was the meetist per-
sonage to be deputed to that roome as well in respecte of the good seryvce 
that he had donn as also for his estate.”130 Sensing a potential whiff of 
treason, the authorities raised the issue directly with men like Hugh Ellis, 
the earl’s servant, who was asked “whether you haue hard the said Erle 
at any tyme speake of the sycknes or deceasse of the kinges majestie and 
who shuld . . . haue the rule and gouernment of the prince?”131 Further 
depositions similarly suggested that Surrey openly “thought noe man soe 
mete to have the governance of the Prince as my Lord his Father,” and 
issues relating to this notion are featured prominently in the interrogato-
ries prepared for Surrey himself:
- yf the King shuld dye my Lord prince being of young and tendre age 
whether you haue at any tyme diused who shuld haue the rule and gouer-
nance of him
- whithr you have at any tyme sayd that if the King shuld die my lord prince 
being of tender age you or your father would haue the rule & gouernance 
of him
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- what meanes and wayes have you at any tyme devised and doon wherby 
you might rule the King in his owne tyme or the prince if god shuld dispose 
of his Majestie132
In other words, Surrey was accused of thinking exactly what the Arun-
del portrait seems to suggest he may have thought: that the Howards, 
through both birthright and service, were natural guardians of a royal 
minor, a role they had played in the past. Given the fantasies of the Rich-
mond elegy, Surrey’s particular focus on the meritorious claim of Norfolk 
is telling: if, a decade after presiding over Richmond, the duke could 
reprise his role as surrogate father to Edward, Surrey would again find 
himself the symbolic brother of a Tudor heir. And if the power ultimately 
fell to Surrey himself— as would seem likely, given Norfolk’s age, and 
as the Arundel portrait seems to argue— the earl further collapses the 
distinction between Howard and Tudor, reiterating the affective implica-
tions of “So crewell prison.”
The second point of contention returns us to Norfolk’s marriage plot 
of that summer— a plan (it seems) largely foiled by Surrey, who was “so 
much incensed” against Hertford.133 (Though it presumably counted for 
less, it was also said that Lady Richmond’s “Fantezy would not serve to 
marry with” Admiral Thomas.)134 But, with a little revision, there was one 
part of the scheme that Surrey could endorse:
She should dissemble the matter, and he would finde the means that 
the Kings Majestie should speake with her himselfe, but that she 
should in noe wise utterly make refusall of him, but that she should 
leave the matter soe diffusedly that the Kings Majestie should take 
occasion to speake with her againe, and thus by length of time, it is 
possible that the King should take such a fantezey to ye that ye shall 
be able to govern like unto Madame Distamps, which should not 
only be a means to halpe her selfe but all her freinds should receive 
a commodyte by the same.
The mistress of Francis I for some two decades, Anne, Duchess of Étampes 
wielded profound influence in the French court: in other words, Surrey 
thought to bawd his sister, the beloved Richmond’s widow, to the rotting 
body of her former father- in- law. (Lady Richmond, it was reported, said 
“she would Cutt her own Troate rather then she would consent to such a 
villany.”) According to the crown’s further investigation, “therle of Surrey” 
did indeed “wishe or deuise that his sister of Richemond might rule about 
the king,” hinging on the possibility that Henry “might caste some Love 
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vnto her wherby in processe she shuld leave as greate a stroke aboute him 
as Madamme Destampz doth abowte the Frenche king.”135 When Surrey 
was questioned, the issue was likely broached both indirectly and explic-
itly. Besides wondering “whithr you have at any tyme procured any person 
to dissemble . . . for the better compassing of your purposes”— and ask-
ing for his hypothetical opinion on a man who, “cumpassing hymself to 
gouerne the realme [and] rule the kynge,” did “for that purpose aduise his 
daughter or sister to becom an harlot”— Surrey’s interrogators were also 
slated to ask directly “whethr euer he made his father pryvey to the mater 
of my Lady of Richemondes.”136 (In one query list, a canceled item wonders 
if Surrey had “procured [his] sister or any othr woman to be the kinges 
concubyne”; a version of the question was perhaps asked anyway.)137
In fact, according to one account, Lady Richmond informed investiga-
tors herself that Surrey had advised her to “lay herself out to please the 
king”; at the trial, when “shown a certain writing in the hand of his said 
sister in which she made this charge against him,” an exasperated Sur-
rey exclaimed “Must I, then, be condemned on the words of a wretched 
woman?”138 The precise force of Surrey’s plan has long been debated; as 
Childs observes, apologists have traditionally been forced to “bend over 
backwards to exonerate Surrey in this affair,” suggesting that the earl’s 
words had been “distorted by his malicious sister and her evangelical 
friends,” or that Mary had perhaps “genuinely and guilelessly mistook 
her brother’s sarcasm for literalism.”139 But I see no reason why an 
increasingly desperate Surrey, having already seen two kinswomen share 
the king’s bed, could not have stooped to such a suggestion with serious-
ness. Ironic or not, the very notion again activates the convergence of 
Howard and Tudor that governed the thematics of “So Crewell prison”; 
it is yet another permutation by which Surrey symbolically insinuates 
himself into the Tudor line.
The final major focus of the crown’s investigation was the one that 
actually secured the earl’s destruction. In an insignia at Kenninghall, it 
was said, Surrey had “usurped the royal arms of England” by displaying 
the heraldry of King Edward the Confessor— and to the crown, records 
a (skeptical) Spanish chronicler, this “was evident proof that he desired 
to make himself king.”140 Peter R. Moore, who offers extensive analysis 
of this deadly charge, concludes that any “argument that Surrey aimed 
at the throne as the heir to Edward the Confessor  .  .  . verges on the 
theatre of the absurd”— but the era’s treason trials so often staged such 
theater, and it was enough to doom both Surrey and his father.141 (“I 
have concealed high Treason,” Norfolk confessed in desperate attempt 
at self- preservation, “in keeping secret the false and traiterous Act, most 
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presumptuously committed by my Son Henry Howard Earl of Surrey, 
[of] putting and using the Arms of St. Edward the Confessor.”)142 It did 
not matter that the Howards had long asserted a right to these arms; the 
family claimed legendary descent from the Saxon warrior Hereward the 
Wake, a contemporary of St. Edward who resisted Norman rule, while 
(more concretely) Richard II had bestowed them upon Thomas Mowbray, 
the first Duke of Norfolk.143 It also did not matter that Surrey had earlier 
consulted with the realm’s garter king of arms about his ancestral rights, 
and left understanding “that he had the opinion of Heralds therein.”144
What only mattered was that, unlike some of the flashier charges, Sur-
rey could and would not deny this infraction— so when his enemies, with 
the king’s blessing, dubbed it treason, the die was cast. “For what intent 
and purpose you put tharmes of St Edward in your cote, armmore, or 
scochen,” Surrey was asked, and “nowe beare the sayd armes at this tyme 
more then you or your father have doon at any other tymes before”?145 
Furthermore, this heraldic crime was of particular interest to Henry. With 
only weeks left to live, the king personally revised a list of interrogatories 
that begins as follows:
If a man cumming of the colaterall lyne to the heyre off the crown 
who ought not to beare tharmes of England but in the seconde 
quarter with the difference of theyer auncestre doo presume to 
change his ryght place and beare them in the first quarter, leaving 
out the true difference of thaunsestre, and in the lieu therof vse only 
the very plase of the heire masle apparent, how thys mans intent is 
to be iudgyd and whether thys importe any daunger peril or slandre 
to the title of the Prince or very heire apparent and howe it wayeth 
in our lawes.146
Bearing arms in the first or second quarter of his shield— the vital dif-
ference between Howard and Tudor, the crux by which Surrey so often 
seemed confounded, made a matter of geometry. At the residence at Ken-
ninghall, the formal bill of indictment read, Surrey “dared to be fashioned 
and painted beside his own arms, together with the emblems of Henry 
Howard himself, the said arms and the said emblems now belonging to 
our Lord the King,” thus “falsely, maliciously, and treasonously hop-
ing, wishing, and desiring to deprive the most illustrious and serenest 
Lord our King of the laws, merit, titles, and names of his royal state,” 
with the purpose of “disrupting our most excellent Lord and disinherit-
ing the said Prince Edward of his true and indubitable title concerning 
the aforementioned crown.”147 At the bar, Surrey vigorously defended 
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his ancestral rights— and defended himself against the many charges that 
were not included in the indictment, but that nonetheless were presented 
at trial. The jury— which, humiliatingly, was “a common Inquest, not of 
the Peers, because the Earl was not a Parliament Lord”— condemned him 
to the axe, and on the “nynetenth daie of Januarie the Erle of Surrey 
was lead out of the Towre to the skaffolde at the Towre Hill and their he 
was beheaded.”148 As for Norfolk, “it was thought that the Duke would 
hardly escape, had not the King’s death, following shortly after, reserved 
him to more mercifull times.”149 A survivor to the end, he would outlive 
Henry’s heir, dying an octogenarian in 1554.
Though Henry’s agents would loudly decry “the moste execrable and 
moste abominable entent and entreprise of the said Erle of Surrey and 
his Father the Duke of Norffolke,” not all observers were convinced: Van 
Der Delft, for example, duly informed the emperor of the alleged Howard 
plot to “usurp authority by means of the murder of all the members of 
the Council, and [gain] control of the prince by them alone,” but equally 
noted that because “the Earl of Hertford and the Lord Admiral . . . have 
obtained such influence over the King as to lead him according to their 
fancy,” it was suspected that “the misfortunes that have befallen the house 
of Norfolk may well have come from the same quarter.”150 (When told the 
news, Francis I of France was said to have “wondred moche, and sayed 
that he knewe the Duke of Norffolke for he had been with hym, and . . . 
wolde never haue thought enye syche thynge yn hym.”)151 Indeed, it seems 
that Hertford and the lord admiral, backed by a court party full of simi-
lar “new men,” found it convenient that the highest pillar of the English 
nobility should crumble in the weeks before Henry gave up the ghost, and 
before a new regime would be installed to guide the boy king. (That the 
Howards were also associated with the old faith did little to endear them 
to this largely reformist clique, despite Surrey’s own apparent evangelical 
leanings.) As we have seen, Surrey’s struggle to parse his own aristocratic 
identity had long been intensified by the advancement of such men, and 
his antipathy helped further underpin his fall; “the Earle of Surrey,” one 
deposition reports, fumed that “those men which are made by the Kings 
Majestie of vile birth hath been the distraction of all the Nobilitie of 
this Realme,” while Lady Richmond similarly informed investigators that 
“her Brother hated them all since his being in custody in Windsor Cas-
tle.”152 At Windsor he had sought the ghost of Richmond, robbed of him 
too soon; now, in his final time on earth, he found himself robbed not 
only of his own life, but of reaffirming and realizing his role as preceptor 
and tutor to the Tudor heir, in the form of Richmond’s half- brother.
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On January 19, 1547, nine days before King Henry VIII himself would 
die, the Earl of Surrey became the final broken pillar that would adorn 
the ruins of Henrician England. (His father’s life was spared only by the 
loss of the king’s own.) This classical image is a fitting enough one for the 
man whose translation of Virgil would forever turn the course of English 
poetry, and whose lifelong commitment to the betterment of his nation, 
so argues his biographer, emulates “Aeneas’ epic quest, at least in inten-
tion if not achievement.”153 It is thus also fitting, I think, to conclude this 
chapter with three remarks upon the earl written in Latin.
The first is a letter composed by Surrey’s children in the spring of 1546, 
with the guiding hand of their Latin tutor, to welcome their father home 
on his unhappy return from France. Though formal in tone and construc-
tion, there is nonetheless, as Childs notes, “a child- like sweetness to the 
letter and a touching reverence undiminished by recent events.”154 (That 
is, the defeat at St. Etienne and the disgrace of his recall.) What interests 
me the most is the children’s concluding statement, which expands the 
epistle’s scope considerably:
We also congratulate the whole Kingdom, because, resting as it 
does on the shoulders of Henry, our invincible and greatest King, 
and defended by his arms, it appears to have won a most illustrious 
name among foreign nations thanks to the efforts of you, a second 
Henry, whilst leaving nothing for the French except envy, lamenta-
tion, and a dread of yourself.155
Alterius Henrici. In his brief life, Surrey so often was— and so often wanted 
to be— a second Henry; a second Henry Fitzroy, a second Henry Tudor. 
And while perhaps Surrey did inspire invidiam among his French adver-
saries, his maddening status as a second Henry, we have seen throughout, 
occasioned no small envy in himself.
The second is an excerpt from Sir Thomas Chaloner’s De Republica 
Anglorum Instauranda, a ten- book Latin epic on English themes pub-
lished in 1579. Although perhaps best remembered today as the first 
English translator of Erasmus’s The Praise of Folly, Chaloner was (like 
Norfolk) a notable survivor of his tumultuous age, variously serving as 
soldier, diplomat, and courtier in the reigns of Henry, Edward, Mary, and 
Elizabeth.156 Named clerk of the Privy Council in December 1545, he had 
close affinity with the men who would destroy Surrey— and when reflect-
ing upon that act from the safety of Elizabeth’s reign, could not help but 
mourn the life cut too short. In the midst of an encomium on the “vener-
able race of Norfolk”— described as “great in learning, greater in arms, 
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and greatest in faithful counsel”— Chaloner bestows particular praise on 
the poet earl, framing his downfall in a telling way:
There was one hero, but alas he was taken by cruel fates!
Surrey could have been placed first before all others
If wild Lachesis had not stripped away his mounting honors,
Envy harming (him) with a sideways ax and heedless deeds.157
With “two envious hands,” he continues, “jealous Nemesis extracted 
punishments with blood not long ago.”158 Surrey was struck down by the 
fates, envious of his virtue— and though not a novel trope, we nonetheless 
again find envy and Surrey connected in the elegiac context. But Chaloner 
goes further when addressing Envy more precisely, declaring it “so often 
fatal to the British court”: “are you not able,” he continues, “to pluck the 
nation’s hoped for fruits before they are ripe?” 159 In this recollection, the 
whims of fate become coequal with the whims of the men (like Hertford) 
who wielded Henry’s axe— each poisoned with an envious breast. But 
through Chaloner’s pen, the nobility that Surrey embodies becomes the 
founding verse of a new, corrective prophecy: “it would be worthy,” he 
prays, “that an emulative nation spring forth with appropriate zeal, to 
lead them in imitating their noble heroes in action.”160 Envy, emulation, 
and imitation— the affective nodes so active in Surrey’s memory of Rich-
mond, here helping to define his own legacy.
I lied about the third. It was not originally composed in Latin, and is 
not a reflection specifically about the earl— but given what we’ve seen 
in this chapter, it might as well have been. “Above all,” Francis Bacon 
suggests, “those are most subject to envy, which carry the greatness of 
their fortunes in an insolent and proud manner.”161 Bacon here explicitly 
describes those who elicit envy— but the splendid ambiguity of subject 
cuts both ways. Despite his bloody end, fortune shone on Henry How-
ard from birth— and it should come as no surprise that in 1539, only 
two years after Richmond’s death, the 22- year- old earl was famously 




The Rejected Earl of Leicester, 
the Rejected Sir Philip Sidney
In the final movement of book V of The Faerie Queene, Artegall, the knight 
of justice— who, aided by the war- machine Talus, had already extended 
his cold and brutal mandate to the far reaches of Faerie Land— liberates 
the island commonwealth of fair Irena from the arch- tyrant Grantorto, 
in an episode refracting the cankered plight of historical Ireland, a long- 
festering wound in the side of Elizabethan political culture. Having 
toppled the head of the insurgency, Artegell sets out to cleanse the isle 
of Grantorto’s stain, hunting down rebels and collaborators while work-
ing to restore the authority of its rightful sovereign. Yet before Artegall 
can fully “reforme that ragged common- weale,” he finds himself recalled 
to Faerie Court, his virtuous tasks obscured at home by the shade of 
“enuies cloud.”1 In answering the summons, he is beset by the dual hags 
Enuie and Detraction— who, with their monstrous pet the Blatant Beast, 
do “barke and bay / With bitter rage and fell contention,” befouling the 
honorable knight with words “most shamefull, most vnrighteous, most 
vntrew.”2 In chapter 2 we saw the power of envy in the courtly sphere, 
and Artegall proves no match for its barbs and bites: he must yield the 
stage to Calidore, a knight whose courtly arsenal will, in the poem’s final 
proper book, prove at least a bit more apt than sword or flail. Bruised 
and battered from his long endeavors, and smarting from slander’s sting, 
Artegall trudges forth to Gloriana’s court, “returning yet halfe sad.”3
This is hardly a notable end for a rather notable knight, and it is easy 
to appreciate why his return is a doleful one. But why, we may stop and 
wonder, does the poem describe this disgraced hero as half sad? Why is 
Artegall’s sadness only partial, and what comprises this alternate, con-
flicting response? What does this emotional state tell us about Artegall, 
and what does it reveal more generally about the Elizabethan courtly 
experience?
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This chapter is an attempt to imagine what these mixed feelings might 
be, and how they might emerge from the particular nature of Artegall’s 
career of royal service. My focus, however, lies not with Artegall’s strug-
gles in the fictive court of faerie, but rather with those of the courtly 
makers themselves: a group also tasked with negotiating the emotional 
intricacies of life at court, and whose varied fortune as servants to Queen 
Elizabeth would find complex expression in figures like Spenser’s knight 
of justice. In my analysis, this contested affective terrain is situated in an 
equally contested social context: the political experience of the late 1570s, 
a period crucial in shaping the climate of Elizabeth’s subsequent rule. My 
interest in this chapter surrounds two key players on this stage: Robert 
Dudley, Earl of Leicester (the famed courtly favorite) and his nephew and 
protégé Sir Philip Sidney (the famed courtly poet).
The most notable courtier of the Elizabethan period, Leicester was the 
central node of a vast network of courtly patronage and influence; this 
amorphous collective, which I will (informally) refer to throughout as the 
Leicester party, found common ground in a series of broad ideological 
commitments, such as an interventionist outlook on the affairs of Europe 
and an inclination to the reformed faith. Yet despite Leicester’s unequaled 
mastery of the courtly game, the actualities of Elizabethan policy rou-
tinely brought disappointment and frustration to those of his political 
persuasion— and despite their overriding personal loyalty to the queen, 
men like Leicester and Sidney had to brave the persistent sting of way-
laid plans, neglected proposals, and personal slights.4 To begin charting 
the affective consequence of this position, I will in this chapter consider 
how the Leicester party contended with courtly rejection: the affective 
response occasioned by the blockage, deferment, or disruption of one’s 
political goals, and (as in the case of Artegall) by the failure to have one’s 
political value actualized and appreciated within the court’s social world.5
Recent research has shown that rejection hurts, both psychically and 
physically.6 It is not pleasant to have one’s ambitions thwarted— and that 
pain is exacerbated, we must imagine, when those ambitions are weighed 
on a geopolitical (and even cosmic) scale. But there is also, I argue in 
this chapter, a silver lining to this affective cloud of courtly frustration. 
Such ostensible failures also have a shadow life as productive social 
moments, generating new modes of personal identity and new forms of 
political collectivity: a conciliatory affect comprising the other half of 
Artegall’s sadness. Rejection, I suggest, could be powerfully constitutive 
to Elizabethan courtiers like Leicester and Sidney, insofar as it sanctions 
a reciprocal ethos of protest and opposition: an ostensible failure, when 
salvaged and repackaged as heroic or ennobling, can become a striking 
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announcement of one’s refusal to be fully integrated into the symbolic 
universe of Elizabeth’s court, and of one’s willingness to break script from 
its enabling fictions. But what starts as a posture of individual bravado 
(or heroism, or narcissism, or recklessness) is soon transformed, through 
the channels of performance, to an intersubjective act: by broadcasting 
his own alienation, the courtier offers an alliance to the similarly minded, 
inviting them to join him in an alternate social order. This community of 
disaffection— galvanized both by a concurrent set of political and social 
goals, and by the ongoing opposition to those goals— assumes the role 
of a courtly subculture, founded and sustained by the affinity of negative 
affect.
In the uncertain courtly climate of the late 1570s, such a recuperative 
model of rejection was particularly valuable for Leicester and Sidney; it 
finds particular expression, I suggest, in the pageantry that they spon-
sored in this period. In the second half of the decade, the Leicester party 
treated Elizabeth to an elaborate series of multimedia events— such as the 
queen’s progresses to Kenilworth and Woodstock, and Sidney’s pageant 
The Lady of May— in which all manner of suits, appeals, and adver-
tisements were couched in the splendor and spectacle of nominal royal 
delight. But despite their primary (and genuine) commitment to the task of 
royal ingratiation, these literary performances, I argue, nonetheless seem 
to anticipate and account for the possibility of their own failure. Leicester 
and his proxies embed within these texts certain discursive contingency 
plans, in which spoiled or frustrated attempts at flattery and insinuation 
might be retroactively claimed as a symbolic, collective victory by the 
ostensibly slighted party. As we will see, and as Leicester and Sidney were 
well aware, even the stock tropes of royal performance housed a latent 
source of entropic and oppositional energy, waiting to redeem a would- 
be failure. In the 1570s, when Elizabeth’s grip on England’s symbolic and 
political order was not yet fully realized, it was a particularly valuable 
time to squeeze royal lemons into courtly lemonade.
Why So Rejected?
The precise manifestation of Leicester and Sidney’s courtly rejection in 
the 1570s emerged from two primary nodes of social contestation.
The first entailed Leicester’s long- simmering ambition to secure Eliz-
abeth’s hand in marriage— an extended affair that had lingered, albeit 
faintly, for nearly two decades.7 It was shortly after her accession in 1558 
that Elizabeth developed her affection for the young Robert Dudley; as 
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master of the horse, he enjoyed close and frequent contact with the queen, 
and within less than a year their intimacy was the subject of rumor and 
innuendo on both sides of the Channel.8 Perceptions worsened in Septem-
ber 1560, when Dudley’s wife Amy Robsart was found dead of a broken 
neck, apparently after “falling downe a paier of stayres.”9 Though cleared 
of wrongdoing by the coroner’s inquest, Dudley was plagued for decades 
by rumors of a domestic conspiracy— a theory infamously expounded in 
the so- called Leicester’s Commonwealth (1584), a Catholic polemic that 
has been called “the most notorious of Elizabethan political libels.”10 Yet 
despite this bad publicity, Elizabeth wavered little in her affection for 
Dudley, and within only weeks of Robsart’s death, reports circulated that 
“hyr Hygness shoolde marry hym” before too long.11
There was no doubt that England longed for a royal wedding; in the 
first Parliament of the reign (only weeks after her coronation), the queen 
was petitioned with a formal request to find the realm a suitable king, 
in whom its future hopes might be secured.12 But Elizabeth could not, 
as unvalued persons do, carve this matter for herself— and whatever the 
inclinations of her heart, Dudley was not an especially apt choice for such 
a royal match. The queen’s young court, already swirling with envy and 
resentment at his being favored, would hardly be settled by such a choice, 
and by embracing her own subject (a fraternization usually thought 
beneath a prince’s dignity), Elizabeth equally threatened to tarnish her 
reputation abroad, all the while foreclosing the possibilities of matrimo-
nial diplomacy. Throughout 1561, Dudley scrambled to make himself a 
more appealing candidate, even entreating the Spanish powers to agitate 
on his behalf— but the support he had secured was not enough to sus-
tain him in the coming months. By 1563, Susan Doran argues, Elizabeth 
was left with “apparently little desire and certainly no intention of taking 
Dudley as her husband.”13 The moment had passed for Dudley, who was 
no longer a plausible romantic contender; “the queen will never choose 
to marry me,” a Spanish ambassador reported him to say, “because she is 
determined to marry some great Prince.”14 In the years to come, Dudley 
(now ennobled as the Earl of Leicester) would devote no small energy 
to undercutting, or outright sabotaging, the foreign suitors that vied for 
Elizabeth’s hand— and while this opposition cannot be attributed merely 
to spite, there is nonetheless no small hint of cumulative rejection in the 
affective cloud surrounding it.15 Although Elizabeth would never marry 
Leicester or any great prince, there were certainly times when the latter 
seemed close to happening: especially, as I will touch upon later, in the 
final years of the 1570s. Leicester’s marriage suit was an early casualty 
of Elizabeth’s reign, but proved remarkably resilient in clinging onto life. 
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The rejection of this possibility, we will see, is reimagined and rechan-
neled in the courtly performances that he sponsored.
The second cause of agitation in the 1570s— more immediate, more 
intense, and more dispersed among Leicester’s party— concerned the reli-
gious strife that ravaged the nations of Europe, and the extent to which 
England should and could enter the fray. Leicester, Sidney, and a group 
of similarly minded men at court (including Secretary of State Fran-
cis Walsingham and William Davison, English ambassador to the Low 
Countries) persistently pushed for direct English military intervention in 
the late 1570s; their overriding agenda concerned the ongoing revolt in 
the Netherlands, and how England might best help this Dutch resistance 
overthrow the yoke of Spanish tyranny. Leicester envisioned himself com-
manding an army, with Sidney at his side, to overthrow the forces of 
Continental papistry— and on many occasions during this period, he was 
assured by the queen that his plan would be enacted. Yet, as so often was 
the case with Elizabeth, such plans changed swiftly, and in the 1570s both 
Leicester and Sidney were consistently frustrated in these long- sought 
ambitions. Their fantasies would not be realized for nearly a decade, in 
the final years of both their lives.
Some context is necessary. In the second half of the 1560s, inhabit-
ants of the so- called Low Countries— a complex patchwork of distinct, 
though geopolitically related provinces, corresponding largely to the 
modern nations of Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands— took up 
arms against their collective Habsburg sovereign, in attempts to liberate 
themselves from King Philip II and escape the flames of his inquisitors.16 
It was no easy thing to rule the Low Countries, an amorphous political 
conglomeration that boasted its own hereditary aristocracy, and Philip II 
(who was not, like his father, born in the Low Countries) was willing to 
make the necessary concessions, granting members of the Dutch nobil-
ity a nominal stake in their own governance.17 On matters of religion, 
however, Philip would not budge, and his refusal to accommodate the 
growing pockets of Calvinism in his territories— combined with more 
endemic frustrations over taxation and centralization efforts— sparked 
outbursts of iconoclastic resistance in 1566.18 Yet this initial push would 
meet a hasty end: the Calvinist forces of William (the Silent) of Orange, 
the charismatic rebel- prince whose name would become synonymous 
with the struggle for Dutch independence, were no match for the counter-
insurgency of the Duke of Alba, whose Spanish troops restored a brutal 
order to the land and secured the governorship for their general.19 With 
Philip’s blessing, Alba installed a blood tribunal to exterminate whatever 
traces of resistance might be uncovered, and in the wake of his entry into 
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the Low Countries, over 60,000 people are said to have fled the region.20 
Orange, however, would not be deterred, and the rebellion simmered over 
the next decade, variously engaging the Spanish with waves of violence 
and uneasy truces.
For Leicester and his fellow reformers, the situation in the Netherlands 
activated a number of personal motivators, both sacred and profane: 
delivering the Dutch their independence would liberate a valuable eco-
nomic center from French and Spanish control and strike a blow at the 
heart of Continental Catholicism. A letter to Walsingham of 1571 reveals 
the intensity of Leicester’s commitment to immediate intervention on the 
Dutch behalf:
I think her Majestie shall be advised not to lose all these good 
advantages offered her, specially when they tend both to the setting 
up of Gods true Religion, and establishing of her own surety, with 
augmentation of her Crown. For my part, I never found cause since 
her Reign, that moveth me more to further it; and be you assured, I 
will do all that is possible that somewhat may come thereof.21
But while no friend of the papal authority— whose bull of excommunica-
tion had, only a year earlier, essentially entailed a contract on her life— the 
queen was even more loath to sponsor insurrection against an anointed 
king; this was especially true after her own harrowing experience in the 
Northern Rebellion of 1569.22 And though the infamous massacre of St. 
Bartholomew’s Day in 1572 (witnessed firsthand by Sidney and Wals-
ingham) would fortify the resolve of England’s interventionist reformers, 
it ultimately helped to mend relations between England and Spain, who 
formalized their amity with the Treaty of Bristol in 1574.23 In the years 
that followed, Leicester and his allies on the council continued to agitate 
for intervention, with little success.
The tide seemed to turn in the fall of 1576, when a swarm of mutinous 
Spanish troops “putt to sacke” the city of Antwerp, unleashing “a petyf-
full slavghter & a mysarable spoyle” on that city’s unfortunate citizens.24 
Like the sack of Rome (1527) and the Massacre (1572), the siege of Ant-
werp (or “the Spanish Fury”) would become another iconic moment in 
the sixteenth century’s long history of religious violence. The galvanized 
Dutch States (often fractured by matters of policy and religion) formed 
a united coalition of resistance, and Queen Elizabeth, now receptive to 
her council’s pleas, tentatively authorized financial and military support 
to the cause. But despite the waves of optimism that swept through the 
Leicester party, their hopes would prove agonizingly hollow: the two years 
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that followed were plagued with difficulties and deferrals, and Leicester 
could do little but wait for a command that would not materialize, as 
did the many on the Continent who sought his coming. The decision was 
finalized in March 1578, when Elizabeth reached a compromise: rather 
than deploying the promised English forces, which threatened to antago-
nize Spain and France, she would instead sponsor the German reformer 
Count John Casimir, whose mercenary army would protect the interests 
of the Dutch States.25 After months of negotiations and assurances, the 
sudden shift in policy— from direct military intervention (through the 
states themselves) to indirect financial intervention (through the proxy 
Casimir)— was a grave disappointment to the gung- ho counselors.
To understand the quality of this rejection, it is necessary to recog-
nize the vast energies (social, psychic, and intellectual) that Leicester had 
invested in his promised generalship. In the second half of the 1570s, cor-
respondence on both sides of the Channel buzzed with anticipation of the 
earl and his forces— a collective excitement that made Elizabeth’s even-
tual decision devastating. “My Lord of Leicester,” it was first reported in 
the English diplomatic community, “is the moste deseirowse to goe the 
chiefe of this Iorney that ever yowe herd of, and dothe labor that bothe 
by his owen policy, and by the favor of all his freindes.”26 This deploy-
ment seemed inevitable— and “yf ther be cause to send ayd,” Leicester 
himself would later ensure, “her majestie doth promys my self shale have 
the Chardge.”27 According to one report, in fact, the earl had made up his 
mind before Elizabeth:
My Lord of Leicester commeth over generall of all the men which 
her majestie shall send in the lowe Countries. This is his full deter-
mynation, but yet vnknowen vnto her highnes, nether shall she be 
acquainted with it, vntill she be fully resolued to send.28
In this conviction, Leicester was encouraged by a network of hopefuls on 
the Continent— including, he was told, the Prince of Orange himself, who 
“dailye insist vppon the callinge ouer of your Lordship, aswell to satisfie 
his longinge desyre to see and honour youe in person, as for the common 
wealhes sake, which he is owt of dowbt shalbe singularlye relieued by 
your transportation.”29 As Leicester was reminded, he was essential to the 
Dutch cause, both as a political supporter and as a general:
I fynd the Prince the most desyrous man in the worlde of your Lord-
ships comminge ouer, and yt ys the strenge he daylye harpes on, but 
as one carefull, I thinke, aboue all men, of your Honors welfare. 
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He hath considered and discoursed with me at large of all the dif-
ficulties, one of the greatest whereof might be your longe absence 
from court, which might perhappes breede as greate preiudice one 
waye as proffit another, knowinge how by your credytt and pres-
ence there, all their causes haue the better speede and successe.30
This fondness, in fact, extended to those of his party: when discussing 
with Orange “persons to supplye your Lordships roome,” the English 
ambassador William Davison made the welcome suggestion of “my good 
Lord of Warwick, your Lordships brother, or, if that might not be, Master 
Phillip Sidney, both men so agreable to his Excellencie, as in a world I 
could not haue made a choyce to his better contentment, for the honor-
able opinion he hath both of the one and other.”31
Because of this intense expectation, Elizabeth’s sudden change of pol-
icy in March 1578 was crushing. Only days later, Leicester reveals his 
despair in a heart- wrenching letter to Davison:
I know you thinke much in me that I have wrytten so syldome to 
you of late, but truly I have byn so trowbled to se the alteracions of 
our resolucions as I nether had mynd to wryte, or doe any thing.32
For Leicester, it was impossible not to take the news as a personal failing, 
and thus as an implicit insult to his honor:
And ageyn, for my owne parte, hit can not but greve me, putting 
my self so farr forward as I dyd, & the matter in so great shewe of 
my going as yt was, to imagyn what want may be thought in me 
that so great a chaunge ys happened, spetyally being a mynister, as 
I have been, in the cause, & holding the place I doe. But I take god 
to record I have donne my best & vtter most to sett hit forward 
as I thought hit most safe & honorable for her majestie, and he 
knoweth best also how lytle I sowght therin any iote of my owne 
partyculer.
In language bordering on the apocalyptic, Leicester’s anxiety for the 
realm’s safety has a clear theological bent, a feature which suggests the 
extent to which his intervention was framed as a divine mandate:
Well I can say no more, but I pray god we be all as we ought & that 
her majestie & this Realme fynd no dangerous lacke of this alter-
acion. . . . I had rather a 1,000 tymes hassard my lyffe in seking to 
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preuent so great daungers as everye way ar lyke to happen to vs & 
our frendes, than lyve in the greatest fellycyty or securytye for my 
owne personne that may be wyshed. But our good god hath found 
vs, I fear, to vnworthie [of] his former blessinges. Hit ys he alone 
nowe that can help vs, I meane myraculously, seing the apparaunt 
ordinary courses ar so overslipt.
But perhaps most of all, Leicester could not but feel that he had failed 
Orange personally:
I have almost nether face, nor countenance to wryte to the prince, 
his expectacion being so greatly deceaued, but I hope you wyll lett 
him faythfully knowe how yt greveth me, & that he wyll think I am 
a subiect & seruant, but that loveth him as much as any mann that 
lyveth, who soever he be, and wysheth his prosperytye as greatly, 
and so shuld he have found, yf god had byn pleasyd that I had come 
this voyage or that yet hit may please him that so hit may fall out 
hearafter.
For those of Leicester’s party, this was all a bitter pill to swallow. After 
years of hopeful expectation, they had missed their chance to seize the 
reins of Christendom— and this failure, combined with that of Leicester’s 
marriage suit, would greatly shape their affective world in the immediate 
future.
The Nature of Rejection
In the late 1570s a cluster of very powerful men at court were bound by a 
mutual dissatisfaction with the queen’s proceedings, which often seemed 
(to them) overtly contemptuous of her advisors’ counsel, her realm’s well- 
being, and her own personal safety at large. When exploring the emotional 
resonance of this configuration, one fact is paramount: by rejecting the 
aims of men like Leicester and Sidney, Elizabeth inflicted no small vio-
lence on their very identity as English subjects. For a prominent peer 
like Leicester, the queen’s policy of deferment could be experienced as a 
direct ontological injury; by denying Leicester his army, she barred him 
from actualizing the active political selfhood for which he was, according 
to the culture’s logic, natively designed.33 Sidney shared with his uncle 
this neo- chivalric outlook on the nature of service and autonomy— but 
like Surrey, with whom he shared a general affective disposition, Sidney 
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would never fulfill the promise of his upbringing, and his courtly career 
was even more plagued with frustrations and disappointments.
Rejection is a difficult thing to study, insofar as the word often serves 
as an umbrella term for concepts such as “rejection, ostracism, abandon-
ment, and exclusion”— but it is a topic of enormous interest in social 
psychology and related disciplines, where scholars have been tracking, 
among other things, the cognitive and emotional consequences of inter-
personal rebuffs.34 It is further difficult to consider the consequences of 
rejection for men like Sidney and Leicester, some of the most privileged 
subjects in the English realm— hardly those social actors apt to garner the 
most sympathy. But it is crucial to remember as we proceed that the affec-
tive consequences of the Leicester party’s political fortunes were formed 
by relative expectations, in the sense that attendance at court can be 
thought of as a “status- organizing process”: that is, one “in which evalu-
ations of and beliefs about the characteristics of actors become the basis 
of observable inequalities in face- to- face social interaction,” and where 
participants are thus “differentially evaluated in terms of honor, esteem, 
or desirability, each of which is associated with distinct moral and perfor-
mance expectations.”35 Because “people pursue status as an (emotional) 
goal in itself,” devaluation at court had significant affective consequence, 
even for the most well- heeled of Elizabeth’s subjects.36
Indeed, in the last decade “dozens of studies in different nations have 
revealed that socioeconomic status only weakly predicts an individual’s 
subjective well- being,” while “research on the cognitive, emotional, and 
interpersonal consequences of being rejected shows that people’s percep-
tions of acceptance and rejection do not always map onto how accepted 
or rejected they objectively are.”37 In other words, scholars now argue 
that “hierarchy can be conceptualized as objective social status (e.g., 
education level) or subjective social status (i.e. one’s own judgment of 
one’s status)”— and, it turns out, “subjective social status [is] more con-
sistently and strongly related to psychological functioning” than more 
traditional markers of class and cultural rank.38 Recent research speaks 
of a “local- ladder effect,” in which “an increased sense of power and a 
sense of social acceptance” relative to peers leads to higher subjective 
well- being (with the opposite, of course, also being true).39 Despite their 
objective, material advantages, men like Leicester and Sidney were thus 
still positioned to be deeply affected by such rejection, especially within 
the status- amplifying boundaries of the courtly sphere. This is because 
what has traditionally been thought of as self- esteem may be more accu-
rately called “social esteem”— and, “threats to self- esteem,” in turn, can 
be conceived of as “events that make the possibility of social exclusion 
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salient.”40 Arguing that “the self- esteem system evolved as a monitor of 
social acceptance, and that the so- called self- esteem motive functions not 
to maintain self- esteem per se but rather to avoid social devaluation and 
rejection,” theorists like Mark R. Leary and his colleagues argue that 
humans innately possess a “sociometer”: that is, a “subjective monitor or 
gauge of the degree to which the individual is being included and accepted 
versus excluded and rejected by other people,” tasked with scanning 
“the social environment (often at a nonconscious or preattentive level) 
for cues connoting exclusion, rejection, and ostracism and alert[ing] the 
individual by means of negative affect.”41 Subjective self- esteem is “sim-
ply an indicator of the quality of one’s social relations vis- à- vis inclusion 
and exclusion”— making it of particular consequence to those, perched 
atop the social hierarchy, who were dispositionally inclined to puff their 
feathers.42
I have suggested that feelings of social rejection among the Leicester 
party— that is, dips in the sociometer— led to the creation of a tempo-
rary community of disaffection, in which members actively performed 
their opposition to the direction of Elizabethan courtly policy. To under-
stand the affective mechanics of this manuever, it is useful to consider 
the literature on the social psychology of schism. In simplest terms, a 
schism occurs when a splinter population, feeling rejected by its in- group, 
turns the tables and initiates its own process of rejection.43 When a sub-
population feels “marginalised and discriminated against, rather than 
valued and respected,” schismatic action “is seen ultimately as a way 
of escaping [the] undesired identity and emotional distress” caused by 
intra- group dissonance.44 Precipitating the schism, Fabio Sani observes, 
is the fundamental belief among dissident members that mainstream 
“group identity has been subverted”; this response, in turn, “will prompt 
negative emotions (i.e. dejection and agitation) and decrease both group 
identification and perceived group entitativity (i.e. cohesion, oneness).”45 
When a courtly subpopulation like the Leicester party becomes “disso-
nant both with what they wish the group to become (the ideal group) 
and with what the group has the obligation to be (the ought group),” 
members must contend with “important cognitive and affective conse-
quences . . . [that] generate a mixture of both dejection- related emotions 
(disappointment, sadness) and agitation- related emotions (apprehension, 
uneasiness).”46 Unsurprisingly, the splintering can work to reassert and 
reaffirm new in- group cohesion, aligning it with affective and cognitive 
processes of group dynamics more generally: “group devaluation leads 
to higher identification with the devalued in- group,” while “increased in- 
group identification after (perceived or actual) group devaluation is an 
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assertion of a (preexisting) positive social identity that counters the nega-
tive social identity implied in societal devaluation.”47
Aggrieved by the queen’s rejection of their aims, the Leicester party 
enacted— or at least enacted the fantasy of— such in- group schism, 
becoming what we might term a courtly subculture: “an enclave, a cult, or 
a distraction of antithetical values that are expressions of either frustra-
tions with or interventions into the dominant structure of legitimization 
and control within society.”48 And as it signaled a temporary disruption 
of the orthodox courtly social order, we can equally label this subculture 
(and the literary texts it created) as delinquent. Because antisociality is “a 
way of communicating one’s disdain of the system and hence claiming 
membership among like- minded others”— and because “acts of exclu-
sion from the formal social order are signals of eligibility for inclusion in 
groups that oppose the social order”— delinquent action is “perhaps the 
clearest possible way of indicating that you see authority as opposed to 
you and hence that you are opposed to authority.”49 The openness of such 
opposition is a key feature, making it of particular value in the hyper- 
surveilled world of the court:
Delinquent acts are primarily conducted as part of a group activ-
ity and a public activity. Delinquents are keenly aware of their 
audience and seek to manage their reputation, and part of that 
reputation involves establishing distance from a key outgroup— the 
system. Thus, delinquency is characterized not only by exclusion 
from the mainstream, but by inclusion in a group defined in terms 
of opposition to authority.50
From atop the Elizabethan social order, men like Leicester and Sidney 
performed their discontent in such delinquent play, an affective coun-
termeasure to the frustration and blockage occasioned by their courtly 
rejection.
To speak of delinquency is appropriate, I think, given the intense con-
nection between interpersonal rejection and aggression.51 The motives for 
“antisocial reactions to rejection” are manifold, but have obvious con-
nection to social slight; “anger,” it has been argued, “has two important 
facets, namely, venting frustration and displaying dominance.”52 Indeed, 
in many cultures, to display anger is to assert a privilege either already 
possessed or actively desired— a clearly attractive reparative technique 
for a frustrated courtier looking to reassert a wounded ego.53 Here the 
objective, ontological status of men like Sidney and Leicester once again 
becomes salient, because it “appears that people who are emotionally 
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invested in grandiose self- views are the most aggressive, particularly in 
response to an esteem threat”: it is those tending toward the narcissistic 
that respond in this way to devaluation, and “the link between threat-
ened egotism (i.e., inflated self- views) and aggression has been extensively 
documented across a range of situations.”54 I don’t think it is overreach-
ing to suggest that enhanced egotism was part of the psychic equipment 
of any elite Elizabethan courtier— and indeed, the biographies of Sidney 
and Leicester (to say nothing of Surrey, or, as we’ll see, Essex) are flush 
with examples of rampant self- regard.
To the Elizabethan courtier, it mattered little that such social aggres-
sion was often self- defeating: the “fundamental motivation to protect the 
perceived worth and integrity of the self,” research suggests, can have 
“maladaptive consequences,” while “reaffirming a threatened domain 
can have the effect of exacerbating dissonance.”55 (Or, as a recent book 
chapter nakedly announces in its title: “Social Exclusion Increases Aggres-
sion and Self- Defeating Behavior While Reducing Intelligent Thought 
and Prosocial Behavior.”)56 This particular response to goal- blockage and 
exclusion leads to the fundamental paradox of the aggression/rejection 
response: why on earth do people (or groups) so often respond to rejec-
tion with behavior that cannot help but demand further rejection?57 “One 
possibility,” suggest Kipling D. Williams and Cassandra L. Govan, “is 
that the need for belonging and self- esteem may pull toward inclusion-
ary reactions and the need for control and meaningful existence may pull 
toward antisocial reactions”; another “is that both reactions are triggered 
in the individual: anger and retaliation at an implicit level, and hopes for 
reinclusion at the explicit level.”58 Whatever the case, it is my argument 
that the rejected Elizabethan courtier was forced to negotiate this pre-
carious position: knowing that reintegration into the orthodox order was 
an eventual necessity, but needing still to engage in affective repair, their 
antisocial aggression required being bold but not too bold. This paradox, 
I think, helps explain the many aspects of the Tudor courtly experience 
that seem immediately self- defeating, or that defy strict logic: courtiers 
like Leicester and Sidney routinely engaged in behavior that was perhaps 
politically maladaptive, but affectively energizing.
Political rejection threatened to be emotionally crippling, and men like 
Leicester and Sidney necessarily developed strategies to manage it. One 
such technique can be detected in the literary performances with which 
they were associated. To repair the psychic wounds of political frustration 
and disappointment, those of the Leicester party drew collective strength 
from a series of textual and performative moments designed to reassert 
their own autonomy, by announcing themselves incompatible with the 
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larger symbolic matrix that governed Elizabethan monarchal representa-
tion. Such moments are not simply “subversive,” in the sense of suggesting 
a challenge to the dominant discourse; rather, they exist to publicize a 
challenge that has already taken place, and to remind the royal powers 
of who is making it. The mode is less immediately combative than it is 
confessional— though the confession, to be sure, is of the malcontent’s 
willingness (and happiness) to engage in courtly combat. For the disaf-
fected courtier, I suggest, such disruption could generate a heroic moment 
of existential autonomy— an assertion of wicked will that demonstrates, 
like the example of Camus’s Sisyphus, that “there is no fate that cannot 
be surmounted by scorn.”59 Leicester and Sidney’s entertainments have 
been primed to produce such moments: even as they celebrate Elizabeth’s 
glory, they nonetheless have been armed with a series of embedded coun-
termeasures, textual features that might be activated at a moment’s notice 
to unleash an unsuspecting attack or cloak a hasty retreat. A history of 
failure sows anticipation of a failing future— a crippling truth, unless that 
possibility is co- opted in advance.
After decades of New Historicist scholarship, it is no surprise to find 
that courtiers and their proxies found means to thread strands of dis-
content and opposition within the larger, conventional framework of 
monarchal celebration.60 But my point is not to observe that the pageants 
of the 1570s contained moments of subversion, but rather to emphasize 
how these texts anticipate their own failing, and how these failures can 
engender productive forms of collective identification.61 Such a strategic 
display of disaffection is doubly fortifying to the courtier’s sense of per-
sonal autonomy: it frees them from the burden of masking negative affect 
(and thus diverting the costly “emotional work” of such dissimulation) 
and flaunts, through a naked breach of decorum, that his force of will is 
not such that will be deterred by fear of reprisal.62 When this technique is 
deployed across a network of discontent (such as that formed by Leices-
ter, Sidney, and the similarly minded), the result is to forge an alternate 
model of community— an oppositional anti- court, defined by its attempt 
to refashion, through an act of affective reversal, negative social meaning 
into the stuff of identity confirmation and alternative political action.
So how did they do it? By turning to the woods.
Into the Wild
In the middle of May 1578, when riding through the woods of Leicester’s 
estate at Wanstead, Queen Elizabeth found herself suddenly starring in 
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Philip Sidney’s earliest surviving literary composition. During her regular 
summer “progresses”— in which the royal court, fully mobilized, would 
tear its way through the houses and manors of its nobility— Elizabeth 
was routinely entertained by elaborate spectacles and performances; in 
this particular pageant, known now as The Lady of May, Sidney had cast 
the queen as mediator in a rustic debate that had spontaneously erupted 
before her. A country girl, lately on the cusp of “that notable matter” 
of matrimony, finds herself equally inclined to the suits of Espilus— a 
wealthy shepherd, offering a life of ease and comfort— and Therion— a 
lusty forester, promising a life of activity and exhilaration. As the drama 
unfolds, both sides debate the merits of the lovers and their professions, 
before the queen is finally called upon to adjudicate.63
Given Therion’s virile, vital associations with the active life, modern 
readers have tended to agree that he is some kind of literary figuration 
of the Sidney/Leicester agenda— and this is with good reason, as we will 
see.64 Yet at the same time, if Sidney wanted to assure a victory for the for-
ester, there are a few details he might have spared: when not off “stealing 
me venison out of these forests,” the lady admits, Therion often “grows 
to such rages, that sometimes he strikes me, sometimes he rails at me.”65 
This rather naked assertion certainly troubles Therion’s representational 
status, and is enough for some to disqualify any association with Sidney 
altogether: “on a literal level,” Katherine Duncan- Jones wonders, “could 
he have expected the Queen to reward a violent poacher?”66
My analysis of The Lady of May will conclude this chapter. Yet 
Duncan- Jones’s reasonable question demands an answer now, and the 
thrust of it has implications for a more general reading of the Leicester 
party’s literary ethos— because yes, she’s fundamentally right, it does seem 
unlikely that Sidney would expect the queen to unequivocally reward 
such renegade behavior. But the very notion, as Duncan- Jones frames it, is 
premised on the assumption that Sidney’s absolute and overriding inter-
est was securing the reward for his proxy— and this supposition (and the 
spirit that animates it) risks limiting our understanding of courtly dynam-
ics, especially as they inflect and are inflected by the courtier’s subjective 
experience. As demonstrated by the literature on rejection reviewed 
above, there were very good affective reasons why a frustrated courtier 
might construe himself so unsuitably, however imprudent as a matter of 
immediate policy.67
And indeed, there were good reasons why Sidney and Leicester might 
want to align themselves specifically with the forester Therion, the fig-
ure whose native domain was the depths of the wild, liberated from the 
softening touch of art and culture, and from the order and degree of the 
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monarch’s court. By virtue of their standing, the average Elizabethan aris-
tocrat had a functional relationship with the natural world: nobles often 
joined the queen in her favorite pastime of hunting, and their newly built 
estates, elaborately stylized with gardens, parks, and other artificial land-
scapes, drew much of their significance via contrast with the surrounding 
woodland.68 Yet there was also a more substantial way that England’s 
wild proved a site of identity management for Elizabeth’s nobility. Con-
cepts of the wild were a vital counterbalance in the long development of 
European courtesy, as a site of contestatory energy that threatened to dis-
rupt the symbolic order of civil discourse, and that threatened to disrupt 
the principles of governance itself.
That wildness was thought antithetical to authority is suggested by 
a representative document of early 1538, in which a northern prior 
denounces the recent religious risings against Henry VIII:
And as touchinge all other persones of what sorte of menn so euer 
theye bee, kynne or frende, or other, that shall fortune to vtter 
their stomakkes agaynst the kinges highnes, or to be accused of 
the same, I for my parte shall bere them less favour then I wold do 
to turkes: for turkes, albeyt they be infideles, yeat they be of the 
same nature, menn as we bee— and those that do rebell agaynst 
their naturall prince, whome by goddes lawe and mans lawe they 
ought to defende, be to be reputed as no menn, but as serpentes and 
wyelde beestes.69
In the ordered world of a monarch’s realm, there was little room for such 
savageness. Yet this protestation, an orthodox Renaissance commonplace, 
obscures a central paradox about the nature of the wild: that, as it works 
to strip a man bare, wildness necessarily exposes the raw human stuff 
that had been fettered by his social clothes. This untapped vein of power, 
autonomy, and (as in the emerging “noble savage” trope) even virtue 
could fuel a shadow- self, an alternate guise that might, by giving the lie to 
the social world that cloaked it, enable a mode of intense actualization. 
There is perhaps no purer form of virility than the one experienced on the 
descent to join those “reputed as no menn.” For this reason, I suggest, the 
wild was a site of valuable fantasy for the disaffected Elizabethan aristo-
crat, who saw in it a symbolic opportunity to perform the recuperative 
and compensatory affective measures I have described above.
Fundamentally, of course, The Lady of May is a pastoral literary 
exercise, and both foresters and wildness can be generally related to the 
larger discourse of pastoralism, the Elizabethan courtier’s conventional 
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mode of literary critique.70 The social dynamics of pastoralism have been 
elucidated by the work of New Historicist scholars like Louis Adrian 
Montrose, who suggests that pastoral forms served “to mediate differ-
ential relationships of power, prestige, and wealth in a variety of social 
situations.”71 Rather than a mere “longing after innocence and happi-
ness,” the pastoral genre’s “fundamental self- contradictoriness” made it 
a powerful vehicle of indirect argument, as suggested by a much- cited 
passage of George Puttenham:
The poet devised the eclogue . . . not of purpose to counterfeit or 
represent the rustical manner of loves and communication, but 
under the veil of homely persons and in rude speeches to insinuate 
and glance at greater matters, and such as perchance had not been 
safe to have been disclosed in any other sort.72
It seems clear that pastoralism was the “appropriate medium in which 
living princes may be obliquely criticised or instructed,” and that “its 
properties of dissimulation and insinuation make it apt to embody any 
motive that it might be impolitic, graceless, or dangerous to advance 
openly in the predatory environment of a Renaissance court.”73 But, as 
the fundamental contest of The Lady of May reveals, the discourse of 
wildness— even as it is embedded within the pastoral mode— enables a 
related critique which is not appropriate, and which is impolitic, grace-
less, or dangerous— and that sometimes this friction was to be preferred, 
especially as an affective resource. This association with wildness was 
especially valuable during the first half of Elizabeth’s reign, when the 
political and representational modes that defined her were still pliable, 
and when discourse (oppositional or otherwise) was not yet inflected by 
the cult of Gloriana, the structure of symbolic orthodoxy that governed 
courtly expression in the 1580s and 1590s.74
Though the pageants of the 1570s were a reification of the Elizabe-
than symbolic order, Leicester and Sidney routinely found means within 
to introduce a node of chaos, by aligning themselves with this energy 
of the wild— a maneuver enabled by the natural setting in which they 
occurred. While there has been some discussion about the political nature 
of wildness in this period, I think that the range and significance of its 
affective valence has not yet been understood.75 In the sixteenth- century 
imagination, notions of wildness conjured a complex tapestry of associa-
tions, telling all manner of tales about the men and beasts that inhabited 
the natural world. In this folk tradition, a variety of archetypes soon 
emerged— though it is not easy to delineate them precisely. Writing nearly 
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a century ago, Robert Withington observed the challenge of sorting out 
this cast of characters:
The relation between wild- men, green- men, foresters, Robin Hood, 
the Moors and the devil is very difficult to clear up. A great many 
cross- influences must exist; and it seems obvious that all these fig-
ures are connected.76
Because these stock types share an associative range, it is not necessary to 
profile them completely— but by sketching the broad parameters of their 
thematic domain, it becomes clear that they collectively activate an affec-
tive suite of aggression, virility, and opposition.
Remaining with Therion, we can begin with the figure of the forester: 
the man who, with trap and axe, bravely seeks his fortunes in the wild, a 
potent symbol and worthy champion of the active life. As Catherine Bates 
has recently argued, the act of hunting has long been vital to notions 
of “heroic masculinity” in the Western literary tradition; in the Renais-
sance, she importantly demonstrates, varieties of hunting motifs signaled 
ongoing negotiations of “wealth, status, prestige.”77 Though the forester 
motif figured widely in the sixteenth- century literary imagination, it 
seems to have been a particular favorite of Elizabeth’s father— the king 
who, armed with his majestic codpiece, actively mythologized himself as 
the font of virility. As such, the forester made regular appearances in the 
entertainments of Henry VIII’s reign, and the records of his pageants are 
flush with receipts for “foresters’ coates and hoods” and “hunters’ jack-
ets.”78 (In fact, the forester featured in King Henry’s coronation revelries, 
in a spectacle recorded by Hall.)79 Furthermore, a cluster of forester songs 
are recorded in British Library Additional MS 31922, the “Henry VIII 
Manuscript,” a songbook in which the work of composers like William 
Cornish and Robert Cooper is preserved alongside King Henry’s own 
literary and musical compositions.80 Though the forester/hunter figure 
assumes several different roles in this collection, it nonetheless harmo-
nizes around two central assertions: that the wild is a site of both violent 
and erotic opportunity, and that the forester is the man best poised to 
activate it. Exploiting the commonplace trope of the erotic hunt, the for-
esters of these songs deploy an arsenal of horns, spears, and arrows to 
celebrate (or mourn the decline of) the masculine lustiness with which 
they are naturally endowed. The opening verse, for example, of Cornish’s 
“Blow thi hornne hunter” entails an almost ritualistic invocation of the 
phallus:
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Blow thi hornne hunter
& blow thi horne on hye
ther ys a do in yonder wode
in faith she woll not dy
now blow thi hornne hunter
& blow thi hornne ioly hunter.81
In general, the forester figure in this collection accrues a thematic cluster: 
notions of erotic abundance, implicit and explicit violence, and masculine, 
homosocial autonomy. Though the forester is the least savage (and least 
subversive) denizen of the natural world, he nonetheless stands on the 
threshold of wildness— and as such, he begins to introduce, in regulated 
form, the energies of wanton violence, sexual aggression, and unfettered 
autonomy that only intensify as we proceed further into its depths.
Leicester and Sidney may have especially admired one particular for-
ester of the “wilde Countries”: the infamous Robin Hood.82 As “chiefe 
gouernoure” of the wild, Robin Hood presided over an outlaw court of 
his merry men, a political subculture bound by the affective affinity of 
mutual alienation.83 He enjoyed a robust presence in the folklore of late 
medieval and early modern England— and we know he appealed to the 
Sidney family, who staged a Robin Hood performance during their spring 
festivities in 1574. (There’s reason to think that Leicester, Elizabeth’s own 
“sweet Robin,” may have also identified with this alternate namesake.)84 
Embodying a “permanent state of resistance to governmental authority,” 
the Robin Hood figure of the late Middle Ages was inherently “chaotic, 
centrifugal, even subversive.”85 Born to a “Forester [who] shot in a lusty 
long Bow,” Robin is routinely described as a “gode yeman” in the ballad 
tradition; for reason of this humble start, he was a star of folk tradi-
tions (like the May Day festivals) that upended the conventional social 
hierarchy.86 But in the early modern period, Robin Hood underwent 
an enormous social change, and it was one that made him even more 
meaningful to men like Leicester and Sidney. For reasons still not entirely 
clear, the sixteenth century witnessed a “gentrification” of the Robin 
Hood legend, in which the outlaw became increasingly imagined not as a 
working- class hero, but as a displaced, disaffected, or exiled aristocrat.87 
In the early decades of the century, he was already a figure notable in 
court fiction (in 1510, for example, Henry VIII and his friends took the 
guise of “Robyn Hodes men” to perform before Queen Catherine), and as 
the era progressed, Robin would become a natural denizen of the courtly 
universe— though one fundamentally opposed, in his kingdom of the 
wild, to the site of court proper.88 Thus, in the second half of the sixteenth 
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century, as Leicester and Sidney were rehearsing their grievances in the 
imaginative space of the wild, the Robin Hood of medieval lore was simul-
taneously adopting a form in which they might increasingly recognize 
themselves. In this new order, it has been said, “May games [were] now 
war games” and “the politics of Robin Hood [were] revolutionary”— 
features that, by lending a stately gravity to the tale’s folk origins, aligned 
it with the affective mode the Leicester party.89 Blending antiauthoritarian 
aggression with moral righteousness, the merry men were an apt model 
for a community of frustrated courtiers.
But if the forester is one step removed from the site of court and culture, 
there are many figures even more natively suited to the wilderness. The 
most prominent is the wild (or savage) man, the half- beast who embodied 
the primordial condition, untamed yet by the civilizing process. Though 
known by many names (wild man, savage man, green man, woodwose), 
he is familiar to readers of Elizabethan literature; he appears on stage, for 
example, as Bremo in Mucedorus, while his image is refracted in many 
personae in The Faerie Queene, through which Spenser explores the con-
tours of human nature.90 “Depicted in deliberately grotesque terms,” he 
was “covered with a thick coat of hair, or with moss and ivy, and carry-
ing an uprooted tree or club”; he is thus a presocial form of the forester, 
who (with culture’s guiding hand) replaced a coat of natural hair with 
the cured hides of his quarry, and who traded the phallic brawn of his 
club for the phallic finesse of an arrow.91 As such, the wild man equally 
evoked associations of violence, sexuality, and raw freedom— but as a 
creature immune from the laws and mores of society, he amplified them 
to a potentially terrifying degree.92 From this native state, the wild man 
thus “implied everything that eluded Christian norms and the established 
framework of Christian society”— that which “was uncanny, unruly, raw, 
unpredictable, foreign, uncultured, and uncultivated.”93 Because the mon-
arch’s court was the epicenter of rule and culture, the wild man thus 
stood as a perfect inversion of the courtier: a position that might prove 
enormously productive for those, like Leicester and Sidney, who had tem-
perament to inhabit it. (That wild figures were often motivated by “a 
case of rejected love” furthers the association for Leicester.)94 Though the 
wild man existed in many forms throughout the early modern period, 
he was, at his core, antithetical to the principles of sovereignty; this fact 
prescribed his orthodox role in Elizabethan pageants, to be tamed by the 
queen’s presence.95 He was thus an apt vessel, even more than the forester 
figure, for courtly fantasies of subversion, opposition, and autonomy.96
The wild man was featured regularly in shows of the 1570s, in a 
variety of permutations. In addition to the Leicester- sponsored events 
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discussed below, he figured in the New Year’s revels of 1574, a pageant in 
July of the same year, and in George Whetstone’s 1578 comedy Promos 
and Cassandra.97 (Like the forester, the wild man was also a favorite of 
Henry VIII: the folk figure of hypermasculine abundance found reflec-
tion in one of England’s most hypermasculine, patriarchal, and phallic 
kings.)98 The raw vitality of the wild man figure, and a further indication 
of his potential suitability as a site of identification, is similarly confirmed 
by his linkage to characters of the divine, or legendary, variety. In many 
instances, the wild man is associated with a pair of related figures from 
antiquity: Sylvanus, spirit of the forest and countryside, and Silenus, spirit 
of the wild.99 Like the wild man, both can be seen wielding uprooted 
trees— and Silenus, as companion to the satyrs and foster father to Dio-
nysus, was especially prone to fits of frenzy.100 Along with such classical 
contributions, the wild man’s symbolic meaning was inflected by local 
custom. Though the wild man is a stock character of European folklore, 
his particular manifestation in England is indebted to the “green man” 
of Celtic mythology, an analogous native of the natural world— and for 
this reason, the savage man of the English forest is often clothed not in 
hides and hair, but in vines and ivy.101 The wild man also had a curi-
ous affinity with Saint George, England’s patron saint and ur- champion: 
for example, the “St. George plays” of the medieval and early modern 
period often employed “leaves or green branches” in their costuming.102 
Both the classical and native English traditions expanded the wild man’s 
symbolic range by allowing his inherent linkage with strength, virility, 
and autonomy to manifest within the cosmic register of heroes, legends, 
champions, and divines.
And indeed, there is one such association that demands particular 
note. In The Individual and the Cosmos in Renaissance Philosophy, Ernst 
Cassirer importantly argues that Hercules is a principal icon of early 
modern autonomy: in defeating his allegorical nemesis Fortune, Hercules 
asserts the supremacy of truth, judgment, and freedom, epitomizing the 
supreme notion of valor (fortezza). (That is, the “strength of virility itself, 
the strength of the human will which becomes the tamer of destiny, the 
domitrice della fortuna.”)103 Embodying the proximity of man and god, 
Hercules was a particularly apt hero of the early modern period, and it 
is not surprising that he enjoyed a rich career as a symbol of Renaissance 
virtue.104 Yet, because of his traditional signification in art and literature— 
armed with a club, and draped in the skin of the Nemean lion— Hercules 
would also develop an association with the wild man topos of European 
folk culture. In the Middle Ages, there grew an increasing correspondence 
between “a man clad in fur, and one endowed with it by nature,” and for 
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obvious reasons, many “attributes of the strong Hercules . . . coalesced into 
those of the conventional wild man.”105 In some cases, the association was 
quite explicit: for example, a fourteenth- century illustration of Seneca’s 
Hercules Furens depicts Hercules as unmistakably wild, a club- wielding, 
anthropomorphized lion- man marked by both human hands and feline 
paws and tail.106 As Michael Wintroub notes, this version of Hercules— 
which extends the god- man permutation to god- man- savage— reveals 
that the wild man equally encompasses “a discursive field in which the 
normative values of elites could be negotiated and/or contested.”107 The 
addition of Hercules further thickens the associative texture of Leicester 
and Sidney’s interest in the wild man topos: to the unrestrained, danger-
ous, and audacious power of the savage man, the classical hero added 
notions of nobility, governance, and even humanist eloquence, all without 
yielding the fundamental core of volatility that makes savagery so seduc-
tive in the first place.
Virility, aggression, autonomy, rebellion, violence, lust, subversion, phal-
licism, patriarchy, heroism, primitivism, naturalism, frenzy, audacity, 
degeneration, and virtue: the discourse of wildness evoked many things 
in the sixteenth- century English imagination. Some were commendable, 
even honorable. But many still were chaotic, posing an inherent danger 
to the core principles of governance and social order— or, perhaps worse 
still, in the case of many of the gendered terms, announcing a specific 
challenge to the authority of a (virgin) queen. Insofar as identification 
with wildness entails a kind of style, this symbolic range may be thought 
to entail what Sarah Thornton (adopting Bourdieu) calls “subcultural 
capital,” the “subspecies of capital operating within  .  .  . less privileged 
domains” of mainstream culture.108 The discourse of wildness was a thing 
of endless productivity for a cadre of disaffected men in Elizabeth’s court, 
in which they could find a thematic and formal vocabulary to perform 
affective states of rejection, discontent, and antisociality— and indeed, to 
dismantle, however temporarily, the very notions of courtship.
With the previous discussion in mind, I will now consider how the 
oppositional thematics of wildness are deployed by the Leicester/Sidney 
circle in three entertainments of the late 1570s: the pageants at Kenilworth 
and Woodstock in 1575— which begin to employ the disaffected poetics 
I have been describing— and Sidney’s The Lady of May in 1578— which, 
in response to three additional years of rejection, is even more explicit in 
promoting the discontent of its sponsors. In each performance, elements 
from the lexicon of the wild are strategically exploited in the service of an 
antisocial undersong, sounding notes of negative affect even within the 
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celebratory mode of the entertainment proper. Such songs would soon 
enough become the official soundtrack of the pasture— but in the 1570s, 
they emerged from a considerably more frenetic place, and were invested 
with fantasies of a wilder nature.
Leicester and Sidney, Entertainers
Kenilworth, 1575
In July 1575 Leicester hosted an entertainment for the roving queen at 
his magnificent castle of Kenilworth. Present during the nineteen- day cel-
ebration was the young Philip Sidney, freshly returned from his two- year 
finishing tour of Europe; the primary poetic architect, however, was the 
well- known writer (and grizzled soldier) George Gascoigne, who seems 
to have guided much of the festivities.109 The events were recorded in two 
contemporary accounts: Robert Laneham’s eyewitness report, published 
in 1575 as A Letter Whearin Part of the Entertainment Vntoo the Queenz 
Maiesty at Killingwoorth Castl in Warwik Sheer in This Soomerz Prog-
ress 1575 Iz Signified, and Gascoigne’s pseudo- official version, published 
(anonymously) a year later as The Princelye Pleasures, at the Courte of 
Kenelwoorth.110 As these texts reveal, the queen was honored with such 
panoply of spectacle— song and dance, playlets, combat, pyrotechnics, 
and special effects— that it has been often claimed that the events entailed 
a de facto marriage proposal on Leicester’s behalf.111 Yet, in spite of this 
motive— or, perhaps more rightly, because of it— there also exist moments 
of oppositional energy, in which Leicester and his proxies anticipate the 
likely failure of this very proposition. In doing so, they find means to 
assert their own wild autonomy, by promoting the suitor’s fundamental 
inability to be integrated in (and thus reduced to) the symbolic universe 
of his beloved.
At the outset of her stay, Elizabeth was lavishly celebrated even before 
she reached the grounds of Kenilworth proper: “there met her on the way, 
somewhat neere the Castle, Sybilla, who prophecied vnto her Highnes, 
the prosperous raigne that she should continue, according to the happy 
beginning of the same” (2:290). With this happy ambush, Elizabeth was 
treated to a welcome verse, promising a peaceful future for herself, her 
subjects, and her realm.
Yet even within this conventional welcome, the Sybil— “placed in 
an arbor in the parke neere the high way where the Queenes maiestie 
came” (ibid.)— finds subtle means to establish a demarcation between the 
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feminine source of the queen’s authority and the masculine consensus by 
which it is enabled. This tension is detected even within her ostensibly 
benign prayer for a peaceful realm:
You shalbe called the Prince of peace,
and peace shalbe your shield,
So that your eyes shal neuer see
the broyls of bloody field. (2:291)
Though apparently unremarkable, these lines acknowledge a literal fact 
of no small importance: Elizabeth’s eyes won’t ever see the field of war, 
and this is precisely the feature that separates her from martial subjects 
like Leicester, Sidney, and Gascoigne. Though Elizabeth may preside over 
the fictive combats of the pageant world, the Sybil reminds her that she, 
unlike her mighty father, was a monarch barred from the theater of war. 
Elizabeth’s engagement with the realm of blood and steel was restricted to 
the kind of martial role- playing we see before Tilbury— a justly celebrated 
gesture, but one whose rhetorical power is ultimately premised on the 
queen’s fundamental incompatibility with the realm of genuine combat.
But while Elizabeth may have been excluded, the site of war was none-
theless a key domain for the formation and management of aristocratic 
identity, in which men like Leicester and Sidney strove to “vindicate their 
honor and authority” through exploits in the field.112 The same neo- 
chivalric spirit that inspired their flair for martial pageantry assured that 
the symbolic combats they staged were an inadequate substitute for the 
thing itself: the real place for affirming their aristocratic ontology was in 
battle, and this was the birthright that Elizabeth insistently denied them. 
Indeed, when the opportunity was finally presented, many would ruth-
lessly seize it: the queen’s command was routinely disobeyed in times of 
war, when her generals found means to subordinate her will to their own. 
(As we will see in the next chapter, this was a tactic of the Earl of Essex.) 
These social dynamics are being negotiated even within the celebratory 
mode of the pageant— and, for all its orthodoxy, the observation that 
Elizabeth’s “eyes shall neuer see / the broyls of bloody field” cannot help 
but activate alternate ways to read the mock- combats that will be subse-
quently staged for her entertainment.
After the confirmation that Elizabeth’s reign would be marked by tran-
quility, she encountered a bellicose dumb show that suggested the opposite:
Her Majesty passing on to the first gate, there stode in the Leades 
and Battlementes thereof, sixe Trumpetters hugelie advaunced, 
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much exceeding the common stature of men in this age, who had 
likewise huge and monstrous Trumpettes counterfetted, wherein 
they seemed to sound: and behind them were placed certaine Trum-
petters, who sounded in deede at her majesties entrie. And by this 
dum shew it was ment, that in the daies and Reigne of K. Arth-
ure, men were of that stature. So that the Castle of Kenelworth 
should seeme stil to be kept by Arthurs heires and their seruants. 
(2:291– 92)
The trumpeters, with their exaggerated height, physical prowess, and 
“huge and monstrous” phallic devices, signal the potent virility of Leices-
ter’s world, recalling the brawn of the savage man archetype. It is thus 
not surprising that they announce the earl as a figure of Arthur: the font 
of British chivalry, a heroic warrior, a defender of the faith, and (above 
all) a king.113
It is difficult to think that this is not, on some level, a challenge to 
Elizabeth’s authority: she is being welcomed as a subject to an alternate 
realm, an artifact of England’s heroic past, in which Leicester rules as 
warrior- king. Indeed, though Leicester took extensive steps to modernize 
the grounds, Kenilworth was still an “ancient military fortress,” recalling 
the domains of the overmighty peers that Elizabeth’s father and grandfa-
ther struggled so endlessly to undo.114 In the 1570s Leicester continued to 
fortify and expand his arsenal at Kenilworth, from which he commanded 
a nearly unthinkable reserve of potential power:
Not for over half a century had a subject possessed such formidable 
military resources. If only he could have ensured the loyalty of his 
men, Leicester was in a position to defy all comers, even perhaps his 
sovereign. He was the last of his kind in English history.115
Though the arsenal wasn’t merely for show, its primary force is symbolic, 
transforming Kenilworth into a counterculture monument to the force of 
Leicester’s exceptional magnificence— though one devoted officially, of 
course, to eliciting her majesty’s pleasure.116 When we recall that Henry 
VIII was invested in the mythos of Arthur, whose ancient authority would 
premise his world- shattering claims of religious prerogative,117 it becomes 
clear that the symbolic world of Kenilworth provides an alternate court 
to Elizabeth’s own, grounded in the patriarchal principles of a hypotheti-
cal Dudleian rule.118 Given this investment in virility, it is not surprising 
who Leicester elected as the champion of his heroic, masculine realm: 
“when her maiestie entred the gate, there stoode Hercules for Porter” 
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(2:292). For the interventionalist Leicester party, who ached to don spurs 
on behalf of the Low Countries, such fantasies of a militaristic empire 
were an obvious affective well, counteracting the threat to aristocratic 
ontology posed by Elizabeth’s continual reluctance to engage.119
As the festivities continued, the pageant’s engagements with the dis-
course of wildness became further explicit. Later in the week, for example, 
Elizabeth encountered an “Hombre Saluagio, with an Oken plant pluct vp 
by the roots in hiz hande, him self forgrone all in moss and Iuy” (2:250). 
Initially unaware of the queen’s presence, the savage man has been stirred 
by the disruption of his domain, and seeks someone to explain “why all 
these worthy Lords and Peeres, / are here assembled so” (2:297). In a 
comic exchange with Echo, the wild man (who seems to have been played 
by Gascoigne) is led through a brief précis of the pageant’s proceedings 
to date— a recapitulation that serves to emphasize the extraordinary 
efforts of “O Dudley,” who “gaue him selfe and all, / A worthy gift to 
be received, / and so I trust it shall” (2:301). He finally spots Elizabeth 
herself, the guest of honor; he falls to his knees, begging that she might 
accept the service of such a “wilde and sauadge man” (2:302).
Unlike many of the playlets during the progress, the saga of the Savage 
Man is left puzzlingly unresolved; despite his promise (and willingness) 
to yield, there is no catharsis, no transformation, and no integration into 
the social order. The texts give no hint of Elizabeth’s response, and the 
terms of his submission are accordingly unclear. Indeed, his final words 
to the queen contain a barely concealed challenge— “And take in worth 
the wilde mans words, / for else you do him wrong”— and his concluding 
remarks, as Gascoigne tells it, invoke rejection and despair:
let me go seeke some death,
Since I may see this Queene no more,
good greefe nowe stop my breath. (2:303– 4)
An odd way, it seems, to conclude the sequence, which is notable in itself 
for suspending the conventions of the wild man transformation trope.
But the reason for this abrupt ending may be indicated by an event that 
is omitted in Gascoigne’s text. As Laneham tells it, another incident had 
actually concluded the wild man episode:
Az thiz Sauage for the more submission brake his tree a sunder, 
kest the top from him, it had allmost light vpon her highness hors 
hed: whereat he startld and the gentleman mooch dismayd. See the 
benignittee of the Prins, az the foot men lookt well too the hors, and 
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hee of generozitee soon callmd of him self, no hurt, no hurt quoth 
her highnes. Which woords I promis yoo wee wear all glad to heeer, 
and took them too be the best part of the play. (2:251)
Though merely an accident, it is suggestive that the savage man brings 
near- disaster to the queen, via the very act that is intended to signal his 
submission: her courtiers might sublimate much of their desires, but 
there is nonetheless a potential cost to the civilizing process of Elizabeth’s 
court. In fact, according to a contemporary Spanish dispatch, the wild 
man episode wasn’t the only occasion at Kenilworth that presented dan-
ger to the queen:
The queen majesty, as I write, is far away from here, at my Lord of 
Leicester’s castle, called Kenilworth, where the earl has treated her 
to many festivities. It is said that one day, while going to hunt, a 
traitor (whom they then seized) shot at her with an arrow— though 
others say he was just shooting at the deer, and meant no harm. The 
bolt passed by the queen without hurting her, thank God.120
Was there a Robin Hood lurking in the woods of Leicester’s Kenilworth? 
The queen, it seems, didn’t have much luck with clubs or arrows on this 
visit— the phallic signifiers of the wild proved a too- real reminder of the 
dangerous virility that stood in symbolic defiance of her order.
As we have seen, the Kenilworth festivities were punctuated by an 
oppositional undersong, in which Leicester and his agents embedded 
themes that strategically cut against the spirit of the celebration proper. 
This is perhaps no better exemplified than by the events surrounding the 
so- called Masque of Zabeta, a sequence in which the organizers seem 
to deploy, but at the same time anticipate the failure of, a coded mar-
riage proposal to the queen. Apparently intended as a centerpiece of the 
queen’s visit, the masque reveals how the nymph Zabeta, a former dis-
ciple of Diana, is encouraged to join Juno and her cult of matrimony.121 
(Continuing the prevalent motif, the performance also features “a man 
cladde all in Mosse,” who announces himself as “the wylde mans sonne” 
[2:309].) But though the show was “prepared and redy (euery Actor in his 
garment) two or three dayes together,” it never was realized— and while 
allegedly postponed for “lack of opportunitie and seasonable weather,” it 
has in fact “long been suggested (and is generally accepted) that the real 
reason for the cancellation of Gascoigne’s marriage masque was the sen-
sitivity of its overt call for Queens to wed” (2:322; ibid. footnote 556). By 
printing the playlet’s text in his 1576 account, Gascoigne scores a minor 
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revenge, ensuring that the nixed performance would still have life in the 
public record: the volume’s preface, in fact, explicitly signals the inclu-
sion of “one Moral and gallant Deuyce, which neuer came to execution, 
although it were often in a readinesse” (2:289). In not addressing “the 
real source of the queen’s displeasure,” Susan Frye observes, this maneu-
ver “subtly undercut[s] her and protect[s] the participants by pretending 
that her actions are unfounded.”122
But even more important is the fact that, while this particular show was 
canceled, Leicester seemed determined that Elizabeth would hear the tale 
of Zabeta, one way or the other. Days later, in the final moments before 
“her departure from thence, the Earle commanded master Gascoigne to 
deuise some Farewel worth the presenting”— and to do so, the poet clad 
himself “like vnto Syluanus, God of the Woods” (2:322). Of the dozens 
of allegorical figures that had appeared throughout the week, Gascoigne 
selects the lord of “these woods and wildernes” to engage Elizabeth for a 
final time; he follows alongside the queen as she rides, delivering a series 
of speeches designed to entice an extension of her visit (ibid.). As Sylvanus 
explains it, the “late alteration in the skyes” should be attributed to the 
“flowing teares” of the gods, grieved at her imminent departure, and the 
anticipation of which reverberates throughout the natural world:
Not onely the skies scowled, the windes raged, the waues rored and 
tossed, but also the Fishes in the waters turned vp their bellies, the 
Deere in the woods went drowping, the grasse was wery of grow-
ing, the Trees shooke off their leaues, and all the Beastes of the 
Forrest stoode amazed. (2:324– 25)
But Sylvanus next turns to the show that had been allegedly ruined by this 
meteorological upheaval: in lieu of the canceled performance, Gascoigne 
himself unfolds the “strange and pitifull adventures” of Zabeta— the 
nymph “surpassing all the rest for singuler gifts and graces”— and her 
unlucky suitors— “whome shee hath turned and conuerted into most 
monstrous shapes and proportions” (2:326). As they proceed throughout 
the forest, Sylvanus narrates this gallery of wretched souls (such as “Con-
stance,” turned to “this Oke,” or “inconstancie,” to “yonder Popler”), 
forcing the queen to gaze upon the casualties of her displaced erotic obsti-
nacy (2:326– 27). Of particular interest is the fate of “Ambition”:
She dyd by good right condemne hym into this braunch of Iuy, the 
which can neuer clyme on hygh nor florysh without the helpe of 
some other plant or tree, and yet commonly what tree soeuer it ryse 
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by, it neuer leaueth to wynde about it, and strayghtly to infolde it, 
vntyll it haue smowldred and killed it. (2:327)
Though a normal enough indictment of the courtly rat race— and of the 
clawing upstarts that so aggrieved men like Sidney and Leicester— ivy is 
also the essential signifier of the English wild man, an association that 
substantially thickens the moment’s symbolic importance. On one hand, 
the wild man is a living monument to the deleterious effects of unchecked 
courtly ambition: covered in ivy, he offers visual witness to the process of 
predation that Sylvanus describes, and which slowly erodes the bedrock 
of aristocratic ontology. Yet on the other, the wild man is not simply cov-
ered in ivy, but is made of it: in this sense, he is ambition animated, with 
the seizing of autonomy it entails, and with the threat of destruction to 
those who might impinge it. Following an increasingly familiar pattern, 
this slick maneuver embraces the alluring threat of courtly ambition even 
as it righteously condemns it.
But the centerpiece of Sylvanus’s catalog is the figure of “Deepe desire,” 
who was turned into “this Holy bush  .  .  . now furnished on euery side 
with sharpe pricking leaues, to proue the restlesse prickes of his priuie 
thoughts” (2:328).123 Unlike Zabeta’s other victims, desire is given the 
opportunity to speak for himself— but his attention is fixed not on his 
tormentor, but on Elizabeth. He returns to the queen’s meteorological 
significance, reviewing how these “great floods of mone” have disrupted 
the natural order, before imploring her to
commaunde againe,
This Castle and the Knight,
which keepes the same for you:
These woods, these waues, these foules, these fishes
these deere which are your dew. (2:329– 30)
Such a pledge, he assures, will redeem his natural form. Sylvanus equally 
craves, in his final words, “that you would either be a suter for him vnto 
the heauenly powers, or else but onely to giue your gracious consent that 
hee may be restored to his prystinate estate” (2:331).
Like the earlier savage man episode, the princely pleasures of 
Kenilworth end indeterminately, at least as it appears in the textual 
record. Elizabeth’s response is not recorded, but the progress proceeded 
as expected: an implicit rejection of desire, as it is framed by this final 
encounter. But why, to conclude these weeks of extravagance and expense, 
was Elizabeth even given this final opportunity to reject her host? 
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Did Leicester and Gascoigne really expect the queen to embrace the 
offer?
The answer, I think, is that this rejection has been anticipated, and writ-
ten into the text itself, via the contestatory forms that Leicester inhabits: 
forms that, in effect, underwrite the failure of their own rhetorical aims. 
The very shape of Leicester’s transmuted desire (the consequence of his 
enforced submission to the Elizabeth- figure Zabeta) flaunts its aggres-
sion, threatening to prick those who encroach upon its space. The threat 
of violence is specifically phallic, as when Sylvanus quips on the differ-
ences of “he Holly” and “she Holly”: “Nowe some will say that the she 
Holly hath no prickes, but thereof I entermeddle not” (2:328). But the 
“prystinate estate” of Leicester’s desire— that is, the desire that would be 
unleashed by Elizabeth’s favor, and to which she herself would submit— is 
more threatening still in the sheer magnitude of its force:
I am that wretch Desire,
whom neither death could daunt;
Nor dole decay, nor dread delay,
Nor fayned cheere inchant.
Whom neither care could quench,
nor fancie force to change. (2:328)
It is only Zabeta’s rejection that has capped the bottle of desire— and it is 
hard to imagine why Elizabeth would want to uncork it.
In 1575, it would have been exceptionally unlikely for Elizabeth to 
give her hand to the Earl of Leicester. I find it hard to believe that any of 
his associates expected that she would.124 While this certainly does not 
mean that Leicester would have rebuffed the opportunity to become an 
Arthurian king of England, it does suggest that he was aware of his suit’s 
near impossibility— and accordingly, that he and his agents knowingly 
constructed a fictive world that was ultimately destined to memorialize 
its failure. In anticipation of this inevitable end, Leicester populates this 
world (and associates himself with) a cast of wild figures that are adver-
sarial, threatening, and fundamentally unsuitable for engaging the queen: 
a maneuver that, when considered retrospectively, co- opts the autonomy 
of Elizabeth’s choice, and reconfigures her rejection as a confirmation 
of his own fundamental power. This consolation is grounded upon the 
performance of opposition and contention; in the texts of the Kenilworth 
shows, the discourse of wildness functions as an escape clause, drafted 
ahead to absorb and refashion the sting of frustrated desire. It is no acci-
dent that Leicester’s guise of the holy bush so resembles Zabeta’s lover 
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Contention, who was transformed to a “bramble Bryer” armed to “catch 
and snach at  .  .  . garments, and euery other thing that passeth by it” 
(2:327).
In a perceptive chapter— which tellingly begins with the heading 
“Gascoigne’s Wilderness Years”— R.W. Maslen notes that “George Gas-
coigne specialized in the fiction of failure”; this tendency is perhaps best 
exemplified in “Gascoignes Wodmanship,” his most famous lyric, which 
recounts a woeful hunter who “shootes awrie almost at every marke.”125 
Emerging from the discourse of the wild, I suggest, the Kenilworth fes-
tivities reflect Gascoigne’s deep commitment to failure— but it is failure 
pointedly deployed in the affective interests of Leicester and his allies.
Woodstock, 1575
Not long after the events at Kenilworth, Elizabeth was treated to another 
such round of festivities at her manor of Woodstock, organized by its 
keeper (and Leicester client) Sir Henry Lee— the man who would go on, as 
the queen’s official champion, to become the guardian of the Elizabethan 
neo- chivalric cult of honor.126 Though surviving records don’t account 
fully for her month- long stay, we do know that she witnessed, with appar-
ent delight, an intricate pageant of interlocking, star- crossed lovers in the 
romantic mode; its centerpiece is the two- part drama of Gaudina and 
Contarenus, a rousing tale in which love is ultimately sacrificed for public 
service.127 Though readings diverge wildly, there is near- universal agree-
ment that the entertainment must, in some way, be read in conjunction 
with Kenilworth; some, for example, find it a “response or riposte” to the 
pro- matrimony slant of the previous event, while others have “argued 
that there are close similarities in their respective agendas” regarding 
“Leicester’s ambitions as defender of the Protestant cause in the Low 
Countries.”128 And though there is consensus that she was pleased by the 
proceedings— part of which, at least, she commanded “should be brought 
her in writing”— I still think there is a way in which the masculine pre-
rogative of the Leicester party is embedded within the surviving text: the 
saga of Gaudina and Contarenus again offers the opportunity to trans-
form royal rejection into a badge of empowered alienation.129
As in many such entertainments, the host of this sequence is a denizen 
of the wild. The story is unfolded by the unfortunate Hemetes, a blind 
hermit who presides over an isolated bower “couered with greene Iuie, 
and seates made of earthe with sweete smelling hearbes” (2:374). Recall-
ing Zabeta’s victims at Kenilworth, he is defined primarily as a casualty of 
erotic violence, the terms of which are twisted into the larger narrative.130 
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Once a strapping knight, Hemetes fell for a coy enchantress (“most 
deynty to be dealt with”); to rebuff his advances, she “putt on the shape 
of a Tigresse so terrible to behould” that he was convinced (prophetically) 
to “neuer more sett eyeon her” (2:377).131 His vow became literalized, 
however, when he was “sodenly striken blynde” by Venus, as punishment 
for his rejection of love (2:378). (His sight, unsurprisingly, is eventually 
restored by Elizabeth’s presence.) This hermit figure is a central framing 
device, which situates the narrative within the realm of wildness— and 
the symbolic freight of enforced hermitage will stand in sharp contrast 
to the position of self- imposed exile that the story’s Leicester figure will 
eventually occupy.
In the pageant, Leicester ultimately seems to occupy the role of Contar-
enus, “a knight (of estate but meane but of value very great),” whose love 
for Princess Gaudina has been frustrated by her father (a “mighty duke” 
of Cambria), at whose behest he was magically exiled for a term of seven 
years (2:375, 374). In the first sequence of the pageant, Hemetes recounts 
how Gaudina, fleeing her father’s court, is finally reunited with her cham-
pion; in her journey, she becomes the chaste companion of Loricus, 
another knight jilted in love, who serves as her protector until Contar-
enus’s arrival.132 In the second half of the entertainment, a playlet works 
to undo the forward progress of the first. In its action, “this haughty 
Duke” elects to “leaue his Princely states” in search of his daughter— and 
though not the most sympathetic figure, he now assumes the role of the 
questing knight, “whom fortune doth constraine, / with fruitlesse toyle to 
trauel stil in vaine” (2:414, 413, 414). A Queen of Faerie (before the fig-
ure was synonymous with Elizabeth) moderates their eventual encounter, 
in which the Duke begs her, on behalf of “countries good,” to “neglect, 
/ The Loue of him which led you so astray” (2:423); the Faerie Queen 
similarly urges Gaudina to suppress her love for the public good. Despite 
rigorous debate on the nature of civic duty, Gaudina will not budge: as 
a last resort, the Duke turns to Contarenus himself, “to see if his desire 
might be delaide” for the sake of the commonwealth (2:427).
It is thus by his own will that Contarenus, after hearing further 
deliberations, reluctantly forsakes his long- sought beloved, agreeing 
to “yeeld to Countries good / the thing which to possesse so neere he 
stood” (2:430). With good reason, this is often taken as the swan song to 
Leicester’s kingly ambitions; Berry, for instance, argues that here the earl 
offers “explicit” acknowledgment that “his service could not be rewarded 
with marriage.”133 But the larger point, I think, is the extent to which the 
Leicester- figure assumes complete mastery over his beloved; it is Contare-
nus who takes possession of Gaudina, and it is Contarenus who agrees to 
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dissolve their love— in an act, what’s more, that only serves to glorify his 
civic virtue. If the Kenilworth entertainment is underwritten by a bond 
of interpretive insurance, in which rejection is anticipated and accounted 
for in advance, here there is hardly need for such safeguards: the Wood-
stock pageant dismisses Elizabeth before she has any chance to say 
otherwise.
Such a posture is reflected in Contarenus’s refusal to be reintegrated 
into the newly harmonized Cambrian court. Though the Duke welcomes 
him home, and vows to reward him handsomely for his loyalty, Contar-
enus views his exile as final:
My Lord, what you haue done, your state maintains,
exiling me that did offend your eye,
My life must be in course of restlesse paines,
for her whom care of countrey doth denye.
Good hap light on the land where I was borne,
though I doe liue in wretched state forlorne. (2:430)
The extent of his sacrifice is magnified by this oppositional mode; by con-
struing himself as a political martyr, Contarenus only serves to amplify 
his own stoic resolve. The knight leaves once again as a man apart, a hero 
cast out from his own brood, but one whose unimpeachable virtue is now 
free to serve a master who might better appreciate its value. Alienated 
from the courtly world, he is left to roam “where so aduentures hard shal 
carry”— that is, throughout the wilds and frontiers of unknown lands 
(2:434). What’s more, Contarenus explicitly declares that this antisocial 
impulse will, in fact, ultimately forge new channels of affinity:
And tel my Lady deere that I intend,
henceforth to seeke if I may meet her friend,
Loricus whom the Hermit did commend,
Ile bid him thinke and hope one day to find
Reward for that his faithful seruice long,
til when we both may plaine of fortunes wrong. (2:434)
Like Leicester and Sidney, the disappointed knights Contarenus and Lori-
cus are conjoined in a community of discontent.134 Even in absence, the 
socio- spatial valence of this community is suggested by the de facto mem-
ber Hemetes, the third such jilted knight: this is a collective of the wild, 
united by the mutual affective experience of frustration, and bonded by 
the mutual social experience of courtly alienation.
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Perhaps, as is often suggested, the Woodstock pageant does entail 
Leicester’s vow to renounce his erotic claim to Elizabeth, if he is only 
given leave to pursue his fortunes elsewhere— like in the Low Countries, 
backed by an army of her soldiers.135 But even so, the affective essence here 
seems to be one of relative positionality, in which Leicester announces the 
productiveness of rejection, and his readiness to “retire and draw [him] 
selfe apart” (2:431). This force of will, and the streak of latent sadism that 
accompanies it, is finally etched in the princess herself, in a brand that 
marks her as forever his:
Yet this I am assur’de her Princely heart,
where she hath lou’d wil neuer quite forget,
I know in her I shal haue stil apart,
in honest sort I know she loues me yet. (2:434)
This is, I think, no small consolation— and it is one of immense empower-
ment for a frustrated and rejected subject. And, as Doran notes, it would 
have to do: “In November 1575 Elizabeth declined to accept the sover-
eignty of the Netherlands which had been offered to her by the States of 
the provinces, and over the next two years she consistently turned down 
their appeals for a military alliance.”136
“If,” begins the Tale of Hemetes, “you marke the woords with this pres-
ent world, or were acquainted with the state of the deuises, you shoulde 
finde no lesse hidden then vttered, and no lesse vttered then shoulde 
deserue a double reading ouer” (2:374). Depending on who is doing the 
double reading, I suggest, the 1575 entertainments at Woodstock could 
simultaneously contain very different affective registers.
The Lady of May, 1578
I arrive finally at Philip Sidney’s infamously obscure entry into the realm 
of literary politics: The Lady of May, performed at Leicester’s newly pur-
chased manor of Wanstead in mid- May 1578. The themes of opposition, 
virility, and audacity pervade Sidney’s literary debut— a reflection of three 
further years of disappointment and frustration with Elizabeth and her 
policy. (To remind: it was only two months earlier that Elizabeth had 
suddenly abandoned her long- promised, long- delayed plans for direct 
intervention in the Low Countries, opting instead to fund the mercenary 
troops of Count Casimir.) There are exceptionally few things that can be 
settled in this odd little show— though Linda Shenk has recently offered 
the intriguing suggestion that it reflects the contemporary Anglo- Dutch 
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relations discussed above— but I will here argue one main point: the 
affective stakes of The Lady of May have not yet been accounted for, 
because we have not yet understood the precise implications of Sidney’s 
adversarial mode.137
The Lady of May begins with a spatial disruption, in which the bound-
aries of Wanstead’s aristocratic frame are breached by a foreign presence. 
It was during a stroll through the manor’s garden, just as Elizabeth 
“passed down into the grove,” that
there came suddenly among the train one apparelled like an honest 
man’s wife of the country; where, crying out for justice, and desir-
ing all the lords and gentlemen to speak a good word for her, she 
was brought to the presence of her Majesty.138
She falls in supplication, begging that the queen aid her in her plight. The 
point of contention, we’ve seen above, is her daughter’s two very differ-
ent suitors, “both loving her, both equally liked of her, both striving to 
deserve her” (21.19– 20). But what might otherwise suggest a light inter-
lude, we learn, has a more serious dimension:
But now lastly (as this jealousy, forsooth, is a vile matter) each have 
brought their partakers with them, and are at this present, without 
your presence redress it, in some bloody controversy; my poor child 
is among them. (21.20– 23)
The distraught mother points Elizabeth in the direction of the broil, pray-
ing that she might defuse the escalating tension and deliver her daughter 
to safety.
Though conflict is an integral part of Elizabethan pageantry, the com-
bative elements often emerge (as we saw at Kenilworth and Woodstock) 
from a framework designed to contain, distance, or soften the violence— 
such as the overt presence of allegorical, fantastical, or historical content, 
or the ritualized ceremony of the tournament tradition more gener-
ally.139 But the clash at Wanstead entails a very real breach of the social 
order, recalling not the mythical battles of the earlier pageants, but the 
“controuersie betwene  .  .  . wilde men” that plagued administrators in 
Tudor Ireland.140 Though these combatants, so apt to be allegorized and 
abstracted, are not realist in any modern sense, they are still of a different 
register than dragons, faeries, and enchantresses; as such, their conflict 
recalls the local feuds and personal conflicts that really did occupy the 
lords and justices of Elizabeth’s realm, particularly in its frontiers. It is 
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through this verisimilitude, ironically enough, that Sidney defuses much 
of the queen’s symbolic majesty: even within the framework of monar-
chal deference, The Lady of May imagines (like the Sybil at Kenilworth) a 
space that is largely immune to the coercion of Elizabeth’s social and sym-
bolic authority, by creating a humble landscape that makes no attempt 
to soar to the aerial register of the (soon- to- be) Faerie Queen. To begin 
his pageant, Sidney announces Elizabeth’s alienation from the playworld 
created in her honor, by staging a challenge to which she is (in his mind) 
fundamentally unsuited to respond: the symbolic body politic of Albion’s 
warrior queen might be fit to parlay with Hercules and sylvan gods, but 
what could the body natural of the 44- year- old Elizabeth do to quell an 
outbreak of rustic gang warfare?
And the conflict is sudden: after the country lady departs, and before 
Elizabeth can proceed further, “there was heard in the woods a confused 
noise, and forthwith there came out six shepherds, with as many fosters, 
haling and pulling to whether side they should draw the Lady of May, 
who seemed inclined neither to the one nor other side” (22.15– 18). (Also 
amidst the fray is the comic schoolmaster Rombus, an ancestor of Shake-
speare’s Holofernes, whose absurd commentary on the action is repaid 
in full with “many unlearned blows” [22.22].) The struggles are finally 
suspended at the sight of Elizabeth, and the young lady steps forward to 
unfold the opposition of Therion and Espilus. I now quote her appraisal 
in full:
Espilus is the richer, but Therion the livelier. Therion doth me many 
pleasures, as stealing me venison out of these forests, and many 
other such like pretty and prettier service; but withal he grows to 
such rages, that sometimes he strikes me, sometimes he rails at me. 
This shepherd, Espilus, of a mild disposition, as his fortune hath not 
to do me great service, so hath he never done me any wrong; but 
feeding his sheep, sitting under some sweet bush, sometimes, they 
say, he records my name in doleful verses. (25.2– 10)
Her dilemma, as posed to the queen, is “whether the many deserts and 
many faults of Therion, or the very small deserts and no faults of Espilus 
be to be preferred” (25.11– 13).
Before adjudicating, Elizabeth is presented with several rounds of 
argument (by both the litigants and their seconds) on “whether the estate 
of shepherds or foresters were the more worshipful” (26.24– 25). Espilus 
stresses both the abundance and ease of the shepherd’s life, marked as it is 
by the “pasture rich, the wool as soft as silk”; he begs the lady to “let not 
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wild woods so great a treasure have” (26.9; 25.34). Therion, on the other 
hand, stresses the wild autonomy of a life unfettered by such objects:
Two thousand deer in wildest woods I have,
Them can I take, but you I cannot hold:
He is not poor, who can his freedom save,
Bound but to you, no wealth but you I would. (26.13– 16)
After these opening statements, “the shepherds and foresters grew to a 
great contention whether of their fellows had sung better”; the shepherd 
Dorcas and the forester Rixus continue the verbal skirmish, debating the 
relative merits of their trade for a period much longer than the primary 
rivals (26.23– 34). As they see it, the distinctions between both suitor and 
vocation point to a fundamental divide in matters of temperament: Rixus 
is appalled that any would “liken Espilus, a shepherd, to Therion, of the 
noble vocation of huntsmen,” while Dorcas equally refuses to “liken The-
rion to my boy Espilus, since one is a thievish prowler, and the other is 
as quiet as a lamb that new came from sucking” (27.13– 14, 18– 20). But 
while Dorcas will further extol the easy life of the shepherd (whose con-
templative eye is only “busied in considering the works of nature”), Rixus 
suggests that the virtues of pastoralism are already a natural component 
of the active life:
I was saying the shepherd’s life had some goodness in it, because it 
borrowed of the country quietness something like ours. But that is 
not all; for ours, besides that quiet part, doth both strengthen the 
body, and raise up the mind with this gallant sort of activity. (28.14; 
29.14– 17)
With this rhetorical maneuver, the debates are brought to a close, and 
Elizabeth is granted the floor.
With good reason, readers of the pageant have often puzzled over Sid-
ney’s sympathies in the conflict, and virtually every possible permutation 
has been proposed. Some have argued that Sidney had no horse in this 
forensic race; Catherine Bates, for example, suggests that “the two suitors 
are in essence exactly the same,” and that the impossibility of choos-
ing between them signifies the “ultimate arbitrariness” of Elizabeth’s 
power.141 Duncan- Jones, as we have seen, sees his allegiance as more 
pointed, claiming the pageant’s design makes it “both apt and predicable 
that the Queen should choose Espilus, the inoffensive shepherd, rather 
than Therion, the active forester.”142 But Sidney is most often thought 
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to side with the champion of the active life, an outlook that underwrites 
several of the most influential readings of the pageant: Stephen Orgel, for 
example, argues that the gruff Therion still displays a sensitivity to the 
“contemplative virtues,” obviating his more limited rival, while Montrose 
similarly finds that “Sidney harmonizes action and contemplation in the 
forester’s life,” by moving “the audience from a situation of indecision 
between two antithetical extremes to a realignment that shows one term 
to incorporate, revise, and transcend the other.”143 With Therion thus 
associated with the interests of Sidney, Leicester, and the more actively 
inclined Protestant party, he becomes, in many such readings, an advocate 
for the author’s position on any number of topical issues, such as inter-
vention in the Netherlands, the royal favor owed to Leicester, or Sidney’s 
desire to take a more rigorous role in English politics.
As should be quite clear, I too associate Sidney and Leicester with the 
virile, aggressive, and autonomous energy of the wild forester Therion, 
for the reasons that have been enumerated in this chapter. But the import 
of this association may have a different valence than has been usually 
understood, and it is one that is best exemplified by how Elizabeth elected 
to resolve the conflict. After the conclusion of the debate, the lady begs 
Elizabeth to make her selection, with a final proviso that “in judging me, 
you judge more than me in it” (30.12). The queen’s decision, however, 
is recorded by Sidney in a maddeningly truncated response: “This being 
said, it pleased her Majesty to judge that Espilus did the better deserve 
her; but what words, what reasons she used for it, this paper, which car-
rieth so base names, is not worthy to contain” (30.13– 15). This outcome, 
unsurprisingly, has elicited even more critical puzzlement: if Sidney built 
the superior case for Therion, what do we make of his defeat? Some, like 
Orgel, have viewed the outcome as a disastrous mistake— the queen, per-
haps not paying full attention to the pageant’s subtleties, simply assumed 
that “shepherds are the heroes of pastoral”— while others, like Montrose, 
suggest the queen’s decision was purposeful and deliberate, entailing a 
“conscious and pointed rejection of Sidney’s pastoral paradigm for the 
just and temperate relationship that should obtain between freeborn Eng-
lish gentlemen and their sovereign.”144
But to return at last to Duncan- Jones’s central question: is it reasonable 
to think that Sidney would have expected his virgin queen to sentence the 
May Lady to an outlaw life, made only worse by regular beatings? Prob-
ably not. Yet there can be no denying, as we have seen in this chapter, 
that Leicester and Sidney consciously and deliberately associated them-
selves with the forces of wildness in the pageantry they sponsored. As 
Edward Berry has persuasively argued, the May Day context suggests (or 
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perhaps insists) that Therion is the pageant’s folk champion: it is he, not 
the gentle shepherd, who must preside over the day’s celebration of viril-
ity and misrule.145 For the traditional May King is none other than Robin 
Hood: a man who, like Therion, famously boasts to “lyve by our kynges 
dere.”146 As de facto ruler of Wanstead’s symbolic frame, this Robin is an 
apt guise for he who rules its literal one: Robin Dudley, Earl of Leicester. 
Leicester’s association with the forester figure is made further explicit by 
the pageant’s epilogue, in which Leicester (“Master Robert of Wanstead”) 
is ironically imagined as a “huge catholicam,” praying to the Virgin Eliz-
abeth on a pair of “Papistian beads” (31.23– 24, 28, 31). This bizarre 
moment, like so many others in the pageant, is difficult to assess. It is 
perhaps most commonly read (though I’m not sure rightly) as “Dudley’s 
decisive abdication from the king- game”; it is also possible to assess the 
image wickedly, insofar as Leicester accepting Elizabeth’s rejection hum-
bly is about as likely as him turning to the pope. But one thing is clear: it 
quite explicitly transforms the defeated Leicester into a hermit- figure, the 
malcontent of the wild. 147 This precise image is deployed by Cooper, to 
culminate his ode on the forester’s retirement:
Now will I take to me my bedes
for and my santes booke.
And pray I wyll for them that may
for I may nowght but loke.
yet haue I bene a foster.148
Leicester is a disappointed hermit, and disappointed hermits are retired 
foresters.149 Given the entire network of associations, it seems impossible 
not to read Therion as a proxy for Leicester.
We are left, then, with granting Duncan- Jones’s premise, but radically 
inverting the conclusion we draw from it. Therion is an unlikely winner 
in this contest, but this does not, in turn, mean that he lacks the author’s 
sympathies: rather, it reveals that Sidney was willing to cast his uncle in a 
losing role, and accordingly dictate the terms of the inevitable rejection. 
This would not, in fact, be unusual for Sidney: in both poetry and prose, 
Bates argues, “Sidney’s numerous avatars” find themselves “put into posi-
tions in which they repeatedly fail . . . to hit, hunt, or shoot properly.”150 
But failure can be co- opted. As in the other pageants, The Lady of May 
insistently asserts the benefits of the forester’s life, which in its wildness 
valorizes notions of virility, aggression, self- sufficiency, and autonomy. In 
the foresters, Sidney presents an antisocial community of outlaw hunters, 
a site of fantasy identification that could not possibly be accommodated 
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within the Elizabethan symbolic order. As such, the (anti)sociality of 
the “wild fool” inherently threatens the more pliant community of the 
“sheepish dolt”— a community which is, as Dorcas himself reveals, sim-
ply a reconfiguration of the conventional courtly world:
How many courtiers, think you, I have heard under our field in 
bushes make their woeful complaints, some of the greatness of 
their mistress’ estate, which dazzled their eyes and yet burned their 
hearts . . . making our vales witnesses of their doleful agonies! So 
that with long lost labour, finding their thoughts bare no other wool 
but despair, of young courtiers they grew old shepherds. (28.18– 26)
Despite attempts to differentiate between the young courtier and the 
despairing shepherd, they are still creatures of the same order. By embrac-
ing this form of retirement, the ex- courtier remains bound, sheep- like, 
to the same symbolic system that he attempts to flee; pastoral retreat 
is rendered harmless, a benign form of opposition that is anticipated, 
accommodated, and underwritten by the larger terms of the bond of 
courtship. As Rixus rebuts, to become truly unfettered from the courtly 
world, one must go off the grid entirely, by embracing the virtue and 
freedom of the wild:
O sweet contentation, to see the long life of the hurtless trees; to 
see how in straight growing up, though never so high, they hinder 
not their fellows; they only enviously trouble, which are crookedly 
bent. What life is to be compared to ours, where the very grow-
ing things are ensamples of goodness? We have no hopes, but we 
may quickly go about them, and going about them, we soon obtain 
them; not like those that, having long followed one (in truth) most 
excellent chase, do now at length perceive she could never be taken. 
(29.18– 25)
For Sidney and his party, this is a site of affective redemption, home to 
an antisocial community that draws collective strength from its outcast 
status. The very identity of this subculture is premised on rejection, which 
is again reimagined as a badge of honor.
Derek Alwes, in his provocative reading, suggests that “failure was 
inscribed” in The Lady of May— and to a point, I agree, in the sense that 
Sidney could hardly expect Elizabeth to choose the suitor in which his own 
identity was invested.151 Yet in the larger sense, I am arguing that it was 
even more impossible for Sidney to lose: by choosing Therion, Elizabeth 
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publicly endorses Sidney, and co- signs his party’s temperament, and by 
choosing Espilus (as she did), she ascribes to them an outsider status that 
they have already prepared to embrace, and which they have primed as 
a site of psychic and social empowerment. The oppositional dynamics of 
wildness, quite ironically, make The Lady of May a very accommodating 
play: a fact confirmed by its baffling conclusion, a song in which the win-
ner Espilus (possibly in duet with Therion) tells “two short tales” in praise 
of the wild agenda.152 They are both worth quoting in full:
Silvanus long in love, and long in vain,
At length obtained the point of his desire,
When being asked, now that he did obtain
His wished weal, what more he could require:
“Nothing,” said he “for most I joy in this,
That goddess mine, my blessed being sees.”
When wanton Pan, deceived with lion’s skin,
Came to the bed, where wound for kiss he got,
To woe and shame the wretch did enter in,
Till this he took, for comfort of his lot:
“Poor Pan,” he said, “although thou beaten be,
It is no shame, since Hercules was he.”
Officially, Espilus’s song is said to be “tending to the greatness of his own 
joy, and yet to the comfort of the other side,” but this can hardly be taken 
at face value: the first ditty tells of the forest god’s erotic triumph, and the 
second of the shepherd god being assaulted by the wild man’s legendary 
form. Clearly the song is meant to champion the spirit of Therion, in a 
way too forceful to be conciliatory— but this does not necessarily mean, 
as is usually claimed, that Sidney expected his forester to be crowned 
victor. As we have seen, there is another way that Sidney might have con-
trolled the fortunes of his litigants. This ode to wildness was likely sung, 
despite Therion’s defeat: anticipated by the pageant’s architect, Sylvanus 
and Hercules are finally vindicated, even in the face of public rejection.
In the Arcadia, it has long been argued, Sidney displays little overt 
sympathy to the “Cittezens of the woodes,” that dangerous rabble of 
common folk who upend the social order with open rebellion.153 But as 
a means of aristocratic identity management, I hope to have shown, the 
outlaw, outsider fantasy was nonetheless an invaluable affective resource 
for Leicester, Sidney, and their adherents— men ostensibly rejected by the 
queen’s maddening refusal to place their will in front of her own.
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In from the Wild
If The Lady of May provided an affective boost for the Leicester/Sidney 
party, it would have been a much- needed one: the early months of 1578 
did not bode well for those of their persuasion, and things would con-
tinue to degrade as the year unfolded. Interventionist fantasies of military 
glory remained spoiled by Elizabeth’s pledge to Casimir; to make matters 
worse, the queen had recently reopened marriage negotiations with Fran-
cis, Duke of Anjou and Alençon, brother to the French king— a suitor 
who provoked widespread disdain in both court and country, but perhaps 
most of all to men like Leicester and Sidney. The rejection I have discussed 
throughout this chapter— which, refined through a community of opposi-
tion, might be called upon as a source of political strength— was hardening 
into despair, and resistance to the queen’s will seemed increasingly futile. 
It is perhaps unsurprising, then, that during the queen’s summer progress 
in 1578, the pageantry she witnessed (with which Leicester seems to have 
had at least some connection), took on a rather different tone. In these 
performances, Queen Elizabeth is praised in strikingly new terms:
Who euer found on Earth a constant friend,
That may compare wyth this my Virgin Queene?
Who euer found a body and a mynde
So free from staine, so perfect to be seene,
Oh Heauenly hewe, that aptest is to soile,
And yet doste liue from blot of any foyle.154
Just a few years earlier the nymph Zabetha was indicted for this very 
disposition, and the queen herself was begged to counteract the ruin it 
had brought to Leicester’s world. But here, in a stunning reversal, Eliza-
beth’s state of unmatched matrimony is reimagined as a reflection of her 
unmatched virtue.
This shift in emphasis would have drastic implications for the future 
of Elizabethan representation: “The Norwich entertainments of August 
1578,” Susan Doran argues, “were the first recorded public occasion 
where the appearance of the cult of the Virgin Queen can be seen.”155 
This cult, it seems, emerged from a desperate attempt to thwart the unde-
sirable match with Alençon— an attempt that was ultimately vindicated, 
insofar as Elizabeth was forced to concede, in 1579, that the would- be 
nuptials evoked too much ill will to proceed. (Talks, however, would lin-
ger for years to come.) But before long, the image of Gloriana would be 
ruthlessly seized upon by Elizabeth herself— who, in an ironically familiar 
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maneuver, refined this site of opposition into a reservoir of enormous 
power, from which she fueled the machines of orthodoxy that would 
dominate her reign’s second half. This system of representation, Mon-
trose observes, “may have had its origins in symbolic resistance to the 
royal will”— but in its “exorbitant final phase, this resonant nexus of 
images was instrumental to the interests of the monarch and her increas-
ingly authoritarian and isolated regime.”156
To be sure, this regime did not eradicate the discourse of wilderness 
from Elizabethan literature; indeed, George Peele’s Araygnment of Paris 
(c. 1581; pub. 1584), the first major pastoral entertainment of the 1580s, 
stages the woodland gods Faunus, a “hunter [with] a faune,” and Siluanus, 
a “woodman with an oken bowe laden with acornes.”157 But in terms of 
oppositional spirit, Peele’s offering bears little resemblance to the pageants 
sponsored by Sidney and Leicester in the 1570s. In this performance, as 
Montrose describes, Elizabeth’s mastery of the fictive scene is undisputed:
Entertainments such as those sponsored by the Earl of Leicester at 
Kenilworth and Wanstead in the 1570’s ostensibly offered a choice 
to the Queen but it was one in which the options were skewed 
against female independence or dominion. . . . The Araygnement of 
Paris is typical of royal entertainments in its hyperbolic treatment 
of the royal spectator and her fictional personae. But it differs from 
many of the entertainments of the previous two decades in that 
it fully acknowledges and celebrates the Queen’s own choice, her 
complex transcendence of the simplistic oppositions contrived by 
her courtiers.158
In light of such thematic developments, Montrose is surely correct in sug-
gesting that pastoralism settled into “an authorized mode of discontent” 
in the Elizabethan court, and thus not “a critique made in terms of a con-
sciously articulated oppositional culture.”159 But the earlier discourse of 
wildness, I have suggested in this chapter, did enable such an oppositional 
(counter)culture, at a time when many Elizabethan courtiers were increas-
ingly alienated by their queen’s policy— and at a time, in the 1570s, when 
there was still a place for such pricklier disaffection.
In the early cantos of The Faerie Queene’s fourth book, a grand tourna-
ment is organized by the noble Satyrane— the half- satyr hero who tamed 
his innate savagery to join the fraternity of virtuous knights. Through-
out the tourney, Satyrane fares exceptionally well, until the arrival of an 
unknown figure:
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Till that there entred on the other side,
A straunger knight, from whence no man could reed,
In quyent disguise, full hard to be descride.
For all his armour was like saluage weed,
With woody mosse bedight, and all his steed
With oaken leaues attrapt, that seemed fit
For saluage wight, and thereto well agreed
His word, which on his ragged shield was writ,
Saluagesse sans finesse, shewing secret wit.160
This savage man unleashes a frenzied attack on the other competitors, 
single- handedly routing the field before the awed spectators. Satyrane, 
who had forsaken the woods for the civil world, is defeated by a foe 
whose engagement with the wild is absolute.
Who is this brutal knight, who dispatched his adversaries so com-
pletely? The narrator delivers us from uncertainty:
Much wondred all men, what, or whence he came,
That did amongst the troupes so tyrannize;
And each of other gan inquire his name.
But when they could not learne it by no wize,
Most answerable to his wyld disguize
It seemed, him to terme the saluage knight.
But certes his right name was otherwize,
Though knowne to few, that Arthegall he hight,
The doughtiest knight that liv’d that day, and most of might.161
Long before he was half- sad, the knight of justice understood the attrac-
tion of savagery. Like Leicester and Sidney, he was charged with protecting 
the realm of the Faerie Queene— and like Leicester and Sidney, he under-
stood that sometimes it required stepping outside of it entirely.
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The Dreading, Dreadful Earl of Essex
“Love is a thing full of anxious fear.”1 So says Ovid’s grief- struck Penel-
ope, in a phrase often poached by Renaissance humanists, as she pleads 
for news of her husband’s long wandering fleet.2 In the middle of July 
1597, the 63- year- old Queen Elizabeth I was similarly beset with anxious 
fear, and similarly watched the sea for sign of her beloved. Only days 
before, the most worthy men of her realm had set a triumphant course 
for Spain, intent on relieving the arch- tyrant Philip II of both his navy 
and his colonial plunder; the voyage was commanded by royal favorite 
Robert Devereux, Earl of Essex, the man who had assumed the place in 
Elizabeth’s heart once held by his stepfather, the great Earl of Leicester.3 
But fate was cruel to the English fleet. Shortly after its departure, both 
land and sea had quaked with “an extreame storme which lasted afore 
and after six dayes”: the “leke wether at this tyme of the yere,” exclaimed 
Admiral Thomas Howard, vice- admiral of the enterprise, “was never cene 
by man.”4
The queen’s love for her peers (and the soldiers they commanded) was 
not conjugal, and her suffering paled beside Penelope’s years of grief— 
but this mattered little at the time, as Elizabeth anxiously awaited word 
of the “storme beaten fleet.”5 When it finally came, the news was better 
than expected: though bruised and battered, and thwarted in their aims, 
her ships had reached safe harbor. The queen was especially relieved to 
learn of Essex, whose vessel had staggered to port “in great extremetye & 
imminent perrill of sinkinge in the sea”; upon hearing of his return, the 
earl was later told, “the wattr came plentyful out of her eyes.”6 For Essex, 
however, there was little time to celebrate. He still had a war to wage, and 
a fleet to reassemble:
Since my last I am remoued from Fawmouth to Plimmauth, a most 
toylesumm iorney, butt such as I cold nott forbear, because I must 
seeke to gather my scattered flock. I haue found Sir Walter Rawleigh, 
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Sir Francis Vere, Sir George Carew, Sir William Haruy, and Captain 
Throgmorton, with 4 of the queens greatt shippes heere.7
“I mett with Sir William Brooke and Sir Ferdinando Gorge,” Essex con-
tinues, “in the Drednought,” as plans were hatched to set sail again.
“The rise of English naval mastery,” writes Geoffrey Parker, “may be said 
to have started with the launch of the Dreadnought, the first ‘all big- 
gun battleship,’ in 1573.”8 A vessel of very “neere twenty saile” and over 
thirty guns, the Dreadnought was among the first experimental designs 
of master shipwright Matthew Baker, the man whose technical genius 
would revolutionize the warships of the Elizabethan navy.9 As “probably 
the most gifted English shipwright of his age,” Baker initiated a paradigm 
shift in nautical design; in his hands, the discipline of shipmaking (revital-
ized by an innovative use of blueprints and formulaic procedures) became 
a field of enormous imaginative dexterity, freeing the architect from the 
laborious task of managing adjustments at the site of construction.10 
Under his direction, English warships were equipped with an extended 
gundeck and sleeker design (the “race- built” style), an optimization with 
results that seemed fantastical: Elizabeth’s navy could now carry heavier, 
more devastating artillery, and do so with greater precision and finesse. 
The Dreadnought’s relative ordinance capacity was without equal, and 
before long new ships were commissioned and old ships were retrofitted 
according to her model. It was with this technical mastery, fifteen years 
later, that the English captains “completely thwarted Philip II’s design to 
invade and conquer the realm, and drove the Armada into ignominious 
flight back to Spain.”11 It is with good reason, then, that Parker speaks of 
the rise of English naval supremacy as “the Dreadnought Revolution of 
Tudor England.”
But in the bone- shaking storm of July 1597, the Dreadnought may 
have had some trouble living up to its name— at least, that is, if we are 
to go by the accounts of her unlucky sailors. Sir William Brooke, the 
Dreadnought’s commander in the action, sent rueful report of the “dis-
tres and harmes receaued by this late tempest”; “euery one,” he admitted, 
“complain of to be in his ship.”12 Others in the fleet were more forthcom-
ing about the dire experience of braving the storm. As Sir Walter Raleigh 
describes it, the conditions on his Warspite were dreadful indeed:
In my shipp it hath shaken all her beams, knees & stanches well in 
a sunder, in so mich as on Saterday night last wee made accompt 
to have yeelded our seules vp to god, for wee had no way to worke 
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ether by triinge, hollinge, or drivinge that promised better hope, our 
men beinge wasted with labor & watchynge & our shipp so open 
every wher, all her bulk head rent & her verye cookrome of brike 
shaken down in to powder.13
In one of his most powerful early poems, the young John Donne similarly 
recalls the horrific scene:
Lightning was all our light, and it rain’d more
Then if the Sunne had drunke the sea before;
Some coffin’d in their cabbins lye, ‘equally
Griev’d that they are not dead, and yet must dye.
And as sin- burd’ned soules from graves will creepe,
At the last day, some forth their cabbins peepe.
“Compar’d to these stormes,” Donne reveals, death seemed “but a 
qualme,” and the desperate crew could not manage “to feare away feare” 
in the face of oblivion.14
But for a man like Essex, whose sense of self was built on fantasies of 
martial glory, it was not even this threat of destruction that summoned 
feelings of dread: on the contrary, it was the intolerable thought that 
he would be barred from fulfilling the promise of his generalship, and 
that King Philip would escape a crippling defeat. When the fate of Essex 
was still unknown, Raleigh worried that “ether my Lord Generall hymme 
sealf will wrestell with the seas to his perrill, or constrayned to cum bake, 
be fovnd vtterly hartbroken”— despite the fact that, as all would read-
ily admit, “it be not in the powre of man to fight agaynst ellements.”15 
The earl’s return confirmed the latter suspicion, as Raleigh would shortly 
inform the council:
Sir I beseich yow to worke from her Maiestye summe cumfort to 
my Lord generall, who I know is dismayd by thes mischaunces, 
even to death, although ther could not be more dvn by any man 
vppon the yearth, God havinge turned the heavens with that fury 
against vs, a matter beyovnd the power or valure or witt of man to 
resiste.16
Essex was devastated by the initial setback of his command. He would 
quickly rally, and put to sea again, but the expedition that unfolded 
proved even more disastrous. This campaign, usually known today as 
the “islands voyage,” was the final major military action of Elizabeth’s 
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reign. Less than four years later, Essex would lose his head at the queen’s 
command.
To conclude Emotion in the Tudor Court, I attempt to reconstruct the 
emotional characteristics of the late Elizabethan courtly sphere; my focus 
is the Earl of Essex and his followers, who in early 1601 took to the 
streets of London in an infamous armed uprising. What affective state, 
I ask, drove Essex and his men to such a desperate action, and how did 
it emerge from the increasingly ruthless courtly experience of the decade 
that preceded it? We have seen how, in the middle years of Elizabeth’s 
reign, a series of shared political rejections led to the creation of cer-
tain emotional communities at court; in the 1590s, as Elizabeth’s death 
loomed and England’s future hung uncertainly, the value of such alliances 
would only intensify, transforming court into a factional battlefield. This 
deep uncertainty about the future set Elizabeth’s courtiers against each 
other, in a struggle to assert their own will in the face of oblivion.
This cultural moment, I suggest in what follows, may be best under-
stood through the affective category of dread: an emotional current 
central to the late Elizabethan court, and central to the late Elizabethan 
experience more generally. Emerging from the context of religious devo-
tion, dread may be seen as a hierarchical affect, a terror or anxiety that 
acknowledges the other’s mastery: dread is the fearful reverence that the 
creation owes its creator, or that the subject owes their sovereign, or that 
the sailor owes the tempest, precisely because of the categorical distinc-
tion between the two. To dread is to fear that which is earthshaking, that 
which is rupturing, that which is mind- bending; it is fear, no doubt, but 
it is a fear that acknowledges domination, or the potentiality of being 
dominated.
A series of dreadful conditions marked England in the 1590s, including 
the aging queen’s unsettled succession, persistent threats of foreign inva-
sion, and widespread social and cultural unrest. In the courtly sphere, this 
general affective atmosphere led to the intensification of rivalrous, violent 
conflicts; the factionalism that plagued the late Elizabethan court thus 
gave rise to a particular form of interpersonal dread, as men like Essex 
and his enemies each struggled to assert their own mastery and subjugate 
their opponents. With the court’s social hierarchy in flux, the competition 
was particularly grinding: courtiers and their adversaries found them-
selves simultaneously feared and fearing, each trying to dominate the 
other and secure the favor of their queen. It is this affective contest that 
defined the courtly experience of the 1590s, and that ultimately drove the 
Earl of Essex to his ruin.
The Dreading, Dreadful Earl of Essex 141
My treatment of dread in this chapter, and my understanding of its 
affective dynamics, is broadly inspired by the modern psychological con-
cept of terror management theory— an approach, appropriately enough 
for a discussion of the Elizabethan court, that situates the emotion within 
the context of self- esteem, culture- building, and interpersonal conflict. 
Emerging from the work of the cultural anthropologist Ernest Becker, 
terror management theory (TMT) is how a trio of psychologists in 
the 1980s attempted to account for a pair of bedrock questions about 
human behavior: “Why are people so intensely concerned with their self- 
esteem?” and “Why do people cling so tenaciously to their own cultural 
beliefs and have such a difficult time coexisting with others different than 
themselves?”17 The answer to both, they discovered, owes to an existen-
tial truth.
At the core of terror management theory is humanity’s awareness of its 
own mortality— a condition that, by virtue of our “relative helplessness 
and vulnerability to ultimate annihilation,” presents the species with the 
“constant danger of being incapacitated by overwhelming terror.”18 In 
response, the theory suggests, we have
solved this existential quandary by developing cultural worldviews: 
humanly constructed beliefs about reality shared by individuals 
in a group that serves to reduce the potentially overwhelming ter-
ror resulting from the awareness of death. Culture reduces anxiety 
by providing its constituents with a sense that they are valuable 
members of a meaningful universe. Meaning is derived from cul-
tural worldviews that offer an account of the origin of the universe, 
prescriptions of appropriate conduct, and guarantees of safety and 
security to those who adhere to such instructions— in this life and 
beyond, in the form of symbolic and/or literal immortality.
TMT thus maintains that anxiety- buffering is contingent upon both “faith 
in a particular cultural drama that portrays human life as meaningful, 
important, and enduring” and the “belief that one plays a significant part 
in that drama”— and that, by “meeting or exceeding individually internal-
ized standards of value, norms, and social roles derived from the culture,” 
people can accordingly “maintain psychological equanimity despite their 
knowledge of their own mortality.”19 At the level of personal psychology, 
such worldviews mitigate the terror of death “primarily through the cul-
tural mechanism of self- esteem,” the system through which individuals 
understand themselves as a “valuable contributor to a meaningful uni-
verse.”20 It is thus through cultural participation— such as the Elizabethan 
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aristocrat’s membership in the social organization of the court, or his 
or her membership in the broader community of Christian faith— that 
“people are able to construe the self as a valuable contributor to a mean-
ingful existence,” granting them a crucial identity beyond that of a “mere 
material animal fated only to obliteration upon death.”21
Because of culture’s guiding role in allaying such dread, the psychody-
namics of terror management are socially embedded, insofar as “people’s 
social relationships with others play an important role in maintaining a 
sense of existential security.”22 From its origins, TMT “has emphasized 
the importance of other people to validate the individual’s worldview 
and self- worth,” arguing that “the human needs for togetherness, inti-
macy, attachment, and affiliation are subordinate components of the 
fundamental need for self- preservation.”23 Accordingly, the theory has a 
particular interest in intergroup dynamics, as social conflict arises nat-
urally when anxiety- buffering worldviews clash in opposition. Because 
“so many of the meaning- and value- conferring aspects of the worldview 
are ultimately fictional,” encounters with “other people with different 
beliefs is fundamentally threatening”— and research has thus empha-
sized the “critical function of the ingroup for terror management,” as 
social units participate in “worldview defense” to ward off the existential 
threats posed by rivals.24 Indeed, empirical studies suggest that remind-
ing individuals of death’s inevitability “leads to harsh punishment of 
those who violate values of [their] worldview . . . and more positive reac-
tions to others who uphold values of the worldview or otherwise help 
validate the worldview”; in laboratory settings, for example, mortality 
cues “lead to increased tolerance for racism” and “to aggression directed 
toward people who disparage one’s worldview.”25 What’s more, TMT has 
much to say about the charismatic leaders (like Essex) who lead these 
conflicting social groups: studies indicate that “affection for charismatic 
leadership increases when terror management needs are activated,” and 
terror management processes are thought to engender “support for char-
ismatic leaders who share one’s cherished beliefs and aggression against 
those who hold rival beliefs.”26 In sum, TMT reveals how a fundamental 
human dread guides complex behavior in the social world, as clusters of 
like- minded actors struggle to assert their respective worldviews in the 
attempt to ward off oblivion.
These, the central tenets of terror management theory, are supported 
by ample empirical evidence: in the last three decades: “hundreds of pub-
lished studies . . . have demonstrated that mortality salience leads people 
to favor and defend their cultural worldview and to demonstrate that 
they possess socially valued attributes and skills.”27 There is little doubt, 
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I think, that the Elizabethan courtier invested heavily in the defense of 
cultural worldviews and the demonstration of social dexterity— and 
TMT thus offers a valuable groundwork from which to build an affec-
tive understanding of court factionalism in the dreadful 1590s, a time 
when threats of existential annihilation (of the monarch, of the nation, 
of the cosmos) seized much of public discourse, and a time when social 
conflict dominated the courtly sphere. In this chapter, I don’t apply the 
prescriptions of TMT strictly— but instead, to demonstrate another way 
of engaging a body of extra- literary work on emotion, I use its governing 
insights on social conflict and affective worldview- building to launch my 
own treatment of courtly interaction within the emotional framework of 
dread. Recently, scholars have taken some initial steps in exploring the 
affective dimension of the Essex saga; Will Tosh, for example, observes the 
“highly- personalised, emotionally heightened service practised by certain 
members of the Essex circle,” while Alexandra Gajda notes the “strikingly 
emotive language” of Essex’s patronage correspondence.28 To help further 
reconstruct the affective experience that shaped both Essex’s career and 
the final years of the Tudor dynasty, I conclude my study of emotion in 
the Tudor court by considering how dreadful a place it must have been.
The Last Favorite
The man who became Queen Elizabeth’s final favorite was the eldest 
son of Walter Devereux, first Earl of Essex (1539– 1576), a royal ser-
vant whose short life (as both private investor and government agent) 
was consumed with the task of colonizing the intractable Irish frontier.29 
At his father’s death in 1576, the young Robert Devereux inherited his 
earldom at the age of ten; his mother Lettice secretly married the Earl of 
Leicester in 1578, and after several years of travel and study Essex joined 
his stepfather at court in 1585. Later that year Essex followed Leicester to 
the Low Countries, as part of the English military effort to support conti-
nental Protestantism. Essex was granted the prestigious command of the 
cavalry, and he saw action at both Doesburg and Zutphen; throughout 
the campaign, he displayed the rash courage that would become his mar-
tial trademark. (At Zutphen, Stow records, “the earle of Essex charged 
with his cornet . . . threw his launce in his rest, and overthrew the first 
man, and with his curtelax so behaued himselfe that it was wonder.”)30 
He returned to England a rising star, backed by Leicester’s unequaled 
influence; in 1587 he was granted his stepfather’s former post as master 
of the horse, and in the following year entered the Order of the Garter.
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In 1588 Leicester’s unexpected death left a vacuum at court. Though 
Essex would eventually inherit his stepfather’s role as chief favorite, his 
triumph at court was not immediate, and in the final years of the decade he 
jockeyed for position with men like Raleigh. Around 1590 Essex married 
Frances Walsingham, daughter of Secretary of State Francis Walsingham 
and widow of Sir Philip Sidney— but did so “without acquainting the 
Queen therewith, who was therefore offended at it.”31 The queen’s anger 
was only temporary, however, and in 1591 Essex was granted formal 
command of his first military campaign, an expedition designed to aid 
the French king Henri IV against encroaching Catholic forces; the action 
was a failure, however, and the demoralized Essex returned to court in 
January 1592, determined to become more involved in directing matters 
of state. It was at this time that he began to assemble a formidable circle 
of secretaries and agents, the seeds of what would become the Essex fac-
tion. Essex focused on gathering intelligence and bolstering influence on 
the Continent, secure in his commitment to direct military engagement 
with Catholic Spain.
In 1596 Essex took co- command of the English assault on the Span-
ish port of Cadiz, the crowning achievement of his military career. After 
destroying the naval defenses, Essex led a land assault on the city; with his 
characteristic blend of rashness and bravery, he orchestrated the daring 
capture of Cadiz, and soon returned home to popular acclaim. Elizabeth, 
however, was far less pleased with the affair, and refused to press her 
military advantage. Furthermore, while Essex was at war, his enemy Rob-
ert Cecil had been appointed secretary of state, and the earl now saw 
his influence waning with the queen; Essex, it was said, suffered a “dis-
content hee could not conceale, being thereupon exceedinglie dejected in 
countenance and bitterly passionate in speech.”32 To make matters worse, 
his next military command (the “islands voyage,” described earlier) was 
an unmitigated failure. When plans to assault the Spanish port of Fer-
rol were spoiled, Essex diverted the remaining fleet to the Azores, with 
the hope of intercepting a returning transport of Spanish treasure. This 
gamble failed by an agonizingly narrow margin, and Essex returned to 
England with little to show but a damaged reputation.
Though Essex still enjoyed both favor and influence with the queen, 
the failed excursion of 1597 marked a turning point in his career, which 
would steadily decline until its end. In late 1598 he received a final chance 
to achieve the military glory he had so long sought: he was named lord 
lieutenant of the English expedition to Ireland, an army charged with sup-
pressing the rebel chieftain Hugh O’Neill, Earl of Tyrone. In the spring 
of the following year, he landed in Dublin, prepared to settle matters 
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with a quick, decisive victory— but the grim Irish terrain made a direct 
assault impossible, and he spent the next several months meandering 
through Ireland in a series of costly, minor excursions. Distanced from 
court, Essex became increasingly concerned about the situation at home, 
convinced that Cecil and his allies were actively working against his inter-
ests. In August 1599 he was tempted to lead his army back into England 
to confront his enemies directly, an act of treason that was prevented by 
his advisors. The desperate Essex met privately with Tyrone in September, 
where he engineered a makeshift, temporary truce with the rebel. Dis-
missing explicit orders to the contrary, he soon left for London, where he 
infamously “staied not till he came to the Queens Bed Chamber, where he 
found the Queen newly up, the Hare about her Face.”33
In light of his erratic behavior and unauthorized return, Essex was soon 
taken into custody; for the next several months, he was confined to York 
House as the Privy Council debated his conduct in Ireland. His politi-
cal enemies, such as Cecil, Raleigh, and Attorney General Edward Coke, 
worked tirelessly to prepare a case against him, which would eventually 
come to allege that Essex was secretly in league with Tyrone and had long 
desired to usurp the throne. The earl, however, maintained his popularity, 
and retained no small hold over Elizabeth; the queen eventually loosened 
the terms of his imprisonment, and spared him the ignominy of a public 
trial. On June 5, 1600, a special inquiry was empaneled at York House, 
where his performance in Ireland was denounced. Though he defended 
himself admirably, Essex was nonetheless stripped of all royal appoint-
ments and remained a prisoner of the queen.
Though eventually released from custody, Essex was forever banished 
from court, with little to show for his years of service but a mound of 
debt. (For their part, his enemies would continue to amass evidence in 
the hope of future prosecution.) In October Elizabeth revoked the earl’s 
customary lease on sweetwine, the foundation of his income, finally dash-
ing any hopes for recovery. As we will see, Essex and his followers grew 
ever more disaffected; the earl was desperate to secure both himself and 
his country from the enemies who, he was certain, were pushing Eliza-
beth and her succession closer to Spain. With the new year, Essex and 
his advisors fell to increasingly drastic measures: only direct action, they 
concluded, could free Elizabeth from the likes of Cecil and Raleigh. In the 
coming weeks, a plan evolved: Essex and a group of sympathetic nobles 
would make their way into the queen’s presence, where they would (with 
appropriate reverence) expose her ministers for their corruption.
On Sunday, February 8, 1601, Essex and his followers were finally 
pushed to action, when there arrived at Essex House a delegation of 
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councilors with a “message from her Maiestie that Robert Earle of Essex 
should speedily dissolue his company, and he himselfe should presently 
Come to the Cort, with promise that his greefs should gratiously be 
hard.”34 (Essex had been called to appear before the council the night 
before, inciting panic in his followers.) Still fearing a trap, and heeding 
rumors that Raleigh and Lord Cobham sought his life, Essex refused the 
order, as he and his confidants scrambled to put their premature plans 
into action; the messengers were imprisoned in Essex House, and the earl 
and his roughly 300 followers set off, armed but not armored. Banking 
on his popularity, Essex decided first to appeal to London before engag-
ing the queen herself: his men marched through the streets, proclaiming 
that they came only in self- defense, intending to forestall a plot against 
the earl. The action, however, was a disaster. The townspeople didn’t rise 
to his aid, and the Privy Council had preempted the mob’s arrival, alert-
ing several of London’s key officials. The city gates were shut, streets were 
blocked, and a counterforce was deployed; Essex and his ever- shrinking 
company narrowly escaped by boat to Essex House, where they would 
surrender after a brief siege.
The fallout of the uprising was immediate. In the Star Chamber, Essex 
and his followers were denounced by members of the Privy Council; in 
London they were (by official instruction) denounced from the pulpit. 
On February 19 Essex and his coconspirator Henry Wriothesley, Earl of 
Southampton, were found guilty of treason, for open rebellion and seek-
ing the lives of the council members. Though Southampton was spared, 
Essex was executed at the Tower six days later.
The Nasty Nineties
The spectacular fall of the Earl of Essex, a self- destruction underwritten 
by the combined operation of fear and desperation, is something of an 
index to the social and political atmosphere that settled over England in 
the final years of Elizabeth’s reign. Quite apart from the courtly intrigue 
at the center of power, it was a precarious time for England more gen-
erally: as all Elizabethans were aware, the queen was creeping towards 
the grave, the realm lacked an heir, and unrest at both home and abroad 
threatened the very existence of their nation. In both court and coun-
try, dread was perhaps the defining affective mode of the 1590s— an era 
Patrick Collinson famously dubbed the “nasty nineties”— and it was in 
these dreadful times that Essex emerged as England’s most formidable 
courtier.35
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The affective significance of dread begins with the word itself. Despite 
today’s more casual usage, “dread” in the early modern period was not 
simply a synonym of “fear,” a fact indicated by the theological context 
from which it emerged.36 The notion seems to have first appeared in the 
twelfth century, here (in the Oxford English Dictionary’s oldest recorded 
example) in the verbal form:
Þe eorðliche lauerd ne mei don na mare bote pinen Þe wrecche 
licome to deaðe. Ah godalmihitn Þe mei fordon eiðer ȝe Þine 
wrecche licome and Þine saule. Swilcne lauerd we aȝen to dreden. 
Þet is godalmihtin.
[The earthly lord may do no more than put the wretched body to 
death, but God Almighty may destroy both thy wretched body and 
thy soul. Such a lord we ought to dread, that is God Almighty.]37
The thematic terms of this construction carry wholesale into early mod-
ern usage, as when the “troubled soule” of a late Elizabethan pamphlet 
describes “dreading [God’s] displeasure, whose wrath maketh the deuells 
to quake.”38 Though occasioned by a fantasy of divine annihilation, the 
sentiments here are equally predicated on the magnificent power which 
makes that wrath possible: hence the Oxford English Dictionary’s pri-
mary definition “to fear greatly, be in mortal fear of; to regard with awe 
or reverence, venerate.”39 The affective connection between fear and ven-
eration suggests the multiple, and sometimes conflicting, connotations 
that “dread” variants would begin to accrue in the intervening centuries. 
In the secular correlate, this basic polarity appears in perhaps the term’s 
most familiar early modern usage: the title of “dread sovereign.” The idea 
of dread was thus multivalenced, a union of anxiety and awe that became 
implicated in some of the era’s primary cultural struggles.
And, as has been well- documented, in the 1590s England’s cosmic 
and social order was dreadfully threatened. Facing an unsettled succes-
sion and a moribund queen— and keenly aware of the civil wars that 
had long ravaged France— Elizabethans were gripped by fear of their 
immediate political future; “seeing God hath ordayned you our nursing 
mother,” cried one pamphleteer to his sovereign, “wee your children cry 
vpon you, & most earnestlie beseech you, that by neglecting this motion, 
you vnnaturallie leaue vs not vnto the evident spoile of the mercilesse 
bloodie sword.”40 Indeed, that sword continued to threaten: while Eng-
land was miraculously delivered from the would- be Spanish invaders 
of 1588, King Philip reassmbled his fleets in the subsequent years, and 
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throughout the 1590s English anxieties were persistently spurred by 
rumors of a new Spanish assault.41 Though Philip’s naval attempts of 
1596 and 1597 came to naught, those on England’s coast could again do 
little but “wayte the cominge of the kinges armada.”42 The natural order 
proved equally inhospitable: from 1593 to 1597 an “unprecedented series 
of harvest failures” led to the nation’s most devastating famine of the six-
teenth century.43 Missives from the period heartbreakingly chronicle this 
“harde time of dearth,” which led some to speculate that “the course of 
nature is very much inuerted; our yeares are turned vp- side downe; our 
sommers are no sommers, our haruests are no haruests; our seed- times 
are no seed- times.”44 And famine wasn’t the only such natural upheaval: 
English subjects had to contend, in the early years of the decade, with the 
fact that their nation was “most greviously afflicted with the Pestilence.”45 
Frantic letters of the period warned that “the plage is of late in london 
greatly increased,” while the queen released a series of proclamations “for 
the preseruation of her good Subiectes from the plague.”46 Collectively, 
these dreadful events of the 1590s were thought by many to foretell the 
pending annihilation of the world: a collection of texts from the period 
reflects the growing conviction that “the afflictions and miseries of the 
world by earthquakes, warres, pestilence, famine and such like” were an 
index of Christ’s imminent arrival.47
For such Elizabethans, “our Sauiours coming” promised a glorious res-
olution to the worldly suffering of the 1590s— and indeed, as we shall see, 
in the final phase of his life the ruined Essex came to understand deeply 
that a reverent dread of his creator offered ultimate solace from the whips 
and scorns of a career at court.48 But though they were understood as 
finite, such dreadful times still had to be endured, and the stakes were 
amplified for those, like Essex, who played an immediate role in direct-
ing England’s political, social, and religious future. And in the courtly 
sphere, the era’s cosmic and cultural turmoil found a ready correlate: the 
rampant factionalism that came to plague politics in the declining years 
of Elizabeth’s life. For those in the trenches, the late Elizabethan court 
indeed seemed a war zone of social violence, and commentators routinely 
reveal how the envy, emulation, and backbiting that undid Artegall would 
often emerge along party lines. Sir Francis Bacon, nothing if not a veteran 
of these wars, observed how common it was to think that “the Principall 
Part of Policy” is “for a Great Person to governe his Proceedings, accord-
ing to the Respect of Factions”— but when “Factions are carried too 
high, and too violently,” he warns, it is a “Signe of Weaknesse in Princes; 
And much to the Preiudice, both of their Authoritie and Businesse.”49 
In the essay “Of Friendship and Factions,” the literary polymath (and 
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Essex associate) Sir William Cornwallis reminds the would- be courtier 
that “loue wil not, or cannot be vniversall,” and that the wise man “must 
not entertaine the humor of neutrallitie” in the conflicts of high politics.50 
And Sir Robert Naunton, reflecting upon the career of Queen Elizabeth 
not long after her death, famously declared that “the principall note of 
her raign, will be, that she ruled much by faction and parties, which 
herself, both made, upheld, and weakened, as her own great judgement 
advised.”51 Though the last three decades have seen fierce debate about 
the nature of factions in Renaissance England— and though Janet Dickin-
son has importantly challenged overly simplistic views of late Elizabethan 
factionalism— most historians of the period echo the assessment of Simon 
Adams: in the 1590s “the Court was nearly torn apart by a factional 
struggle of major proportions.” 52
In this struggle, the Essex circle was a quintessential faction, and its 
affective experience in the late Elizabethan courtly sphere was largely 
occupied with both suffering and inflicting dread. Despite Essex’s  de facto 
status as primary favorite, he enjoyed little true dominance over the social 
domain, and in the 1590s he and his allies found themselves dodging as 
many attacks as they themselves administered. As such, the struggle for 
the late Elizabethan court was implicitly an affective struggle over the 
terms of dread: who is the object of terror, and who is the terrified object? 
Who demands social reverence, and who inspires social fear? Which party 
can master the emotional experience of the other?
The ambiguity of this social dread finds an analogy in the term itself: 
with a single word encompassing verbal, adjectival, and substantive 
forms (itself a relative anomaly in the English affective lexicon), “dread” 
also displays, in early modern usage, a notable ability to convey both 
subjective and objective meaning. That is to say, in each grammatical 
category, “dread” can equally attach to both the fearful subject and the 
feared object that evokes it. Though obscured in conventional phrases 
like “Dread God” or “Dread Sovereign,” there is nonetheless a latent way 
that dread can announce its capacity to be undone, by entailing its own 
opposition: in early modern usage, “dread” (like the verbs “let” or “seed”) 
has the capacity to evoke its own antonym, making it what is sometimes 
called an “autantonym” or “Janus word.”53 Encompassing its own binary, 
“dread” might lock both subject and object in a zero- sum game of affec-
tive negotiation, in which each term, equally dreadful, struggles to tip the 
scales from subjugation to mastery.
Before God and queen, such linguistic games were hardly helpful— but 
in a different context, one of lateral social contestation, the reciprocity 
of fear was an important affective circuit. In the 1590s, both the Essex 
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circle and its courtly enemies were infused with dread, though what that 
statement meant at any particular time is exceedingly difficult to sort 
out.54 In this social arena, factional politics ensured that oppositional 
parties found themselves both inspiring and succumbing to anxiety and 
terror. This affective warfare, waged under the dreadful skies of the 1590s 
more generally, ensured that the collective atmosphere of suspicion and 
treachery was mutually reinforcing, as combatants were locked in a per-
sistent struggle to control the terms of who was dreading, and who was 
being dreaded. The Janus- faced linguistic potential of “dread,” I suggest, 
is analogous to the Janus- faced affective negotiations that were being 
contested in the social arena. I turn now to the specific courtly milieu in 
which dread reigned, by considering both what the Earl of Essex and his 
men dreaded, and what dread they inspired in their political adversaries.
To begin, then: why did Essex dread his enemies?
The Earl of Essex: Dreadful Subject
In 1593 the Essex partisan Anthony Standen, writing to Anthony Bacon, 
thought debilitating illness a worthy trade- off from life at court:
I do begin truly to bless and commend your infirmity, which if you 
might receive without pain or torment, I would think you in the 
superlative degree beholding to it, as a cause to retain you from a 
place, from whence all charity is exiled, and all envy and treachery 
doth prevail, and where a prince of the most rare virtues and divine 
parts is assieged with persons so infected with malice.55
Court could be a miserable, corrupting, soul- sucking place, and it was 
especially so in the 1590s. But it was also a critical home for Essex, even 
though it would ultimately destroy him.
As factionalism soaked into the bedrock of the Elizabethan political 
scene, and relationships were polarized accordingly, the court became 
an increasingly oppositional, increasingly dangerous place for men like 
Essex, who found themselves ever more alienated from their enemies and 
enmeshed with their friends. It is no wonder, then, that in late 1597 a 
concerned partisan warned Essex of the forces working against him:
Pardon mee, that am and euer will be redie prest in all offices to 
thy seruice, thow art full of wisdom, bountie, and valor, and dost 
performe all thinges with much honor, and yet mee thinks thow art 
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least perfect in securely woorkinge thy owne good, which in this 
age, and tyme of vncertentie, is most needfull to bee cared for, but 
by the way let mee tell thee, thy owne patience, I say thy patience 
hath continually from the beeginninge giuen way to thy crosses, 
practised by a dubble faction verie stronge against thee.56
We have seen in the previous chapter how shared feelings of persecution 
and alienation generate courtly solidarity, but the advent of factionalism 
altered this dynamic greatly. Sidney and Leicester faced a noncompliant 
monarch, and accordingly manifested a symbolic opposition to manage 
and reclaim feelings of frustration and impotence. But what was largely a 
symbolic conflict for the previous generation became unsettlingly real for 
Essex, who, in the final phase of his life, really did face a group of adver-
saries actively working to undo him.
Indeed, there was a steady stream of rumor and intelligence that ene-
mies had “layd secret plotts, and damnable deuices” to ruin Essex and his 
allies.57 Some were probably true, some embellished, and some invented, 
but each contributed to the collective mood of suspicion, grievance, and 
moral righteousness that would increasingly settle over Essex House. In 
1598, for example, Essex was informed that a network of Jesuit agents 
was secretly suggesting that “it were a verie merritorious acte to Stabb or 
kill the Earle of Essex if you can come att him”; a year later, he was told 
that his enemies plotted “to work some treson . . . agans your person,” 
and was warned to be vigilant against “any suche assasanes.”58 In the 
final months before the rising, Essex desperately reached out to James 
VI in Scotland in a last- ditch effort to secure support; enemies at court, 
Essex bewailed, orchestrated the “corrupting of my servants, stealing of 
my papers, suborning of false witnesses, procuring of many forged letters 
in my name, and other such like practises against me.”59 When Essex and 
his men finally took to the streets in 1601, they did so announcing that 
the “Earle of Essex should haue beene murdered the night before in his 
owne house by Sir Walter Rawleigh, the Lord Cobham, and others.”60
What’s more, the fear and suspicion of external adversaries also worked 
to undo the faction from within, via the possibility that a Judas or Sinon 
might be lurking in its ranks. We get something of this in an exchange 
between Gilly Merrick and Henry Cuffe, two of the earl’s prominent 
associates:
Then soe I here some of our owne famely are very malitious againste 
vs both, butt esspetaly againste me. The coursses practysed are soe 
bayse thatt I would hatt my self yf ytt were true, butt I shale better 
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satisfie ytt whene I come then to trobele you with a tedyus letter. I 
am very sorry thatt some of them proffessinge Relygion can be soe 
malitious. Wee haue envy and malyce inoughe, besydes to haue ytt 
plottyde and practysed by thos thatt my lord vseth soe nere him.61
Consistent with the general atmosphere of paranoia in which he was 
engulfed, Essex was aware that ostensible supporters might have an ulte-
rior motive. “I haue bene many tymes and deeply wounded by practising 
libellers,” he complained during the time of his disgrace in 1600, “who 
since my committment have shadowed ther intended mischeefe to me 
under pretended greefe or passion for me”; in such an environment, the 
earl had to fear “the corrupcyon of some of hys servantes that had accesse 
to hys chamber, who myght take & wrytt owt hys loose papers.”62 Even 
close friends, Essex was warned, needed to be watched carefully: “take 
heede, and remember, that christ had but twelfe, and on proued a diuell.”63
In the 1590s, then, life at court entailed very little security: enemies 
abounded, and even friends could not be trusted. But attendance on the 
queen was a necessary evil, and because of the importance of this physical 
presence, the correspondence of the period bubbles with distant courtiers 
anxiously trying to keep up on the happenings at the power- center. For 
those unlucky enough to get them, lengthy assignments on the politi-
cal periphery were often attributed (though not always rightly) to either 
royal displeasure or the malice of some other courtly notable. But a mili-
tary man like Essex found himself in a particular bind: he constantly 
agitated for a foreign deployment that would remove him from the very 
site of political power. When at sea or in the field, he was not at court, 
and could not control the machinations of his enemies. Even in his earli-
est years, Essex was aware that the management of such absence was a 
primary courtly strategy. In 1587, when Leicester’s conduct in the Neth-
erlands was under suspicion, Essex sent word to the Continent that he 
would guard his stepfather’s interests:
[Queen Elizabeth] hath bene since longe with her counsaile, what 
is agreed on I know not, [but] I desired her, she wold know yowr 
enemies and not belieue any thinge they shuld say, yf they layd any 
matter to yowr chardge, that she wold suspend her iudgemant till 
she did heare yourself speake. I will watch with the best diligence I 
can that yowr enemies may not take advauntage of yowr absence.64
Only a few years later, when Essex himself had aims on Continental 
exploits, it was noted that “his frendes here hathe advised him to the 
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contrary, wishing him rather to seke a domesticall greatnesse.”65 In retro-
spect, Essex apparently found this advice to be spot on, at least according 
to an account sent to Robert Cecil: upon his disappointing return from 
France in 1591, the earl was said to be “infinitly discontented,” because 
“he suspecteth my Lord your father [Lord Treasurer Burghley] hath not 
so much favored him in his absence as he expected.”66
Throughout his political career, Essex’s enemies would regularly capi-
talize on these periodic absences, and thus the thrill of martial deployment 
could not be detached from the anxiety that accompanied foreign action. 
Most notably, Essex was fighting at Cadiz when his primary rival Cecil 
was promoted to secretary of state, despite the fact that the “queene had 
given him a faithfull promise not to doe it, and had confirmed her prom-
ise by her letter sent to him to Plymmouth before his setting saile.”67 In 
fact, Essex was advised to be wary of “plausible offers, which may be 
made unto you to prolong your absence,” and was warned of a “plot 
laid to recoil his lordship, and to keep him aloof by some new employ-
ment, which it was presumed would be pleasing to him.”68 Though the 
earl enjoyed both general popularity and the queen’s favor, this alone was 
not enough to ensure political safety; as Hammer explains, Essex (unlike 
Leicester) lacked allies “in key posts who could support his initiatives or 
defend his interests in his absence.”69 But when the tables were turned, 
Essex found himself paralyzed by his sense of honor: after Robert Cecil 
left on a special diplomatic envoy in early 1598, the earl refused to take 
advantage of his rival’s departure, despite Francis Bacon’s suggestion that 
“Mr. Secretary’s absence” was a fine time to strike.70 It was thus a dread-
ful game that a military man like Essex had to play: were the potential 
rewards of martial glory worth the risk of leaving court?
In the daily struggles of the late Elizabethan courtier, there was much to 
be anxious about. As Essex was well aware (and was endlessly told), his 
enemies strove to usurp his social power, and some even strove to take 
his life; he burned with the desire to engage the enemies of England and 
the enemies of Christendom, but was plagued with worry about how he 
would be undone in absence. But dread was not only an affective state 
that characterized social interaction in this manner: importantly for lit-
erary studies, the anxiety and suspicion that marked the Essex circle’s 
experience in the courtly sphere also manifests in the texts that Essex and 
his allies produced and circulated in its name.
As Hammer has elucidated, Essex’s popular reputation as a dashing 
soldier- playboy obscures the depth of his intellectual curiosity, a disposi-
tional feature that was further cultivated as a matter of prudent policy.71 
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Like that of Sidney, Essex’s approach to politics was thus integrated into a 
larger philosophical and intellectual outlook, which itself helped contrib-
ute to the affective mode of his circle.72 For Essex and his followers, this 
outlook was famously shaped by the sixteenth century’s emerging fond-
ness for Tacitus, the Roman historian with a particular knack for treating 
political corruption and treachery— and for revealing how virtuous men 
might resist them.73 Initially explored on the Continent by thinkers like 
Machiavelli and Jean Bodin, and cultivated at Cambridge (where Essex 
and many members of his circle studied), the methods of Tacitus pro-
vided a novel way of viewing history for a group of men increasingly 
interested in mastering the brutal skills required for life at court.74 This 
“politic” history, inspired by Tacitus, looked to the past for practical 
wisdom on the arts of statesmanship, which might be put to mercenary 
use.75 In an attempt to examine the often inscrutable phenomena of con-
temporary politics, a new breed of historical thinkers “concentrated on 
political causation, searching into the psychology of ruler and ruled; and 
they analyzed the role of fortune in history, and the extent to which men 
could plan for the unpredictable.”76 As such, they increasingly tended to 
the “secondary causes” of history: those historical actors, like Essex, who 
shaped the world through the force of individual will, and from whose 
example political wisdom could be extracted.
Though this development, it now seems, was not quite the sharp 
transition in humanist sensibility described by a previous generation of 
scholars, there is little doubt that the increasing interest in Tacitus had 
important implications for early modern thinkers.77 With this Tacitean 
approach to history, the Essex circle would eventually find a political 
playbook well suited to their evolving temperament: as a historian of 
the tyrant, Tacitus provided ample ammunition for a vigorous critique 
of courtly corruption. In his 1601 essay “Of Histories,” Robert Johnson 
offers a penetrating description of the Tacitean historical subject:
Another kind [of history] there is like labyrinths, relating cunning 
and deceitfull friendshippes, how rage is suppressed with silence, 
treason disguised in innocence, how the wealthy haue beene pro-
scribed for their riches, and the worthy vndermined for their vertue. 
These prouoke vs to eschew their viletie and lacke of vertue, and 
to be rather viceles then greatly vertuous: and although they bee 
distasted by those who measure Historie by delight, yet they are of 
most vse in instructing the minde to the like accidents.78
“In this ranke,” Johnson continues,
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I preferre Tacitus as the best that any man can dwel vpon: Hee 
sheweth the miseries of a torne and declining state, where it was 
a capitall crime to bee vertuous, and nothing so vnsafe as to be 
securely innocent, where great mens gestures were particularly 
interpreted, their actions aggrauated, and construed to proceed 
from an aspiring intent: and the prince too suspitiously iealous 
touching points of concurrancie, suppressed men of great deserte, 
as competitors with them in that chiefest grounde, the loue of the 
people.
A historian so sensitive to issues of aspiration, jealousy, and popularity 
proved notable in a social landscape increasingly torn by factionalism. 
But in addition to its ideological implications, there is another way that 
the turn to Tacitus appealed to the cutting- edge thinkers of the 1590s: 
Tacitus’s famed style of tough, restrained, and sententious prose was 
adopted by the politic historians in conscious opposition to the Cicero-
nian excesses of contemporary academic discourse, echoing Montaigne’s 
call to “fortifie and harden our hearing, against the tendernesse of the 
cerimonious sound of wordes.”79 By replicating Tacitus’s stylistic virility, 
the scholars of the Essex circle asserted a localized, intellectual identity 
that mirrored the larger strategies by which Essex announced himself as 
England’s foremost martial presence. Not surprisingly, such verbal con-
siderations fold back into larger issues of historiography: Tacitus offered 
the politic historians “a style admirably suited to men who aimed at psy-
chological realism and the ‘poyse’ of political experience in their own 
work and who admired strong and self- reliant heroes like William I, and 
Henry IV, and Henry VII.”80
This linkage between style and ideology would become valuable cover 
to an intellectual coterie increasingly interested in subversive political 
philosophy, and increasingly suspicious of prying eyes. For though the 
Tacitean aphorism lent itself to easy memorization, Tacitus also veiled 
his insights in famously difficult Latin. Such murkiness was co- opted as 
a political asset: with it, the politic historians could “conceal their true 
thoughts in riddling and ambiguous words, both to preserve themselves 
from immediate persecution and to enable them to await an outcome 
before committing themselves to a course of action.”81 In his comments 
on Tacitean style, Johnson underscores this captivating union of mas-
culine bluntness and crafted obliqueness: Tacitus constructs his history, 
he observes, “with such an art, hiding art, as if hee were aliud agens, by 
enterlacing the serios of the tale, with some iudiciall, but strangelie briefe 
sentences.”82
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The Essex circle’s fondness for Tacitus and Tacitean historiography 
seems to have contributed to an intellectual, political, and stylistic ethos 
for those in the know— and it was one underwritten by the affective mood 
of the 1590s. As such, Tacitus was a powerful courtly symbol, insofar as 
devotion to his works indicated a series of intellectual assumptions about 
the value of history, a series of political assumptions about the correspon-
dence between imperial Rome and England’s own cankered age, and a 
series of stylistic assumptions about the formal strategies best suited for 
exploring such matters. In a letter of advice to Fulke Greville from the mid- 
1590s, Essex himself proclaimed “Tacitus simply the best” of all historians, 
and this attitude seems to have informed much of the earl’s outlook.83
We know that Essex read Tacitus actively; less than a year after the 
earl’s death, a letter makes reference to a “paper boke of my lord of Essex 
notations of Cornelius Tacitus.”84 But it seems that his engagement with 
the Roman historian was more elaborate still: according to Ben Jonson, 
in 1591 Essex penned the elaborate, anonymous preface to Sir Henry 
Savile’s partial translation of Tacitus’s Historiae.85 In this “seminal docu-
ment of the Tacitean revival in England,” Essex offers lavish praise of the 
historian who “hath written the most matter with best conceyt in fewest 
wordes of anie Historiographer ancient or moderne;” Tacitus, he argues, 
veils his meaning in such obscurity that “the second reading ouer will 
please thee more than the first, and the third then the second.”86 The pref-
ace is capped with a transhistorical conclusion, in which Essex, perhaps 
slyly, contrasts “our owne happie gouernement” of Elizabeth with the 
Rome that “did suffer miseries vnder the greatest Tyrant.”87
Essex’s remarks introduce the first extended translation of Tacitus to 
be published in England, Savile’s The Ende of Nero and Beginning of 
Galba, Fower Bookes of the Histories of Cornelius Tacitus. This edition 
sparked English interest in both Tacitus and the methods of politic his-
tory; in addition to its partial translation of the Historiae, the volume 
contained Savile’s original essay The Ende of Nero and Beginning of 
Galba, a piece of new- style history designed to bridge the temporal gulf 
between Tacitus’s Annales and Historiae. Jonson deemed this act of intel-
lectual ventriloquism the edition’s greatest virtue:
But when I read that speciall piece, restor’d
Where NERO falls, and GALBA is ador’d,
To thine owne proper I ascribe then more;
And gratulate the breach, I grieu’d before:
Which Fate (it seemes) caus’d in the historie,
Onely to boast thy merit in supply.88
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By borrowing the robes of Tacitus, Savile acquires license to craft a piece 
of history in the new politic style: in Savile’s creation, for example, the 
rebel leader Julius Vindex is praised for his attempts “to redeeme his 
cuntrey from tyranny and bondage” by taking arms against the emperor 
Nero.89 As David Womersley argues, the novelty of this reconstruction 
enables Savile and his readers to explore heterodox categories of political 
thought, such as the appropriate grounds for tyrannicide and the necessity 
of military heroes (not unlike Essex) “making successful, principled inter-
ventions in the political life of a nation which, in at least some educated 
and contemporary minds, shared the same underlying form of absolute 
monarchy as Elizabethan England.”90 To be sure, in a recent article Pau-
lina Kewes has importantly reminded us that the concerns of 1591 were 
not the concerns of 1601, and that scholars must guard against read-
ing Savile’s edition anachronistically: at the moment of publication, she 
argues, “Savile’s volume was neither a jaundiced anatomy of royal envy 
and courtly corruption nor an antimonarchical manifesto,” and thus we 
should not see it as reflecting viewpoints that Essex and his circle would 
not come to adopt for several years.91 But the larger point is that the 
inherent content of Tacitean history offered fertile soil for the increasingly 
discontented Essex circle to eventually till— and indeed, as Kewes notes, 
even in 1591 “Savile was keen to warn his patron Essex about the pitfalls 
of court intrigue and royal jealousy.”92 In his anonymous preface, Essex 
himself describes the Tacitean subject as “the miseries of a torne and 
declining state: The Empire vsurped; the Prince murthered; the people 
wavering; the souldiers tumultuous; nothing vnlawfull to him that hath 
power, and nothing so vnsafe as to bee securely innocent”— a catalog of 
horror that cannot help but inflect Savile’s prayer, on the facing page, 
that Elizabeth find “a Tacitus to describe your most glorious raigne.”93 
As the decade continued, and as factionalism ravaged the court, this con-
nection would be ever more appealing for Essex and his ilk, who found 
themselves ruminating upon one Tacitean lesson in particular: “that a 
good Prince gouerned by euill ministers is as dangerous as if hee were 
euill himselfe.”94
To varying degrees, Tacitus featured in the political thought of numer-
ous men associated with Essex, including (besides Savile) Henry Cuffe, 
Henry Wotton, Francis and Anthony Bacon, and Antonio Perez. A variety 
of texts indebted to Tacitus emerged from their collective pen. Of par-
ticular note is The State of Christendom, or, A Most Exact and Curious 
Discovery of Many Secret Passages, and Hidden Mysteries of the Times, 
a political tract first printed in 1657, but written in the 1590s. Though 
the text has been traditionally attributed to Wotton (who is credited on 
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the title page of the first edition), Alexandra Gajda’s recent study suggests 
that Anthony Bacon is more likely the primary author— but either way, 
there is no doubt that it emerged from a follower of Essex, and became 
“a text that shaped the mental world of the Essex circle.”95 Robert John-
son, we have seen, referred to Tacitean history as labyrinthine, and it is 
thus not surprising that this text’s exposure of “secret passages” owes to 
the Roman historian; the author reveals how the “Competencies, Preten-
sions, Titles, Quarrels, and Debates” of Europe’s princes have “greatly 
weakned” the Christian fellowship, exemplified most spectacularly by the 
tyrannical reign of Philip II.96 While The State of Christendom draws 
some specific material from Tacitus— for example, a description of “the 
Treasons of Sejan, his policies, and his purposes”— its primary debt to 
Tacitus is the more general thematic exploration of “the bleak realities of 
political corruption,” and of the steps that subjects might take to coun-
teract it.97 Like Savile, The State’s author borrows the Tacitean mode to 
advance daring views on the limits of sovereign authority, making it “the 
most unequivocal statement of the legitimacy of resistance by a non- 
Catholic English author from the accession of Elizabeth until the civil 
war.”98 As an affective resource, such resistance would come to prove a 
valuable refuge for Essex and his followers.
The Earl of Essex: Dreadful Object
In the 1590s, the Earl of Essex and his associates found much to dread in 
the political sphere; this atmosphere of fear, anxiety, and suspicion was 
embedded in the texts that their circle produced. Turning now to their 
courtly opponents, we find that Essex was equally a source of dread for his 
adversaries: as a popular, martial hero, Essex was an ideal symbol for the 
disaffected Elizabethans of the 1590s, who sought a champion to deliver 
them from the social and political unrest cataloged earlier in the chapter. 
To those who opposed him, Essex cut a terrifying figure, and his capacity 
for political violence was a grave concern for enemies like Cecil, Raleigh, 
and eventually Elizabeth herself. And in a further Janus- twist, dread of 
Essex equally manifested in the textual sphere, though with an inverse 
trajectory to that which we have just witnessed: for Elizabeth and her 
agents, textuality was not a refuge from dread, but rather a source of it, as 
works relating to the earl risked cloaking all manner of seditious content. 
That Essex might prove dangerous was an increasing concern for both his 
courtly rivals and Elizabeth. As events proved, this fear was well- founded.
Why, then, did Essex’s enemies dread him?
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The Earl of Essex, writes his biographer, “lived his life as self- consciously 
as if it were a work of art, and sought to make himself indisputably the 
leader of his generation by excelling all of his contemporaries in accom-
plishments and zeal.”99 As friend to Sidney and stepson to Leicester, Essex 
was exceptionally well positioned to inherit a wealth of symbolic stock; 
in the 1580s, the model of Sidney became the blueprint for the courtly 
persona of the developing Essex, who tapped an array of private and 
public connections to position himself as his mythological heir. It was the 
harrowing experience of war that forever cemented the two young men; 
Essex was knighted for his bravery in the same battle that dealt Sidney 
his mortal wound, and as he lay dying the shepherd knight bestowed his 
best sword on his young friend. The mythic potency of this exchange 
only galvanized the existing connections between them, and when Leices-
ter died in 1588 it was apparent that the young earl would inherit the 
mantle of the Sidney/Leicester circle. With this pedigree, Essex was poised 
to seize command of Elizabeth’s court and the minds of her subjects: 
a feature that made him potentially dangerous to an aging, weakening 
queen.
Even in his earlier years, Essex understood the deep importance of 
public self- promotion— and though this awareness would build him a 
circle of devotees, it also put him in perennial conflict with Elizabeth, who 
did not appreciate being upstaged. After the defeat of the Armada, for 
example, the earl sponsored the highlight of London’s subsequent festivi-
ties, at least according to one observer:
I was, however, present at the last review, which was held by the 
earl of Essex on the 26th, and which I am assured was the best 
of them all. There was a company of 60 musketeers, 60 harque-
bussiers on horseback, and 200 light horse. The uniforms were of 
orange- coloured cloth, with facings of white silk, and several of the 
light- horsemen had surcoats of velvet of the same colour, trimmed 
with silver. . . . A joust was then held in the open field (i.e., without 
lists), and the earl of Essex ran two tilts against the earl of Cum-
berland. As they are two of the best horsemen in the country the 
spectators were much pleased at this.100
It is not hard to imagine why this visual display would have pleased the 
onlookers, and done much for Essex’s popularity. Yet at the same time, 
beneath the celebratory frame, Essex here essentially leads a private army 
through the streets of London— a convention, to be sure, appropriate to 
his aristocratic station, but one that ominously prefigures the events of a 
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decade later. One very important spectator, in fact, was not amused with 
the proceedings:
Several other gentlemen then joined, and they tilted first two against 
two, and then four against four; the earl of Essex always running 
against the earl of Cumberland. When they had finished with the 
lance they drew their swords, but when her Majesty saw this she 
made a sign with her hand that they were to cease, but they set to 
and she shut the window, in order not to see them.
This anecdote exposes a central fault line of Elizabethan aristocratic iden-
tity: nobles like Essex struggled with the competing pulls of obedience to 
the monarch and fidelity to the autonomous individual will. For a man 
in the business of self- promotion, it was very tempting to side with the 
latter.101 As master of the horse, Essex enjoyed “a supervisory role over 
tournaments, which he exploited to its fullest potential”; this control was 
most famously exemplified in the Accession Day tilts of 1595, a fulsome 
celebration of Essex himself.102 The queen, again, was not happy at his 
antics: “if she had thought their had bene so moch said of her,” Eliza-
beth was alleged to have remarked, “she wold not haue bene their that 
Night.”103
Essex’s less ceremonial exploits made for even better publicity— and 
though his martial triumphs, in the larger sense, were relatively minor, 
the victories he did command reminded England of his might. The sack 
of Cadiz, “one of the very few decisive military successes” in England’s 
war with Spain, was an especially potent site for self- presentation; the 
queen eventually was forced to ban the publication of documents relat-
ing to the affair, lest a piece of more partisan propaganda undermine the 
official account she had constructed.104 Nonetheless, Essex was popularly 
commemorated in ballads like “the welcome home of the Earle of Essex 
the Lord Admirall from the victorious voyage of Cales”— allegedly writ-
ten spontaneously by Thomas Churchyard “vpon the sodaine sight of the 
Earle of Essex comming to the Court”— or “Long had the proud Spain-
ards advauted to conquer us,” which celebrates the “most valyant and 
hardy” Essex as a paragon of chivalry:
“Now,” quoth the noble Earl, “Courage, my Soldiers all!
Fight and be valiant, then spoyl you shall have;
And well rewarded all, from the great to the small:
But looke that the Women and Children you save!”105
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In fact, the mythos of the heroic Essex was enough to spark a fashion 
trend. During the voyage, Essex famously grew a square beard, and as 
visual images of the victorious earl circulated, so too did his style of 
grooming.106 Within two years, this trend among England’s young gallants 
was widespread enough for Everard Guilpin to mock it in Skialetheia, his 
caustic collection of epigrams:
I know some . . . 
Which scorne to speake to one which hath not bin
In one of these last voyages: or to one
Which hauing bin there yet (though he haue none)
Hath not a Cades- beard.107
The Cadiz beard would feature prominently in subsequent visual repre-
sentations of the earl, and remains today one of his trademark features.
But it is not just the beard of Essex that figures in Skialetheia. Much 
more seriously, Guilpin mocks Essex under the guise of that “great Foe-
lix,” who “passing through the street, / Vayleth his cap to each one he 
doth meet”:
Who would not thinke him perfect curtesie?
Or the honny- suckle of humilitie?
The deuill he is as soone: he is the deuill,
Brightly accoustred to bemist his euill:
Like a Swartrutters hose his puffe thoughts swell,
With yeastie ambition: Signior Machiauell
Taught him this mumming trick, with curtesie
T’entrench himselfe in popularitie.108
As has been long recognized, these lines recall Richard II’s famous depic-
tion of Bolingbroke, the man with whom Essex was, and would forever 
become, linked in popular imagination. For an ambitious peer like Essex, 
popularity came with the cost of being thought to court it.109 In a famous 
letter of advice, Francis Bacon directly addresses the crux of popular sup-
port, suggesting a shrewd tactic that recalls the dissembling manner of 
Guilpin’s portrayal, but inverts its trajectory:
[Popularity] is a thing good in itself, being obtained as your Lord-
ship obtaineth it, that is bonis artibus; and besides, well governed, is 
one of the best flowers of your greatness both present and to come; 
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it would be handled tenderly. The only way to quench it verbis and 
not rebus. And therefore to take all occations, to the Queen, to 
speak against popularity and popular courses vehemently; and to 
tax it in all others: but nevertheless to go on in your honourable 
commonwealth courses as you do.110
Five years later, the rising itself would reveal that Essex had greatly over-
estimated his own standing with the people— or rather, it would reveal 
that popularity alone, in this context, was not enough to rouse Londoners 
to take up arms against the queen’s counselors. Unfortunately for Essex, 
his crowd- pleasing disposition was still said to be damning evidence of 
ill intentions: immediately after the rebellion, Cecil railed that Essex’s 
“affabilite and Curtosie manifested his desire to be populer,” while at his 
trial it was alleged that Essex “affected popularity and to be the Mynion 
of the people,” thus proving his action “was premeditated and had the 
deeper roote.”111
But for his fearful enemies, it was not simply that Essex courted 
popularity— more dangerous still was with whom, specifically, he was 
popular. Though he variously occupied roles as both courtier and politi-
cian, Essex saw himself primarily as a man of war: it was in war that 
Essex cemented himself as the heir to Leicester and Sidney, just as it was 
in war that he secured the loyalty of countless men who would serve 
him in the coming years. Though his enemies in the 1590s increasingly 
painted Essex as an unstable warhawk, the earl still openly acknowledged 
his “friendshippe to the chiefe men of action, and fauour generall to the 
men of warre”:
For most of them which are accounted the chiefe men of action, I 
doe intirely loue them: they haue beene my companions both abroad 
and at home: Some of them began the wars with me, most of them 
haue had place vnder me, and many of them had me a witnesse 
of their rising, from Captaynes, Lieuetenants, and priuate men, to 
these charges which since by their vertues they haue obtayned. Now 
I knowe their vertue I would chuse them for friends, if I had them 
not, but before I had tryed them, God in his prouidence chose them 
for me: I loue them for my owne sake, for I finde sweetenesse in 
their conuersation, strong assistance in their imployment with mee, 
and happinesse in their friendshippe. 112
As his reference to “rising” suggests, Essex was notorious for bestowing 
knighthoods to his men, often to Elizabeth’s fury, and often in contempt 
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of her explicit order to the contrary. Manuscripts from the period are 
flush with lists of “the knights made at Caliz” or “those that have bene 
knighted by the Lord Lyvtenent in Ireland.”113
In fact, during the proceedings against him at York House in 1600, 
Essex’s fondness for knighting was one of the explicit charges levied 
against him. Before his appointment to Ireland, the panel recalled, “it 
was a question disputable & in great Consultacion before his goinge 
over, whithr by reason of his making so many knightes in former employ-
mentes he should haue that authorytye in his Comission or no”; he was 
ultimately granted authority, but was by the “Queene hir self required 
to be very sparing in that respect, and to make very few & those of very 
good desent & quality.”114 But Elizabeth routinely struggled with curbing 
the will of a warring peer, and the earl’s flouting of her proviso was both 
flagrant and habitual:
Notwithstandinge which warninge after his Coming ouer into 
Ireland, he made a great number of knightes which, being by the 
Queene very much misliked, he was afterwardes by lettres in the 
Queens name required to hold his hande, and yet after the receipt 
of those lettres, he made many.
The crown’s fears were well- founded. As suggested by one account of 
his return to London in 1599, Essex commanded a magnetism that drew 
such soldiers to his physical presence: “His Lordships soddain Retorn out 
of Ireland, bringes all Sortes of Knights, Captens, Officers, and Soldiers 
away from thence.  .  .  . This Town is full of them, to the great Discon-
tentment of her Majestie.”115 But at the same time, his charisma was 
such as to assure loyalty even in absence: only weeks later, he would 
receive word from Ireland that “the full crie of our poore remnant of 
freinds is Essex or none, Essex out of hand or all is loste.”116 The abil-
ity to command such a following was an asset of enormous power, and 
it was a source of enormous distress for those to whom it might be 
directed.
But for that very reason, the sword of popularity cut both ways. Fran-
cis Bacon, noting that “her Majesty loveth peace,” would famously advise 
Essex to subdue his “affinity with a martial greatness”: such a “militar 
dependence,” he warned, “maketh a suspected greatness.”117 Subsequent 
events proved this to be sound reasoning. The earl’s reputation as a man 
of arms made it effortless for the crown to construe the rising as an act of 
open, violent, civil war. Essex and his followers, says one account of the 
indictment, conspired
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not only to depriue the Queens Maiesty from her Royall seate 
and dignity but also to procure the death, and destruccion of the 
Queene, and to procure a Cruell slaughter of her Maiesteies Sub-
jects, to make Cruell warrs within this Realme of England and alter 
the Relligion established by her Maiesty and so Change the gouer-
nement therof, and for the effecting therof did intend to goe to her 
Maiesties house at White- Hall her Maiestie beeing then within the 
sayd house, and by force and power to seaze vpon the Queenes 
person and to take her into his Custody.118
But nonetheless, Essex continued to assert himself fundamentally as a 
man of the sword, and insisted upon his natural affinity with other such 
soldiers. “That generally I am affected to the men of warre,” he explained, 
“should not seeme strange to any reasonable man: the graue iudge fau-
ours the student of the lawe, the reuerend Bishoppes the labourers of the 
ministerie, And I, since her Maiestie hath yeerely vsed my seruice in her 
late actions, must reckon my selfe to the number of her men of warre.”119
Essex’s ability to court widespread public favor and amass a hard core 
of military followers made him a formidable opponent for his courtly 
adversaries; it is not surprising, then, to hear his foe Cecil complain of 
“how hard termes the erle of Essex standeth to me, and how apt diuers 
of his followers are to throwe Imputations vppon me.”120 Essex was a 
dangerous man to have as an enemy, as his rivals were well aware: “I am 
not wize enough to give yow advise,” Raleigh warned Cecil in 1600, “butt 
if yow take it for a good councall to relent towards this tirant, yow will 
repent it when it shalbe to late.”121
For the Essex circle, we have seen, the dread elicited by adversarial courtly 
interactions had a textual correlate in literary production. There is an 
analogous dynamic in the crown’s response to Essex, though directed to 
a different end. Whereas the Essex circle adopted the Tacitean ethos to 
brace themselves against the storm of political corruption, and the Taci-
tean style to alleviate their fears of exposure within it, the earl’s enemies 
engaged the literary field inversely: for them, textual production threat-
ened to be a site of sedition and subversion, obscuring all manner of 
treasonous secrets. They found in textuality a source of endless dread— 
and their efforts centered on shedding light into its depths.
Examples of the Essex circle’s engagement with dangerous texts have 
been well- documented by scholars of the period. Most notable is one 
of the single most analyzed theatrical moments of the sixteenth cen-
tury: the specially commissioned performance of Richard II by the Lord 
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Chamberlain’s Men on Saturday, February 7, 1601. On this evening, only 
hours before the earl’s rising, a cadre of key Essexian partisans (includ-
ing, as Gilly Merrick recalls it, “Lord Monteegle, Sir Christephr Blont, Sir 
Charles Percye, Ellys Iones, and Edward Busshell”) famously decided to 
take some entertainment:
At the mocyon of Sir Charles Percye and the rest, they went all 
together to the Globe, over the water wher the Lord Chamberlens 
men vse to playe, and were ther somwhat before the playe began . . . 
the play was of Kyng Harry the iiijth, and of the kyllyng of Kyng 
Richard the second played by the Lord Chamberlens players.122
With good reason, literary scholars have long explored how this dramatic 
performance (almost certainly Shakespeare’s Richard II) might serve as 
a particularly meaningful example of how literature participated in the 
working (and unworking) of early modern political structures; the anec-
dote is prominently foregrounded in Stephen Greenblatt’s introduction to 
the 1982 collection The Power of Forms in the English Renaissance, a de 
facto manifesto for the budding New Historicist movement.123 The smok-
ing gun, as the crown investigation would subsequently uncover, is that 
members of the Essex circle (most notably Percy) actively commissioned 
this performance from the players:
Sir Charles Percye, Sir Iosclyne Percye, and the Lord Montegle, with 
some thre more spoke to some of the players, in the presans of this 
examinante to haue the playe of the deposyng and kyllyng of Kyng 
Rychard the second to be played the Saterday next . . . Wher thys 
examinante and hys fellowes were determyned to haue played some 
other playe, holdyng that play of Kyng Richard to be so old & so 
long out of vse as that they shold haue small or no Company at yt. 
But at their request this examinante and his fellowes were Content 
to play yt the Saterday and hadd their xls [forty shillings] more then 
their ordynary for yt and so played yt accordyngly.124
That Essex’s men actively requested Richard II, a play about the deposi-
tion of a feeble monarch by a virile, popular nobleman— a nobleman, no 
less, with whom Essex had been associated in contemporary discourse— 
proved particularly enticing for those scholars interested in how early 
modern literary forces circulated within larger fields of power.
Hammer has recently deflated some of the “more extravagant” theories 
about the relationship of Shakespeare’s play to the subsequent rising.125 
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The action on Sunday morning, for example, was a sudden response to 
a newly discovered plot against the earl (thus Essex’s men did not pur-
posely commission the play to prime themselves or London for the next 
day), while the crown’s subsequent investigation into the Lord Chamber-
lain’s players was casual and nonpunitive (and thus sought evidence that 
might be brought against the conspirators at trial, not to indict the public 
stage). Yet nonetheless, the royal response to the Essex rising still made 
a direct correlation between the events on the stage and the events of the 
next day— thus Francis Bacon says of Merrick, in the crown’s official 
account of the uprising, that “so earnest hee was to satisfie his eyes with 
the sight of that Tragedie, which hee thought soone after his Lord should 
bring from the Stage to the State.”126
Also pressing for the crown was the well- known textual anxiety 
inspired by the young historian John Hayward— who, in dedicating his 
The First Part of the Life and Raigne of King Henrie the IIII to Essex, 
would inadvertently bring misfortune upon both himself and his would- 
be master. 127 In January 1599, Hayward published his prose account (in 
the Tacitean mode) of the rise of King Henry IV and the deposition of 
Richard II, in an apparent bid for patronage from the earl.128 Hayward 
overshot his mark, producing a volume that was not provocative, but 
inflammatory: according to the crown’s later account,
1 he selecteth a storie 200 yere olde, and publisheth it this last yere, 
intendinge the application of it to this tyme
2 [he] maketh choice of that story only, a kinge is taxed for misgov-
ernment, his councell for corrupt[ion] and covetous for there priuate 
[benefits], the king censured for conferring benefits of hatefull 
parisites and fauorities, the nobles discontented, the commons gron-
ing vnder countinuall taxation. There vppon the king is deposed, 
and by an erle, and in the ende murdre[d].129
The book, which Essex openly denounced, was soon suppressed by 
authorities for its seditious content. But the text reemerged on the crown’s 
radar during the York House proceedings of June 1600, when the earl 
was explicitly accused of sponsoring it: “a certaine dangerous seditious 
Pamphlet, was of late put forth into print, concerning the first yeeres 
of the raigne of Henry the fourth, but indeed the end of Richard the 
second, and who thought fit to be Patron of that booke, but my Lord 
of Essex.”130 Hayward, now imprisoned in the Tower, was construed as 
the agent of some grander scheme; the book’s content was such, reports 
Bacon, that the queen “would not be persuaded that it was his writing 
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whose name was to it, but that it had some more mischievous author, and 
said with great indignation that she would have him racked to produce 
his author.”131 Though Hayward offered a spirited defense of his histo-
riographical autonomy, the events of the earl’s rising was all it took for 
the crown to authenticate its claims about the seditious content of The 
Life and Raigne. Elizabeth’s agents immediately seized the opportunity to 
insert Hayward into its official narrative of the insurrection, and his book 
was denounced as a blueprint for regicide: Essex’s treasonous intentions, 
it was declared by Cecil in the Star Chamber, “appeared by the booke 
written of Henry 4th wherein many thinges weare inserted to make this 
tyme seeme like the tyme of King Richard 2 & that they weare to be 
reformed by him like as did Henry 4th.”132 For his unsolicited profes-
sion of solidarity, Hayward would remain in the Tower until Elizabeth’s 
death.
At other times, the earl and his agents raised the crown’s ire by pro-
ducing propaganda directly. This was the case after the Cadiz raid, when 
Essex found himself jockeying with Sir Walter Raleigh over credit for the 
successful action, and actively worked to secure the lion’s share of martial 
glory.133 Shortly after the assault, Essex’s followers in London received a 
“discourse of our great Action at Calez penned very truly according to 
his Lordships large instructions,” to be “deliuered to some good printer 
in good characters and with diligence to publish it.”134 Essex’s aim, it 
was reported, was “that it should with the soonest be sett in print, both 
to stopp all vagrant Rumurs and to inform those that are well affected 
of the truth of the whole”— but, to insulate the earl from political blow-
back, it was warned that “nether his Lordships name nor myine not any 
other [should] be ether openly named, vsed, or soe insinuated.”135 (The 
letter’s writer is Henry Cuffe, one of Essex’s several secretaries.)136 The 
council, however, sniffed out Essex’s plan, and before long Cuffe “was 
charged by her Maiestie . . . vppon paine of death not to sett forth any 
discourse of this service without her priuity.”137 As Hammer reveals, 
such bans “did not deter Essex,” but “merely made his propagandising 
more difficult”: despite the queen’s warning, the finished document was 
nonetheless circulated in England, Scotland, France, Italy, and the Low 
Countries.138
Finally, the crown was also deeply fearful of the poetic libels that 
circulated both before and after the Essex rising. The earl himself was 
no stranger to this genre; in the early 1590s, he and Raleigh engaged 
in a poetic flyting over the queen’s favor— Essex, punning on his rival’s 
given name, memorably declared that “it is to much to thinke, / So pure 
a mouth should puddle water drinke”— and Raleigh’s anti- court poem 
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“The Lie” inspired a cluster of satirical responses with apparent ties to 
Essex and his party.139 But as the decade progressed, the libel emerged as a 
valuable weapon in factional warfare, and seems to have been employed 
vigorously on behalf of Essex. In the immediate aftermath of the rising, 
several members of the council include remarks on libelers in their gen-
eral denunciation of Essex and his men. Lord Treasurer Thomas Sackville 
was particularly incensed:
First, to the matter of the libellers. In my opinion they deserve death 
better then open enemies; they are dangerous, & who can be fre 
from their stroake; they barke in secret, and ought to be subiect to 
the Censure of death: there ys remedy against the sworde, against 
gunnshott etc., but none against backebyters & libellers.140
This concern was for good reason: a number of anonymous poems sur-
vive that actively denounce the enemies of Essex, in a variety of manners. 
For example, the minor beast fable “A dreame alludinge to my L of Essex, 
and his adversaries” embeds specific reference to Essex’s enemies in its 
portrayal of “A stately HART” (the earl himself) undone by treacher-
ous machinations: as the fable unfolds, the poet takes shots at Cecil (“a 
CAMMELS uglie broode”), Raleigh (“His meate blood RAWE”), Cob-
ham (“A muddye BROOKE”), and crown prosecutor Edward Coke (“A 
leafe wee’le have from Co- oake”).141 This technique is amplified further 
in “Admir- all weaknes wronges the right,” which has been said to offer “a 
virtual roll- call of Essex’s enemies.”142
Unsurprisingly, it is the “Cankred Cecill” who receives the most venom 
from the anonymous backbiters on Essex’s side.143 The opening lines of a 
“Libell against Sir Robert Cecill” offers a representative sample:
Proude and ambitious wretch that feedest on naught but faction
Prevaile and fill thy selfe, and burst with vile detraction
Detraction is thy game, and hathe bene since thie youthe
And wilbe to thie dyinge daie, He lies that speakes the truthe
But well I knowe thy bosome is fraught, with naught but scorne.144
The attacks against Cecil here recall the terms of anti- Wolsey satires: 
“First did thy Sire,” the poem continues, “and now thy selfe by Machivil-
lian skill / Prevaile, and curbe the Peeres as well befittes your will.”145 In 
“Chamberlaine Chamberlaine, one of her graces kinn,” a poem composed 
after the earl’s execution, Cecil’s pretensions are equally mocked in the 
manner of Skelton:
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Little Cecill tripps up and downe, he Rules bothe Court & Croun
with his great Burghley Clowne, in his Longe fox- furd gowne
with his Longe proclamacion, hee saith hee saved the Towne.146
Both before and after Essex’s death, Cecil is vilified in the anonymous 
poems that circulated throughout London. It is no wonder, then, that 
he and his allies were especially incensed that “the Taverns and ordinar-
ies are filled with tales of governement and matters of state  .  .  . which 
doe falcely and traytorouslye slaunder her sacred Majestie and her whole 
Counsell.”147
The crown’s concerns were well- founded, at least according to a piece 
of evidence that suggests an immediate connection between libels and 
sedition. One week after the failed Essex rising, a cadre of emboldened 
apprentices had “intended to meete at the Exchange . . . at x of the Clocke 
in the morninge,” to embark upon a dashing caper to liberate the earl from 
crown captivity.148 Though the plot was spoiled prematurely, the crown’s 
subsequent investigation revealed their plan of action: “They intended to 
drawe theire companie together by Libells with hope to have 5000 per-
sons.” Without further evidence, it is not clear what form these “libells” 
took; in the early modern period, the word “libel” had a flexible conno-
tation, with usage signaling both non- moralized texts (the generic “little 
book”) and all manner of written slander and invective. But whatever 
the precise form, the apprentices apparently thought that such writings 
could galvanize London to a surprising degree: they anticipated a turnout 
dwarfing that of the rising itself.
Beneath the dreadful skies of the 1590s, Essex and his enemies were 
deadlocked in an affective struggle, each fearing, and each feared. After 
his disgraced return from Ireland, and his subsequent destruction in the 
proceedings that followed, the terms of the contest changed, as Cecil, 
Raleigh, and the anti- Essex party powerfully asserted their own mastery 
over the operation of dread in the courtly sphere. In the final months 
of his life, as Essex was increasingly choked with terror and paranoia, 
he was forced to try to reclaim the terms of dread for a final time. This 
attempt set off a chain of events, both worldly and cosmic, that would 
drag him to ruin.
The Dreadful End
In the early weeks of 1601, the fears of the Essex circle were boiling 
over; there seemed little hope of recovery, and the chambers of Essex 
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House echoed with shadowy reports of plots to destroy the earl. A group 
of frustrated, alienated followers surrounded the equally disposed Essex, 
and the mutual mood quickly worsened. Sir John Harington, the queen’s 
godson, records a chilling glimpse of this malaise:
It resteth wythe me in opynion, that ambition thwarted in its career, 
dothe speedilie leade on to madnesse; herein I am strengthened by 
what I learne in my Lord of Essex, who shyftethe from sorrowe and 
repentaunce to rage and rebellion so suddenlie, as well provethe 
him devoide of goode reason or righte mynde; in my laste discourse, 
he uttered strange wordes, borderyninge on suche strange desygns 
that made me hastene forthe, and leave his presence.149
Though likely embellished by hindsight, Harington’s report at least partly 
indicates the affective toll of this dire moment. On the morning of Sun-
day, February 8, the group’s collective dread reached a critical mass: after 
receiving “ceryetn aduertisementes on the Saterdaye night that his private 
enymies was vp in armes against him,” Essex and his men found them-
selves pushed to a radical act of resistance.150 As Essex later told it, the 
events of that morning were sparked by a spontaneous gathering of his 
adherents, suddenly united to thwart this attack against their symbolic 
epicenter:
[To the charge] that I gathered a Companye togither and that by 
that means intended forceably. . . . I answere the Company that was 
gathered togither in my howse assembled themselues vpon intelli-
gence being giuen out vnto them that my life was sought for & that 
without any priuitye at all vnto me these my seruants and fearefull 
friends in my howse [were making the reports] knowne amongst 
them.151
As we have seen above, when this group of fearful friends took to the 
streets, statements of terror and persecution became their rallying cry. 
Such proclamations served to justify their bold action and incite an atmo-
sphere of collective panic: by assuring onlookers that “they came into 
the Citty only for safty of their liues,” the rebels imagined that London’s 
citizens, equally moved by fear, would be roused to join the cause.152
In this desperate action, Essex thus makes a last- ditch attempt to assert 
his will over his courtly enemies, by orchestrating a final conflict that 
ensured absolute destruction for the loser. To galvanize his followers, 
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Essex continued to denounce men like Cecil and Raleigh, the “Athiests 
and Catterpillers” that perverted the queen’s will and sought his own life; 
with this common enemy, he hoped to assure the group’s adherence to 
both “the lawe of nature” and “good seruice,” by casting their action as 
a political purgative.153 In the rising’s aftermath, however, this maneuver 
would be deemed a despicable fraud:
The Earle of Essex [employed] false Suggesting to the Cittizens & 
others of violence and murder to be intended and attempted against 
him in his house, thereby to breed a commeseracion in the people 
of his estate and danger and to drawe them to hatred of such as he 
Called his priuate enimies.154
Essex is charged with inciting panic— a common affective state that might 
subsequently be retooled into an instrument of violence. During his trial, 
the earl’s alleged strategy is elaborated more specifically:
Why then did you and the whole Company goe vp and downe 
the citty through gracious street, Cheapeside and other the Cheefe 
streets, vpon a purpose to get ayd, and a multitude of Runnigates 
and Vagabounds which might winde with you villanously to effect 
that which you had trayterously determined.155
The crown’s lawyers suggest that Essex is ensnaring those whom he 
engages, creating an enmeshment in which his fears become their own 
(“winde with you”). The affective symbiosis serves to collapse the social 
hierarchy, as both peer and pauper are imagined sympathetic in their 
mutual dread— a fantasy that doubly triggers the crown’s own fear of 
sedition, linking paranoia over high- level courtly intrigues (coups, assas-
sination attempts, etc.) with fears of popular unrest (religious rising, food 
riots, etc.).
But Essex’s popularity, we have seen, was grossly misjudged. The 
action fizzled, as London failed to rise (or even open its gates); the party 
retreated by barge to Essex House, where they staged a perfunctory 
standoff, before surrendering peacefully to the crown’s agents. A week 
later, Essex and Southampton were tried together for treason; Essex pro-
tested his innocence in a rousing defense, but there was little doubt of the 
outcome. As the prisoners were escorted back to the Tower, “the Axe was 
carried before them with the edge towardes them.”156 Here they awaited 
their sentence:
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Nowe you must goe to the place from whence you came, there to 
be laied on a hurdell, drawen to the place of execution, hanged and 
cutt down or you bee dead, then your members to be cutt of, and 
burnt before your faces, your heddes to be cutt of and your bod-
ies to be quartered and dispersed at the Queenes pleasure, And the 
Lord have mercie on your soules.157
Such horrors did not come to pass: Essex would be granted a more hon-
orable beheading, while Southampton escaped the axe entirely. But with 
the promise of these tortures, as prelude to the eternal uncertainty of 
oblivion, Essex now faced a different kind of dread.
The dread explored in this chapter has been largely collective in nature: 
Essex and his allies feared the machinations of his courtly enemies, while 
his enemies (and Elizabeth) feared that the earl’s power and popularity 
might upend the social order. In the aftermath of his failed rising, how-
ever, the Earl of Essex came to know what it was like to be alone. Despite 
all attempts to rouse her, London did not respond as he had hoped, leav-
ing his action without desperately needed support— and on a day, the 
most important of Essex’s life, where “everything that could go wrong did 
go wrong.”158 There were, as we have seen, some immediate professions 
of loyalty to the earl, such as the plot of the apprentices. But Essex him-
self, awaiting imminent execution, would turn inward and upward. His 
dread was shifting its object, and the likes of Raleigh and Cecil seemed 
far less important to him now.
Only days after a defiant performance in the courtroom, the earl 
suddenly summoned Elizabeth’s agents, so that he might “deliuer his 
knowledge of those Treasons which he had formerly denyed at the 
Barr.”159 In a marked reversal, Essex began to realize that his priorities 
had been gravely misaligned. And with a short time to live, he had little 
interest in the profane bonds that linked him to this world, including 
those that he had forged with his former allies:
He did meruailous earnestly desyre that wee would suffer him to 
speake vnto Cuffe his Secretary, against whom he vehemently com-
playned vnto vs to haue ben a principall Instigator to theis vyelent 
courses which he had vndertaken, wherein he protested that he 
chiefly deysred that he might make yt appeare that he was not the 
only perswader of theis great offences which they had commytted, 
but that Blont, Cuffe, Temple, and those other persons who were at 
the priuate conspiracy at Drury house.
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With his eternal soul on the line, Essex was naming names, and he had 
plans to make sure his conscience was cleared fully. Not content with 
merely exposing the chief conspirators, the earl revealed that the extent 
of their intended action was yet unknown to the crown:
[They] had more dangerous and malycious endes for the distur-
bance of the Estate then he doth nowe fynde coulde haue ben 
preuented yf his proiect had gon forwarde, as well appereth by the 
confusion they drewe him to even in his owne house that morning 
that he went into the citty.
To be sure, Essex’s reimagination of the events was self- interested: here, 
it is he who was drawn unknowingly into the schemes of these traitors, 
a bystander swept up in the collective action. To make his peace, Essex 
affirms that he was not a type of Bolingbroke, but rather a counterpart 
of King Richard, and thus of Elizabeth herself: noble souls, tragically led 
to ruin by others. It is thus with no small self- pity that Essex declares to 
Cuffe, when his secretary was brought before him a final time, that “none 
hath ben a greater Instigator of me then yourselfe, to all theis my disloyall 
courses into which I haue fallen.”160
In what is almost certainly the last poem he ever wrote, Essex reflects 
upon the dangers of bad fellowship, a social cancer so apt to bring 
destruction upon the godly:
Ill company, the cause of many woes,
The sugred baite, that hideth poysned hooke;
The rocke unseene that shipwrackt soules o’rethrowes,
The weeping crocodile that killes with looke,
The readiest steppe to ruine and decay,
Grace’s confounder, and helle’s nearest way.161
How many have been ruined by the company they keep, seduced into an 
unforeseen fall? Yet in these dreadful days, Essex continues, to be social 
at all is to expose oneself to the agents of corruptions:
But he is held no sotiable man
In this corrupted age, that shall refuse
To keepe accursed company now and than;
Nay but a foole, unlesse he seeme to chuse
Their fellowship, and give them highest place,
That vildest live, and furthest off from grace.162
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Essex must indict himself with the same charges of bad company that he 
had so often levied at the queen. With newfound clarity, he reveals the 
caterpillars in his own garden; Essex discovers that the greater threat is 
not what was plotted by his rivals, but that which he invited upon himself. 
It is a moment of royal atonement, as the earl’s empathy with Elizabeth 
provides means for his reintegration into the unity of her symbolic self— 
not as a profane sovereign, but as anointed conduit of heavenly grace.
In disavowing his earthly ties, Essex did considerable violence to the 
social ecosystem that had, with his nourishment, come to flourish around 
him. Though some of the earl’s associates would regroup in the court of 
James I, the fate of the Essex circle’s charter members is recorded bluntly 
by George Carleton, in a letter written just weeks after the rising:
You must needes here by common report of the vnadvised & misch-
evous action of the Erle of Essexe & his adeerentes; dangerous to 
the person of our Quene, fearfull to the state, & mischevous to 
him & all his partakers, especiallye to thos that were of hys secrett 
councell & partyes with him in the plott: wherof diuerse haue all-
reddye suffredd death, thoughe not with him yet after him. Therle 
himself was beheaded in the tower first, Sir Guillam Merricke & 
Cuffe his secertarye were after hanged, drawne & quartred att 
Tiborn, & lastleye Sir Charles Danvers & Sir Christopher Blunt 
were beheaded on tower hille openlye.163
All that outrage, all that turmoil, all that dread, reduced to a few passing 
lines. Yet, as Carleton continues, there is a larger story here about the 
frailty of union in this fallen age:
Ytt was strange to see the beginninge of this action (wherof I was 
a behollder) & somewhatt strange to consider the circumstances 
now toward the end. For thes noble & resolute men assured of one 
an other by their vndoubted valour & combined together by firme 
oathes, beinge all taken, severed, examined, & the principalls array-
gned & condempned, sett in the end before their deathes to such 
playne confessions & accusations one of an other.
Once embattled in a zero- sum game with their courtly rivals, the Essex 
men similarly set upon each other— each man determined “to strive who 
could drawe one an other in deepest.”
Denouncing his coconspirators entailed a commitment to atonement, 
however revisionist the narrative that enabled it; the humbled Essex 
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rejected the facilitators of his earthly ambition, turning toward the unify-
ing promise of faith. In a short poem that seems to date from this period, 
Essex struggles with such reorientation, seeking an account of how his 
shattering self is refracted in the hearts and minds of the world at large:
I am not as I seeme, I seeme and am the same;
I am as divers deeme, but not as others name;
I am not as I shoulde; I shoulde be as I saye;
In wantinge what I woulde, I must be as I maye.
finis qd Rob: Essex Comes164
The poem is obscure to me; I assume that the second line is animated by 
an implicit opposition of sinner/traitor, while the final line’s “wantinge” 
suggests the ambivalence inherent in his action, insofar as it might entail 
both desire for the worldly (a successful outcome in the rising; the queen’s 
grace and pardon; etc.) or the sacred (the salvation he turned away from). 
But whatever its precise meaning, the affective tenor is dizzying for both 
the poet and his reader, as Essex struggles to disentangle himself from the 
countless sites of external investment in which his identity had become 
ensnared.
In “The Passion of a Discontented Minde,” Essex’s final poem, the earl 
comes to address his sin and salvation far more directly than in the cryp-
tic epigram above— and in this poetic finale, he devotes no small space to 
establishing the proper object of creation’s dread, and the proper way to 
be dreadful.165 For though sinfulness demands that we “live in feare, dis-
trust, and terror”— and though “heav’nly contemplation,” in turn, yields 
a “minde set free from care, disrust, or feare”— Essex still praises the 
“terror unremovable” of the creator, at “whose sterne lookes all creatures 
are afraide,” and at whom dread is rightly directed as an instrument of 
salvation (165, 144, 142, 302, 78). Essex was once among those “fond 
worldings” who “without feare worke Virtue’s fowle abuse”— but as he 
learned to fear, and learned to fear correctly, he seems to have learned that 
“banishment from everlasting blisse” is our own doing, “Because we fled 
from him we should have served” (286, 39, 81, 156). Essex acknowledges 
the informed volition that marked his descent into sin, and his descent 
away from God:
Thrise happy sinner was that blessed Saint,
Who though he fell with puffe of woman’s blast,
Went forth and wept with many a bitter plaint
And by his teares obtained grace at last;
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But wretched I have falne of mine accord,
Tenne thousand times against the living Lord. (91– 96)
Is it possible that Essex, on some profane level, considered himself equally 
undone by a “puffe of woman’s blast”— but the poem’s professed aim is 
pitched quite differently. “I see my sinnes arraign’d before my face,” Essex 
exclaims, realizing that, through the workings of faith and grace, they 
might be pressed to a nobler service:
Thou deepest Searcher of each secret thought,
Infuse in me thy all- affecting grace;
So shall my workes to good effects be brought,
While I peruse my ugly sinnes a space,
Whose staining filth so spotted hath my soule,
As nought with wash but teares of inward dole. (73, 19– 24).
To complete his confession, the earl thus affirms his rejection of the world 
and its trappings, committing himself to the infinite unity of dreadful 
atonement; “so wil I come,” Essex promises his maker, “with feare and 
blushing cheeke, / For giving others what to thee belonge” (338– 39).
With this promise, finally, Essex acknowledges the significance of his 
own guilt, and the significance of the judge by whom it was pronounced. 
After a struggle to control the meaning of “dread” in the courtly battle-
fields of the 1590s, Essex is left finally with only awe and reverence for his 
God and queen. On the morning of February 25, 1601, as he addressed 
the English nation for a final time, Essex “gave thanks to Almighty God 
from the bottom of his heart, that his designs, which were so danger-
ous to the state, succeeded not”— he had, he assured the gathered crowd, 
“now looked thoroughly and seriously into his sin, and was heartily sorry 
he had so obstinately defended an unjust cause at the bar.”166 Having shed 
himself of his company, Essex promised that “he had now learned how 
vain a thing the blast of popular favour and applause was.”167 Courtly 
friends and courtly foes mattered little now; it was only God who might 
“strengthen his mind against the terrors of death.”168 And in facing the 
dread of oblivion, whatever strength Essex might muster is attributed 
alone to grace:
He bewaylded his sinnes with the greatest shewe of true repen-
taunce. he begged at godes handes strength . . . , acknowledginge his 
owne weaknes & infirmitie, adding further that there was no man 
fearfullr in nature than himself, whereof he had a trewe feeling for 
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that he had passed some danger & thereby knewe his owne imbecil-
litie. But gave vs for a note that were beholders that if he shewed 
any strength or Constancye in that passage it was to be attribututed 
to godes grace & favour, for he himself was weaker than anye.169
After a final prayer, “beesching god that he wold not permitte Sathan 
to distract him at that instant when the body & soule should be seper-
ated,” Essex placed himself on the block, where he “patientlie receaved 
the stroake of thexecucioner.”170 It took three strikes to remove his head 
entirely— but, at the very least, “neither bodie, armes nor hedd ever stirred 
after the First.”171 During the “tyme of his beinge on the scaffold,” one 
witness approvingly observed, “the Erle never uttered worldlie thought.” 
Essex had learned whom to fear, and Essex had learned how to dread.
When, decades later, Sir Henry Wotton reflected on the fate of his patron 
Essex, he offered his own first hand assessment of political life in the 
“nasty nineties”: at that time, he writes, “there were in Court two names 
of Power, and almost of Affection, the Essexian and the Cecilian with 
their Adherents.” 172 For scholars of the early modern period, his emphasis 
on power is probably not surprising. But it is the complementary invoca-
tion of affection— a word that, in contemporary usage, could tellingly 
signal an emotive passion, a general stirring, a personal affinity, or even 
an adopted style— that encapsulates my larger argument in this chapter.173 
Factional participation in Renaissance England was no doubt motivated 
by social self- interest, as an adaptive strategy to achieve one’s political 
and material aims. But, then as now, there is also an affective force to 
collective identification and in- group membership, and it is this crucial 
emotional component of social conflict that has been seldom considered 
by scholars of the period. As we have seen, it did not always feel good to 
be a member of the Essex faction in the late 1590s— but it always felt like 
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